



M. De Voltaire.



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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
DICTIONARY:
OR, THE
OPINIONS
OF
MODERN PHILOSOPHERS
ON
METAPHYSICAL, MORAL,
AND
POLITICAL SUBJECTS.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR G. G. J. AND J. ROBINSON;

AND

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PHILOSOPHICAL

DICTIONARY

OF THE

OPINIONS

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THE

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
DICTIONARY.

H.
HABIT.

WE are what we are made by the objects that surround us: To expect that a man who sees other objects, and who leads a life different from mine, should have the same ideas that I have, would be to require contradictions. Why does a Frenchman resemble another Frenchman more than a German, and a German much more than a Chinese? Because these two nations, by their education, and the resemblance of the objects presented to them, have an infinitely greater connection with each other than with the Chinese.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THE influence of habit arises from the natural indolence of man; and this indolence increases in proportion as he indulges himself in it: it is easier to do as we have done before, than to strike out any thing new. The influence of habit is great over old men and indolent persons; it seldom affects youth. Habit is convenient only to weak minds, which it enfeebles daily more and more.

Habit in every thing destroys the powers of the imagination; these are excited only by the novelty of the object. The imagination is never employed on those objects which are familiar to us; these affect only the memory: and hence we see the reason of the axiom, *Ab assuetis non fit passio*; for the passions are lighted only at the fire of the imagination.

ROUSSEAU.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

GENERAL states of mind, turns of thought, and fixed habits which are the consequences of them, arise from education and the circumstances men are placed in. It is a necessary effect of the principles of association, that the mind grows callous to new impressions continually; it being already

ready occupied with ideas and sensations which render it indisposed to receive others, especially of an heterogeneous nature. In consequence, we seldom see any considerable change in a person's temper and habits after he is grown to man's estate; nothing short of an entire revolution in his circumstances and mode of life can effect it.

you as individuals to himself. **PRIESTLEY.**

1790 305 most sensible is satisfied that to a good

**MORAL AND MECHANICAL HABITS, AND
THEIR INFLUENCE IN POLITICAL SOCIETY.**

THE end of every individual is his own good. The rules he observes in the pursuit of this good are a system of propositions, almost every one founded in authority; that is, derive their weight from the credit given to one or more persons, and not from demonstration.—And this in the most important, as well as the other affairs of life, is the case even of the wisest and philosophical part of the human species; and that it should be so is the less strange, when we consider that it is perhaps impossible to prove that being, or life itself, has any other value than what is set on it by authority.—A confirmation of this may be derived from the observation, that in every country in the universe happiness is fought upon a different plan; and, even in the same country, we see it placed, by different ages, professions, and ranks of men, in the attainment of enjoyments utterly

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unlike.

unlike.—These propositions, as well as others framed upon them, become habitual by degrees; and, as they govern the determinations of the will, I call them moral habits. There are another set of habits that have the direction of the body, that I call therefore mechanical habits. These compose what we commonly call the arts; which are more or less liberal or mechanical, as they more or less partake of assistance from the operations of the mind.—The cumulus of the moral habits of each individual is the manners of that individual; the cumulus of the manners of individuals makes up the manners of a nation.—The happiness of individuals is evidently the ultimate end of political society; and political welfare, or the strength, splendour, and opulence of the state, have been always admitted, both by political writers and the valuable part of mankind in general, to conduce to this end; and are therefore desirable.—The causes that advance or obstruct any one of these three objects are external or internal. The latter may be divided into physical, civil, and personal; under which last head I comprehend the moral and mechanical habits of mankind. The physical causes are principally climate, soil, and number of subjects; the civil are government and laws; and political welfare is always in a ratio composed of the force of these particular causes; a multitude of external causes,
and

and all these internal ones; and not only control and qualify, but are constantly acting on, and thereby insensibly, as well as sensibly, altering one another both for the better and the worse; and this not excepting the climate itself.

FRANKLIN.

H A P P I N E S S.

A CONSIDERABLE part of our happiness consists in the desire itself. It is with happiness as with the golden bird sent by the fairies to a young princess: The bird settles at thirty paces from her; she goes to catch it, advances softly, is ready to seize it; the bird flies thirty paces further; she passes several months in the pursuit, and is happy. If the bird had suffered itself to be taken at first, the princess would have put it in a cage, and in one week would have been tired of it. This is the bird of happiness which we incessantly pursue; we catch it not, and are happy in the pursuit, because we are secure from disgust. If our desires were to be every instant gratified, the mind would languish in inaction, and sink under disquietude. Man must have desires. Few men, however, acknowledge they have this want; it is nevertheless to a succession of their desires they owe their happiness.

HELVETIUS.

HAPPINESS OF DIFFERENT STATIONS FROM THE DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENT OF TIME.

MEN hunger and thirst; they require to lie with their wives, to sleep, &c. Of the twenty-four hours of the day they employ ten or twelve in providing for these several wants. As soon as they are gratified, from the dealer in rabbit-skins to the monarch, all are equally happy. It is in vain to say that the table of wealth is more delicate than that of mediocrity. When the labourer is well fed, he is content. The different cookery of different people proves only that good cheer is that to which we have been accustomed.—If labour be generally regarded as an evil, it is because, in most governments the necessaries of life are not to be had without excessive labour; from whence the very idea of labour constantly excites that of pain. Labour, however, is not pain in itself: habit renders it easy; and when it is pursued without remarkable fatigue, is in itself an advantage. How many artificers are there who when rich still continue their occupations, and quit them not without regret when age obliges them to it? There is nothing that habit does not render agreeable.—The busy man is the happy man. To prove this, I distinguish two sorts of pleasures. The first are *the pleasures of*
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the senses. These are founded on corporeal wants, are enjoyed by all conditions of men; and at the time of enjoyment all are equally happy. But these pleasures are of short duration. The others are *the pleasures of expectation.* Among these I reckon all the means of procuring corporeal pleasures; these means are by expectation always converted into real pleasures. When a joiner takes up his plane, what does he experience? All the pleasures of expectation annexed to the payment for his work. Now these pleasures are not experienced by the opulent man. He is therefore always uneasy, always in motion, continually rolling about in his carriage, like the squirrel in his cage, to get rid of his disgust. The wealthy idler experiences a thousand instances of anxiety, while the labouring man enjoys the continual pleasure of fresh expectations.—In general, every useful occupation fills up in the most agreeable manner the interval that separates a gratified from a rising want; that is, the ten or twelve hours of the day, when we most envy the indolence of the rich, and think they enjoy superior happiness. Employment gives pleasure to every moment; but is unknown to the great and idle opulent. The measure of our wealth, whatever prejudice may think, is not therefore the measure of our happiness. Great treasures are the appearance of happiness, not the reality: so that the workman in
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in his shop, or the tradesman behind his counter, is often more happy than his sovereign. The condition of the workman who can by a moderate labour provide for his wants and those of his family, when the habit of labour has been early contracted, is nearly as happy as it can be, nay, is perhaps of all conditions the most happy. The want that compels his mind to application, and his body to exercise, is a preservative against discontent and disease: now these are evils; joy and health, advantages. Therefore, without being equal in wealth and dignity, individuals may be equal in felicity.—It was not on the tomb of Croesus, but on that of Baucis, this epitaph was engraved, *His death was the evening of a beautiful day.*

HELVETIUS.

HELL.

WHEN men came to live in society, they could not but perceive that many evil-doers escaped the severity of the laws: these could affect only open crimes; so that a curb was wanting against clandestine guilt, and religion alone could be such a curb. The Persians, the Chaldeans, the Egyptians, and the Greeks, introduced a belief of punishments after this life; and, of all ancient nations we are acquainted with, the Jews alone admitted only temporal punishments. At length
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the Pharisees and Essenes, among the Jews, admitted the belief of a hell in their way. This dogma the Greeks had already disseminated among the Romans, and the Christians made it a capital article of faith. Several fathers of the church did not hold the eternity of hell-torments; they thought it very hard that a poor man should be burning for ever and ever only for stealing a goat. Not long since, an honest well-meaning Huguenot minister advanced in his sermons, and even in print, that there would be a day of grace to the damned; that there must be a proportion between the trespass and the penalty; and that a momentary fault could not deserve an everlasting punishment.

VOLTARE.

HEREDITARY SUCCESSION IN GOVERNORS:

THE highest offices of all in a state ought to be hereditary in some measure, especially the office equivalent to that of King. Experience teaches us this maxim, elective monarchies having generally been the theatres of cabal, confusion, and misery. It must be acknowledged, however, to be exceedingly hazardous to the liberties of a people, to have any office of importance filled by the same persons, or their descendants, frequently. The boundaries of very great power can never be so exactly defined, but that, when it becomes the interest

interest of men to extend them, and when so flattering an object is kept so long time in view, opportunities will be found for the purpose. What nation would not have been enslaved by the uncontroverted succession only of three such princes as Henry IV. of France, Henry VII. of England, or the present king of Prussia? The more accomplished and glorious they were as warriors or statesmen, the more dangerous would they be as princes in free states. It is nothing but the continual fear of a revolt in favour of some rival, that could keep such princes within any bounds; i. e. that could make it their interest to court the favour of the people. Hereditary nobles stand in the same predicament as hereditary princes. The long continuance of the same parliaments have all the same tendency. But though it be evident that no office of great power or trust should be suffered to continue a long time in the same hands, the succession might be so rapid, that the remedy would be worse than the disease. But though the exact medium of political liberty, with respect to the continuance of men in power, be not easily fixed, it is not of much consequence to do it; since a considerable degree of perfection in government will admit of great varieties in this respect.

PRIESTLEY.

HERE-

HEREDITARY SUCCESSION IN GOVERNMENT.

OF all the various forms of government which have prevailed in the world, an hereditary monarchy seems to present the fairest scope for ridicule. Is it possible to relate, without an indignant smile, that, on the father's decease, the property of a nation, like that of a drove of oxen, descends to the infant son, as yet unknown to mankind and to himself; and that the fairest warriors and the wisest statesmen, relinquishing their natural right to empire, approach the royal cradle with bended knees, and protestations of inviolable fidelity? Satire and declamation may paint these obvious topics in the most dazzling colours; but our more serious thoughts will respect an useful prejudice that establishes a rule of succession independent of the passions of mankind; and we shall cheerfully acquiesce in any expedient which deprives the multitude of the dangerous, and indeed the ideal, power of giving themselves a master. In the cool shade of retirement, we may easily devise imaginary forms of government, in which the sceptre shall be constantly bestowed on the most worthy, by the free and incorrupt suffrage of the whole community. Experience overturns these airy fabrics; and teaches us, that, in

a large society, the election of a monarch can never devolve to the wisest or to the most numerous part of the people. The army is the only order of men sufficiently united to concur in the same sentiments, and powerful enough to impose them on their fellow-citizens; but the temper of soldiers, habituated at once to violence and slavery, renders them very unfit guardians of a legal, and even civil constitution. Justice, humanity, or political wisdom, are qualities they are too little acquainted with in themselves to appreciate them in others. Valour will acquire their esteem, and liberality will purchase their suffrage; but the first of these merits is often lodged in the most savage breasts: the latter can only exert itself at the expence of the public; and both may be turned against the possessor of the throne by the ambition of a daring rival.—The superior prerogative of birth, when it has obtained the sanction of time and popular opinion, is the plainest and least invidious of all distinctions among mankind. The acknowledged right extinguishes the hopes of faction, and the conscious security disarms the cruelty of the monarch. To the firm establishment of this idea we owe the peaceful succession and mild administration of European monarchies; to the defect of it we must attribute the frequent civil wars through which an Asiatic despot is obliged to cut his way to the throne of his fathers.

THE MIRACULOUS AND MARVELLOUS IN
HISTORY.

IT is the business of history to distinguish between the miraculous and marvellous; to reject the first in all narrations merely profane and human; to scruple the second; and when obliged by undoubted testimony to admit of something extraordinary, to receive as little of it as is consistent with the known facts and circumstances.

HUME,

FOUNDLING HOSPITALS.

HOSPITALS for foundlings seem favourable to the increase of numbers; and perhaps may be so when kept under proper restrictions. But when they open the door to every one without distinction, they have probably a contrary effect, and are prejudicial to the state. It is computed that every ninth child born at Paris is sent to the hospital; though it seems certain, according to the common course of human affairs, that it is not a hundredth child whose parents are altogether incapacitated to rear and educate him. The great difference for health, industry, and morals, between the education in an hospital and that in a private family, should induce us not to make the entrance

into an hospital too easy and engaging. To kill one's own child is shocking to nature, and must therefore be somewhat unusual; but to turn over the care of him upon others is very agreeable to the natural indolence of mankind.

HUME.

HUMANITY.

BORN without ideas, without vice, and without virtue, every thing in man, even his humanity, is an acquisition: it is to his education he owes his sentiment. Among all the various ways of inspiring him with it, the most efficacious is to accustom him from childhood, in a manner from the cradle, to ask himself when he beholds a miserable object, by what chance he is not exposed in like manner to the inclemency of the seasons, to hunger, cold, poverty, &c. When the child has been used to put himself in the place of the wretched, that habit gained, he becomes the more touched with their misery; as in deploring their misfortunes it is for human nature in general, and for himself in particular, that he is concerned. An infinity of different sentiments then mix with the first sentiment; and their assemblage composes the total of the sentiment of pleasure felt by a noble soul in succouring the distressed; a sentiment that he is not always in a situation

tion to analyse.—We relieve the unfortunate to avoid the pain of seeing them suffer. To enjoy an example of gratitude, which produces in us at least a confused hope of distant utility; to exhibit an act of power, whose exercise is always agreeable to us, because it always recalls to the mind the images of pleasure attached to that power; and, lastly, because the idea of happiness is constantly connected, in a good education, with the idea of beneficence; and this beneficence in us, conciliating the esteem and affection of men, may, like riches, be regarded as a power or means of avoiding pains and procuring pleasures;—In this manner, as from an affinity of different sentiments, is made up the total sentiment of the pleasure we feel in the exercise of beneficence.

HELVE TIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IN order to love mankind, little must be expected from them. In order to view their faults without asperity, we must accustom ourselves to forgiveness; to a sense that indulgence is a justice which frail humanity has a right to require from wisdom. Now nothing has a greater tendency to dispose us to indulgence, to close our hearts against hatred, and to open them to the principles of an humane and mild morality, than a

profound knowledge of the human heart. Accordingly, the wisest men have always been the most indulgent. What beautiful maxims of morality are scattered through their works! It was the saying of Plato, "Live with your inferiors and domestics as with unfortunate friends." "Must I always," said an Indian philosopher, "hear the rich crying out, Lord, destroy all who take from us the least parcel of our possessions; while the poor man, with a plaintive voice, and eyes lifted up to heaven, cries, Lord, give me a part of the goods thou dealest out in such profusion to the rich; and if others less happy deprive me of a part, instead of imprecating thy vengeance, I shall consider these thefts in the same manner as in seed-time we see the doves ranging over the fields in quest of their food."

HELVETIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THE folly and wickedness of human nature does not fill a man of sense and humanity with indignation: he, like Democritus, sees in them none but fools; or children, against whom it would be ridiculous to be offended, and who are more worthy of pity than of anger. There are some men who are not humane because they have been imposed upon, and whose humanity decreases

ses in proportion as they obtain more knowledge; but the man of genuine sense and humanity is constantly the friend of mankind, because he alone is acquainted with the nature of man. He considers men with the eye of a mechanic; and, without insulting humanity, complains that nature has united the preservation of one being to the destruction of another; that, to afford nourishment, he orders the hawk to seize in his talons the dove; made it necessary for the insect to be devoured; and rendered every being an assassin.

HELVETIUS.

HYPOCRISY.

TO act the part of a hypocrite is a task at once so painful and so difficult, that nothing but the most violent effort of patience and artifice can support a long and successful performance of it. Let us always be fearful of giving too much to the mind, by taking too much away from the heart. If we enjoy some talents wherewith we deceive others, how many more talents do we not possess which seduce us to impose upon ourselves? The willingness with which we are apt to credit the supposed exertions of hypocrisy may perhaps arise from the not having sufficiently reflected on the nature of the human heart. All who have observed the empire which our interest maintains

over our opinions, must have met with ample reason to be convinced that its own successes soon prove the means of its destruction. We lead off by dishonestly affecting certain practices and sentiments; and when this imposture hath brought us within the reach of applying some great part, of commanding mankind, and of receiving from them riches and consequence, we begin to repose in it more trust; and it at length happens, that by little and little our interest attains to the power of consolidating in our mind the basis of our authority. It is an old remark, that gamesters begin by being dupes, and end by being knaves: in matters of opinion, the case is reversed; and we begin by being knaves, and end by being dupes.

CHATELLEUR.

I.

I.

**IDEA OF BODY EQUALLY OBSCURE AS THAT
OF SPIRIT.**

IF any one say, he knows not what it is that thinks in him, he means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing. If he says, he knows not how he thinks; I answer, neither knows he how he is extended, how the solid parts of body are united, or cohere together to make extension. For though the pressure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter, that are grosser than the particles of air, and have pores less than the corpuscles of air; yet the weight or pressure of the air will not explain, nor can be a cause of, the coherence of the particles of air themselves. And if the pressure of the ether, or any subtiler matter than the air, may unite and hold fast together the parts of a particle of air, as well as other bodies; yet it cannot make bonds for itself, and hold

hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that *materia subtilis*. So that that hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by showing that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bodies, reaches not the parts of the ether itself: and by how much the more evidently it proves that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the ether, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and unity; by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the ether itself; which we can neither conceive without parts, they being bodies, and divisible; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies.

But, in truth, *the pressure of any ambient fluid, how great soever, can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter.* For though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies one from another in a line perpendicular to them, as in the experiment of two polished marbles; yet it can never in the least hinder the separation by a motion in a line parallel to those surfaces; because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space deserted by a lateral motion, resists such a motion of bodies

dies so joined, no more than it would resist the motion of that body were it on all sides environed by that fluid, and touched no other body: And therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion. For if the pressure of the ether be the adequate cause of cohesion, wherever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate against such a lateral separation, therefore in every imaginary plane, intersecting any mass of matter, there could be no more cohesion than of two polished surfaces, which will always, notwithstanding any imaginary pressure of a fluid, easily slide one from another. So that perhaps, how clear an idea soever we think we have of the extension of body, which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his mind, may have reason to conclude, that it is as easy for him *to have a clear idea how the soul thinks, as how the body is extended.* For since body is no further nor otherwise extended than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the *extension* of body, without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of thinking, and how it is performed.

I allow it is usual for most people to wonder
how

how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe. Do we not see, will they be ready to say, the parts of bodies stick firmly together? Is there any thing more common? and what doubt can there be made of it? And the like I say concerning *thinking* and *voluntary motion*: Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves? and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confess: but when we would a little nearer look into it, and consider how it is done, there, I think, we are at a loss both in the one and the other; and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere, as how we ourselves perceive or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of gold or brass (that but now, in fusion, were as loose from one another as the particles of water or the sands of an hour-glass) come in a few moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of mens arms cannot separate them. Any considering man will, I suppose, be here at a loss to satisfy his own or another man's understanding.

The little bodies that compose that fluid we call *water*, are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one who, by a microscope, pretended to perceive their distinct bulk, figure, or motion; and the particles of water are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least force
sensibly

fenfibly feparates them: nay, if we confider their perpetual motion, we muft allow them to have no cohefion one with another: and yet let but a fharp cold come, and they unite, they confolidate; thefe little atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, feparable. He that could find the bonds, that tie thefe heaps of loofe little bodies together fo firmly; he that could make known the cement that makes them ftick fo faft to one another, would difcover a great and yet unknown fecret; and yet, when that was done, would be far enough from making the extension of body (which is the cohefion of its folid parts) intelligible, till he could fhew wherein confifted the union or confolidation of the parts of thofe bonds, or of that cement, or of the leaft particle of matter that exifts. Whereby it appears, that this primary and fupposed obvious quality of body will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehenfible as any thing belonging to our minds; and a folid extended fubftance as hard to be conceived as a thinking immaterial one, whatever difficulties fome would raife againft it.

In the communication of motion by impulse, wherein as much motion is loft to one body as is got to the other, which is the ordinarieft cafe, we can have no other conception but the paffing of motion out of one body into another; which, I think, is as obfcure and inconceivable as how our

minds move or stop our bodies by thought, which we every moment find they do. The increase of motion by impulse, which is observed or believed sometimes to happen, is yet harder to be understood. We have by daily experience clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse and by thought: but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension; we are equally at a loss in both. So that, however we consider motion and its communication either from body or spirit, *the idea which belongs to spirit is at least as clear as that which belongs to body.* And if we consider the active power of moving, it is much clearer in spirit than body; since two bodies, placed by one another at rest, will never afford us the ideas of power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the mind affords ideas of an active power every day of moving bodies; and therefore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirits, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created spirits are not totally separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only passive: those beings that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. But be that as it will, I think we have as many and as clear ideas belonging to spirit as we have belonging to body,
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the substance of each being equally unknown to us; and the idea of thinking in spirit as clear as extension in body; and the communication of motion by thought, which we attribute to spirit, is as evident as that by impulse, which we ascribe to body. Constant experience makes us sensible of these, though our narrow understandings can comprehend neither.

Sensation convinces us, that there are solid extended substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones. Experience assures us of the existence of such beings, and that the one hath a power to move the body by impulse, the other by thought: this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other; but beyond these ideas, as received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire further into their nature, causes, and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do that of thinking. If we would explain them any further, one is as easy as the other; and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a substance we know not should by thought set body into motion, than how a substance we know not should by impulse set body into motion. So that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist, than those belonging to spirit.

LOCKE.

VOL. II.

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IDEAS DERIVED FROM QUALITIES IN BODIES.

WHATSOEVER the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call *idea*; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call *quality* of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snow-ball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce those ideas in us as they are in the snow-ball, I call *qualities*; and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them *ideas*.

Qualities thus considered in bodies, are, *first*, Such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in whatsoever state it be; such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force that can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself be perceived by our senses: *v. g.* Take a grain of wheat; divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on till the parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all these qualities. For
division

division (which is all that a mill or pestle, or any other body, does upon another in reducing it to insensible parts), and never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct or separate masses of matter of that which was before but one; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so many distinct bodies, after division make a certain number. These I call original or *primary* qualities of body; which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest, and number.

Secondly, Such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, *i. e.* by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts; as colours, sounds, tastes, &c. These I call *secondary* qualities.

The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by *impulse*; the only way which we conceive bodies operate in.

If, then, external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas in it, and yet we perceive *these original qualities* in such of them as singly fall under our senses; it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits, by some parts of our bo-

dies, to the brain, or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion, which produces these ideas which we have of them in us.

After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of secondary qualities are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our senses: For it being manifest that there are bodies, each whereof are so small that we cannot by any of our senses discover either their bulk, figure, or motion, as is evident in the particles of air and water, and others extremely smaller than these, perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air or water are smaller than pease or hailstones; the different motions and figures, bulk and number of such particles affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations which we have from the colours and smell of bodies; v. g. that a violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the ideas of the blue colour
and

and sweet scent of that flower, to be produced in our minds.

From whence I think it is easy to draw this observation, That the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are *resemblances* of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have *no resemblance* of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They are in the bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us; and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call so.

Flame is denominated *hot* and *light*, *know*, *white* and *cold*; and manna, *white* and *sweet*, from the ideas they produce in us: which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those ideas are in us; the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror. But whoever considers that the same *fire*, that in one distance *produces* in us the sensation of *warmth*, does, at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of *pain*, will have no reason to say, that his *idea* of *warmth*, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually *in the fire*; and his *idea* of *pain*, which the same fire produced in him the same way, is not in the fire.

The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow, are really in them, whether one's senses perceive them or not; and therefore may be called *real qualities*, because they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them, than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particular *ideas*, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, *i. e.* bulk, figure, and motion of parts.

Pound an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweet taste into an oily one. What real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in any body, but an alteration of the *texture* of it?

Ideas being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an account how the same water, at the same time, may produce the idea of cold by one hand, and of heat by the other; whereas it is impossible that the same water, if those ideas were really in it, should at the same time be both hot and cold. For if we imagine *warmth*, as it is in our hands, to be *nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves or animal spirits*, we may understand

understand how it is possible that the same water may at the time produce the same sensation of heat in one hand, and cold in the other; which yet figure never does, that never producing the idea of a square by one hand which has produced the idea of a globe by another. But if the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, caused by the corpuscles of any other body; it is easy to be understood, that if that motion be greater in one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of one of the hands, and a less than in those of the other, it will increase the motion of the one hand, and lessen it in the other; and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon.

LOCKE.

IDEAS OF SENSATION CHANGED BY THE JUDGMENT.

THE ideas we receive by sensation are often altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe, of any uniform colour, *v. g.* gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness.

ness coming to our eyes; but we having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make on us, what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the difference of the sensible figure of bodies, the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into the causes; so that from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure, and an uniform colour, when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane variously coloured; as is evident in painting. Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one, and when the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: Query, Whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube? It may be answered, No: For though he has obtained the experience how a globe, how a cube affects his touch; yet he has not yet attained the experience, that what affects his touch so or so, must affect the sight in the same manner; or that a protuberant angle in the cube, that

pressed

pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube.

But this I think is not usually in any of our ideas but those received by sight; because sight, the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, or motion, the several varieties whereof change the appearance of its proper object, viz. light and colours, we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This in many cases, by a settled habit in things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed so constantly, and so quick, that we take that for the perception of our sensation which is an idea formed by the judgment: so that one, viz. that of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself; as a man who reads or hears with attention or understanding, takes little notice of the characters or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.

Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice, if we consider how very quick the actions of the mind are performed; for as itself is thought to take up no space, to have no extension, so its actions seem to require no time, but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant. I speak this in comparison to the actions of the body.

body. Any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were, in an instant, do our minds with one glance see all the parts of a demonstration, which may very well be called a long one, if we consider the time it will require to put it into words, and step by step show it another? We shall not be so much surprised that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider how the facility which we get of doing things by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without our notice. *Habits*, especially such as are begun very early, come at last to produce actions in us, which often escape our observation. How frequently do we in a day cover our eyes with our eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark? Men, that by custom have got the use of a by-word, do almost in every sentence pronounce sounds, which, though taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear nor observe; and therefore it is not so strange that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

LOCKE.

Asso-

ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

It is evident that there is a principle of connection between the different thoughts and ideas of the mind; and that in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of regularity and method. In our more serious thinking and discourse, this is so observable, that any particular thought which breaks in upon this regular track or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay, in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connection upheld among the different ideas which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread of the discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him away from the subject of conversation. Among the languages of different nations, even where we cannot suspect the least connection and communication, it is found, that the words expressive of ideas, the
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most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other. A certain proof, that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind. The principles of connection among ideas appear to be only three in number, viz. *Resemblance*, *contiguity* in time and place, and *cause* and *effect*: Contrast or contrariety is a connection among ideas, which may perhaps be considered as a mixture of causation and resemblance. Where two objects are contrary, the one destroys the other, i. e. is the cause of its annihilation; and the idea of the annihilation of an object implies the idea of its former existence. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original: this depends on the principle of *resemblance*. The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an inquiry or discourse concerning the others: this originates from the *contiguity* of the apartments. If we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it: this arises from the connection between cause and effect. This subject is copious; and many operations of the human mind depend on the connection, or association of ideas, which is here described: particularly the sympathy between the passions and imagination will, perhaps, appear remarkable; while we observe that the affections, excited by

one object, pass easily to another connected with it; but transfuse themselves with difficulty, or not at all, along different objects which have no manner of connection together. By introducing into any composition, personages and actions foreign to each other, an injudicious author loses that communication of emotions, by which alone he can interest the heart, and raise the passions to their proper height and period. That this enumeration of the principles of the association of ideas is complete, and that there are no other except these, may be difficult to prove to the reader's satisfaction, and even to a man's own satisfaction.

HUME.

THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS.

ALL the perceptions of the mind may be divided into two species, distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are denominated *ideas*; the other species we shall call *impressions*. By the term *impression*, may be understood all our more lively perceptions; when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. There is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation,

or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may copy the perceptions of the senses; but the utmost we say of them, even when they operate with the greatest vigour, is, that they represent the object in so lively a manner, that we could almost say we feel or see it: but except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me of a person in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of that passion.

All our ideas are copies of our impressions. When we analyse our thoughts or ideas, we always find, that they resolve themselves, however compounded, into such simple ideas, as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. If it happen from a defect of the organ, that a man is not sensible of any species of sensation, we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. The case is the same, if the object, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the organ. A Laplander or Negro has no notion of the re-
lisa

lish of wine. A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge. There is a phenomenon, which may prove it not to be impossible for ideas to arise independent of impressions. The several ideas of colours and of sounds are really different from each other, though resembling. If this be true of different colours, it must be so of the different shades of the same colour; each shade produces a distinct idea. Suppose a person to have enjoyed his sight thirty years, and to have become acquainted perfectly with colours of all kinds, except one particular shade of blue. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank where that shade is wanting; and it seems possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses. Simple ideas, therefore, are not always, in every instance, derived from correspondent impressions.

HUME.

HEATHEN IDOLATRY.

THE Heathen idolatry is a common topic of declamation and abuse on occasions of this nature.

It stands, with modern absurdity and folly, in the same circumstances with a woman who has been beautiful, but whose charms are faded, and who is ever the object of the most malignant satire to another who is distinguished with a native and original ugliness. The superstitions of the ancients, like their beautiful edifices, are defaced only by time and violence. The communities of antiquity, in their decline, seem to have been like some great minds in the decline of life; who are said to retain their former conclusions, while they have totally forgotten the premisses and calculations which had led them to them. The Heathen mythology is natural philosophy allegorised and abused by poets and priests: Jupiter and Juno, and Minerva and Neptune, were personifications of real principles in nature; whereas the phantoms of modern superstition are representations of no true objects in heaven or earth. The former were in the state of all similes, metaphors, and poetical ornaments, liable to be misunderstood and abused; but they were also useful, and furnished the most elegant entertainment and pleasure: the latter, being the produce only of perverted and gloomy imaginations, are never useful, never pleasing; but merely the instruments of imposture, to intimidate and injure mankind. Idolatry, therefore, was to be restrained, as all excesses of natural passions are to be restrained. For,
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by fixing the attention wholly on poetical persons, men were led away from nature, the only source of truth; they easily wandered into follies and vices; and their whole system fell a sacrifice to more extravagant and mysterious institutions. The emperor Julian seems to have had these ideas; and he lived at the very period of this remarkable revolution. He probably thought, that men were not at so great distance from the real principles of nature and truth, and would not require so much trouble to lead them back to those principles, while they adhered to the Heathen idolatry, as when the ambitious Christian priests had plunged them into the fathomless abyss of mysteries; awed them with heavenly and infernal phantoms; bound them down to unintelligible and useless dogmas; and reduced them to the worst species of slavery. Succeeding events proved that he judged rightly. Men, by resigning their faculties to pretended heavenly commissioners, and becoming the tools of their ambition, exhibited a scene of ignorance, barbarism, cruelty, and villany, beyond any thing which had ever dishonoured the annals of the world. This wretched state remained until some fragments of ancient learning were recovered; and some persons were tempted, by manly thoughts and fine writing, into reason, into heresies, and rebellions.

WILLIAMS.

ILL-HUMOUR.

Nothing concerns me more than to see people in ill-humour; to see men torment one another; particularly when, in the flower of their age, in the very season of pleasure, they waste their few short days of sunshine in quarrels and disputes, and only feel their error when it is too late to repair it.

We are apt to complain that we have but few happy days; and it appears to me that we have very little right to complain. If our hearts were always in a proper disposition to receive the good things which Heaven sends us, we should acquire strength to support the evil when they come upon us. But, you will perhaps say, we cannot always command our tempers; so much depends on the constitution; when the body is ill at ease, the mind is so likewise. Well, let us look upon this disposition as a disease, and see if there is no remedy for it. I think, indeed, a great deal might be done in this respect. Ill-humour may be compared to sloth. It is natural to man to be indolent; but if once we get the better of our indolence, we then go on with alacrity, and find a real pleasure in being active. If you object, that we are not masters of ourselves, and still less of our feelings; I must answer, that we don't know how far

far our strength will go till we have tried it; that the sick consult physicians, and submit to the most scrupulous regimen, and the most nauseous medicines, to recover their health.

Is it not enough that we are without the power to make one another happy, but must we deprive each other of that satisfaction, which, left to ourselves, we might often be capable of enjoying? Show me the man who has ill-humour, and who hides it; who bears the whole burden of it himself, without interrupting the pleasures of those about him. No; ill-humour arises from a consciousness of our own want of merit; from a discontent which always accompanies that envy which foolish vanity engenders. We dislike to see people happy, unless their happiness is the work of our own hands. We unto those who make use of their power over a human heart to deprive it of the simple pleasure it would naturally enjoy! All the favours, all the attention in the world, cannot for a moment make amends for the loss of that happiness which a cruel tyranny destroys.

We should say to ourselves every day, What good can I do to my friends? I can only endeavour not to interrupt them in their pleasures, and try to augment the happiness which I myself partake of. When their souls are tormented by a violent passion, when their hearts are rent with grief, I cannot give them relief for a moment.

And

And when at length a fatal malady seizes the unhappy being, whose untimely grave was prepared by thy hand—when, stretched out and exhausted, he raises his dim eyes to heaven, and the damps of death are on his brow—then thou standest before him like a condemned criminal; thou see'st thy fault, but it is too late; thou feelest thy want of power; thou feelest, with bitterness, that all thou canst give, all thou canst do, will not restore the strength of thy unfortunate victim, nor procure for him a moment of consolation.

GOETHE.

WORKS OF IMAGINATION GENERALLY PLEASING.

WORKS of imagination are more generally admired, because there are few who have not experienced some passion. Most persons are better pleased with the beauty of a description, than with the depth of an idea; because they have felt more than they have seen, and seen more than they have reflected. From hence we may conclude, that the paintings of the passions must be more generally agreeable than those of natural objects; and a poetical description of the same objects must find more admirers than philosophical works.

HELVE TIUS.

INDIANS.

INDIANS JUSTLY INCREDULOUS WITH
REGARD TO ICE.

THE Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts that arose from a state of nature with which he was unacquainted, and bore so little analogy to those events of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it. No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him; and it is impossible for him, *a priori*, to tell what will result from it. It is making a new experiment; the consequence of which is always uncertain. One may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy; and is such as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such

an event may be denominated *extraordinary*, and requires a pretty strong testimony to render it credible to people in a warm climate: but still it is not *miraculous*, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature, in cases where all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: but they never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence.

HOME.

THE EXPOSITION OF INFANTS.

THE practice of exposing children in their early infancy was very common among the ancients; and is not mentioned by any author of those times with the horror it deserves, or scarcely even with disapprobation. Plutarch, the humane, good-natured Plutarch, recommends it as a virtue in Attalus, king of Pergamus, that he murdered, or, if you will, exposed all his own children, in order to leave his crown to the son of his brother Eumenes; signalizing in this manner his gratitude and affection to Eumenes, who had left him his heir preferably to that son. It was Solon, the most celebrated of the sages of Greece, that gave
parents

parents permission by law to kill their children. And, perhaps, by an odd connection of causes, this barbarous practice of the ancients increased the population of those times. By removing the terrors of too numerous a family, it would engage many people in marriage; and such is the force of natural affection, that very few, in comparison, would have resolution enough, when it came to the push, to carry into execution their former intentions; though Plutarch, it must be owned, speaks of it as a general practice of the poor. China, the only country where this practice of exposing children prevails at present, is the most populous country we know; and every man is married before he is twenty. Such early marriages could scarcely be general, had not men the prospect of getting rid of their children.

HUME.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THE exposition, that is, the murder, of newborn infants, was a practice allowed of in almost all the states of Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians; and whenever the circumstances of the parent rendered it inconvenient to bring up the child, to abandon it to hunger or to wild beasts was regarded without blame or censure. This practice had probably begun in the times

times of the most savage barbarity. The imaginations of men had been first made familiar with it in that earliest period of society, and the uniform continuance of the custom had hindered them afterwards from perceiving its enormity. We find at this day, that this practice prevails among all savage nations; and in that rudest and lowest state of society it is undoubtedly more pardonable than in any other. The extreme indigence of a savage is often such, that he himself is frequently exposed to the greatest extremity of hunger; he often dies of pure want; and it is frequently impossible for him to support both himself and his child. We cannot wonder, therefore, that, in this case, he should abandon it. One who, in flying from an enemy whom it was impossible to resist, should throw down his infant because it retarded his flight, would surely be excusable; since by attempting to save it, he could only hope for the consolation of dying with it. That in this state of society, therefore, a parent should be allowed to judge whether he can bring up his child, ought not to surprise us so greatly. In the latter ages of Greece, however, the same thing was permitted from views of remote interest or convenience, which could by no means excuse it. Uninterrupted custom had by this time so thoroughly authorised the practice, that not only the loose maxims of the world toler-

rated this barbarous custom, but even the doctrine of philosophers, which ought to have been more just and accurate, was led away by the established practice; and upon this, as upon many other occasions, instead of censuring, supported the horrible abuse, by far-fetched considerations of public utility. Aristotle talks of it as of what the magistrate ought upon many occasions to encourage. The humane Plato is of the same opinion; and, with all that love of mankind which seems to animate all his writings, no where marks this practice with disapprobation. When custom can give sanction to so dreadful a violation of humanity, we may well imagine that there is scarce any particular practice so gross which it cannot authorise. Such a thing, we hear men every day saying, is commonly done; and they seem to think this a sufficient apology for what in itself is the most unjust and unreasonable conduct.

A. SMITH.

INGRATITUDE.

INGRATITUDE would be more rare, if benefits upon usury were less common. Nothing can be more natural than to love those who do us service. The heart of man is self-interested, but never ungrateful; and the obliged are less to be charged with ingratitude, than their benefactors

with self-interest. If you sell me your favours, let us settle the price; but if you pretend to give, and afterwards expect to make terms with me, you are guilty of fraud: it is their being given gratis which renders them inestimable. The heart will receive laws only from itself: by endeavouring to enslave it, you give it liberty; and by leaving it at liberty, it becomes your slave. When the fisherman throws his bait into the water, the fish assemble and continue round him without suspicion; but when, caught by the concealed hook, they perceive him draw the line, they then endeavour to escape. Is the fisherman their benefactor, or are the fish ungrateful? Do we ever see a man, who is forgotten by his benefactor, forget that benefactor? On the contrary, he speaks of him with pleasure, and never thinks of him without emotion: and if by chance he has it in his power to make any return for the favours he has received, with what joy he snatches the opportunity; with what rapture he exclaims, *Now it is my turn to oblige!* Such is the true voice of nature. A real benefit can never produce ingratitude.

ROUSSEAU.

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THE IMPORTANT PRECEPT OF MORALITY,
DO NO INJURY TO ANY ONE.

THE most important lesson of morality is, *Never to do any injury to any one.* Even the positive precept of doing good, if not made subordinate to this, is dangerous, false, and contradictory. Who is there that doth not do good? All the world, even the vicious man, does good to one party or the other: he will often make one person happy at the expence of making an hundred miserable. Hence arise all our calamities. The most sublime virtues are negative; they are also the most difficult to put in practice, because they are attended with no ostentation, and are even above that pleasure so flattering to the heart of man, that of sending away others satisfied with our benevolence. O! how much good must that man necessarily do his fellow-creatures, if such a man there be, who never did any of them harm! What intrepidity of soul, what constancy of mind, are necessary here! It is not, however, by reasoning on this maxim, but by endeavouring to put it in practice, that all its difficulty is to be discovered. The injunction of doing no harm to any one, infers that of doing the least possible harm to the community in general; for in a state of society, the good of one man necessarily becomes

the evil of another. The relation is essential to the thing itself, and cannot be changed. We may inquire on this principle, Which is best; man in a state of society, or in a state of solitude? A certain noble author hath said, *None but a wicked man might exist alone*: for my part, I say, *None but a good man might exist alone*. If the latter proposition be less sententious, it is more true, and more reasonable, than the former. If a vicious man were alone, what harm could he put in practice? It is in society only that he finds the implements of mischief.

ROUSSEAU.

INTENTIONS NOT THE OBJECTS OF HUMAN JUDGMENT.

WE cannot judge of intentions. How is it possible? It is seldom or never that an action is the effect of a sentiment; we ourselves are often ignorant of the motives by which we are determined. A rich man bestows a comfortable subsistence on a worthy man reduced to poverty. Doubtless he does a good action; but is this action simply the desire of rendering a man happy? Pity, the hopes of gratitude, vanity itself; all these different motives separately, or aggregately, may they not, unknown to himself, have determined him to that commendable action? Now if a man be, in general, ignorant himself of the motives of his

his own generous actions, how can the public be acquainted with them? Thus it is only from the actions of men that we can judge of their virtue. A man, for instance, has twenty degrees of passion for virtue; but he has thirty degrees of love for a woman; and this woman would instigate him to be guilty of murder. Upon this supposition, it is certain, that this person is nearer guilt than he who, with only ten degrees of passion for virtue, has only five degrees of love for so wicked a woman. Hence we may conclude, that of two men, the more honest in his actions has sometimes the lesser passion for virtue. The virtue of men greatly depends on the circumstances in which they are placed. Virtuous men have too often sunk under a strange series of unhappy events. He who warrants his virtue in every possible situation, is either an impostor or a fool; characters equally to be distrusted.

HELVEIUS.

JUSTICE.

JUSTICE has two different foundations, viz. that of *interest*, when men observe that it is impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by certain rules; and that of *morality*, when this interest is once observed, and men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to

the peace of society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it. It is the voluntary convention and artifice of men which makes the first interest take place; and therefore those laws of justice are so far to be considered as artificial. After that interest is once established and acknowledged, the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows *naturally*, and of itself: though it is certain, that it is also augmented by a new *artifice*; and that the public instructions of politicians, and the private education of parents, contribute to the giving a sense of honour and duty in the strict regulation of our actions with regard to the properties of others. Though justice be artificial, the sense of its morality is natural. It is the combination of men, in a system of conduct, which renders any act of justice beneficial to society. But when once it has that tendency, we *naturally* approve of it; and if we did not so, it is impossible any combination or convention could ever produce that sentiment.

Most of the inventions of men are subject to change. They depend upon humour and caprice. They have a vogue for a time, and then sink into oblivion. It may, perhaps, be apprehended, that if justice were allowed to be a human invention, it must be placed on the same footing. But the cases are widely different. The interest on which justice is founded is the greatest imaginable; and
justice

justice extends to all times and places. It cannot possibly be served by any other invention. It is obvious, and discovers itself on the very first formation of society. All these causes render the rules of justice steadfast and immutable; at least as immutable as human nature: And if they were founded on original instinct, could they have any greater stability? HUME.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THERE is one virtue, of which the general rules determine with the greatest exactness every external action which it requires. This virtue is *Justice*. The rules of justice are accurate in the highest degree; and admit of no exceptions or modifications, but such as may be ascertained as accurately as the rules themselves, and which generally, indeed, flow from the very same principles with them. The man therefore who, in this virtue, refines the least, and adheres with the most obstinate steadfastness to the general rules themselves, is the most commendable, and the most to be depended upon. Though the end of the rules of justice be, to hinder us from hurting our neighbour, it may frequently be a crime to violate them, though we could pretend, with some pretext of reason, that this particular violation could do no hurt. A man often becomes a villain the moment he

he begins, even in his own heart, to chicané in this manner. The moment he thinks of departing from the most staunch and positive adherence to what those inviolable precepts prescribe to him, he is no longer to be trusted; and no man can say what degree of guilt he may arrive at. The thief imagines he does no evil when he steals from the rich what he supposes they may easily want, and what possibly they may never even know has been stolen from them. The adulterer imagines he does no evil when he corrupts the wife of his friend, provided he covers his intrigue from the suspicion of the husband, and does not disturb the peace of the family. When once we begin to give way to such refinements, there is no enormity so gross of which we may not be capable.

A. SMITH.

THE ORIGIN OF JUSTICE AND PROPERTY.

IT has been asserted, that justice arises from *human conventions*, and proceeds from the voluntary choice, consent, and combination of mankind. If by *convention* be here meant a promise (which is the most usual sense of the word) nothing can be more absurd than this position. The observance of promises is itself one of the most considerable parts of justice; and we are not surely bound to keep our word, because we have given

our

our word to keep it. But if by convention be meant a sense of common interest, which sense each man feels in his own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, which tends to public utility; it must be owned, that in this sense justice arises from human conventions. For if it be allowed (what is indeed evident), that the particular consequences of a particular act of justice may be hurtful to the public as well as individuals; it follows, that every man, in embracing that virtue, must have an eye to the whole plan or system, and must expect the concurrence of his fellows in the same conduct and behaviour. Did all his views terminate in the consequences of each act of his own, his benevolence and humanity, as well as his self-love, might often prescribe to him measures of conduct very different from those which are agreeable to the strict rules of right and justice.

Thus two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention, for common interest; without any promise or contract: Thus gold and silver are made the measures of exchange: Thus speech, and words, and language, are fixed by human convention and agreement. Whatever is advantageous to two or more persons if all perform their part, but what loses all advantage if only one

one perform, can arise from no other principle. There would otherwise be no motive for any one of them to enter into that scheme of conduct.

This theory concerning the origin of property, and consequently of justice, is, in the main, the same with that hinted and adopted by Grotius. (*De jure belli et pacis*, Lib. ii. cap. 2. § 2. art. 4, & 5.)

The word *natural* is commonly taken in so many senses, and is of such a loose signification, that it seems to little purpose to dispute, if justice be natural or not. If self-love, if benevolence, be natural to man; if reason and fore-thought be also natural; then may the same epithet be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society. Mens inclinations, their necessities, lead them to combine; their understandings and experience tell them, that this combination is impossible where each governs himself by no rule, and pays no regard to the possessions of others. And from these passions and reflections conjoined, as soon as we observe like passions and reflections in others, the sentiment of justice, through all ages, has infallibly and certainly had place, to some degree or other, in every individual in the human species. In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from the exertion of the intellectual faculties may justly be esteemed natural.

Natural may be opposed, either to what is *unusual*.

usual, miraculous, or artificial. In the two former senses, justice and property are undoubtedly natural. But as they suppose reason, fore-thought, design, and a social union and confederacy among men, perhaps that epithet cannot be strictly, in the last sense, applied to them. Had men lived without society, property had never been known, and neither justice nor injustice had ever existed. But society among human creatures had been impossible without reason and fore-thought. Inferior animals that unite, are guided by instinct, which supplies the place of reason. But all these disputes are merely verbal.

The rules of equity and justice depend entirely on the particular state and condition of men in society; and owe their origin and existence to that utility which results to the public from their strict and regular observance. Reverse in any considerable circumstance the condition of men; produce extreme abundance, or extreme necessity; implant in the human breast perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapacioufness and malice: by rendering justice totally useless, you thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its obligation on mankind.

The common situation of society is a medium among all these extremes. We are naturally partial to ourselves and to our friends; but are capable of learning the advantage resulting from a
more

more equitable conduct. Few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal hand of nature; but by art, labour, and industry, we can extract them in great abundance. Hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil society; hence justice derives its usefulness to the public; and hence alone arise its merit and moral obligation. Examine the writers on the laws of nature, and you will always find, that whatever principles they set out with, they are sure to terminate here at last; and to assign as the ultimate reason for every rule which they establish, the convenience and necessities of mankind. A confession thus extorted, in opposition to systems, has more authority than if it had been made in prosecution of them. Does any one scruple, in extraordinary cases, to violate all regard to the private property of individuals, and sacrifice to public interest a distinction which had been established for the sake of that interest? The safety of the people is the supreme law. All other particular laws are subordinate to it, and dependent on it: And if, in the *common* course of things, they be followed and regarded, it is only because the public safety and interest *commonly* demand so equal and impartial an administration.

All questions of property are subordinate to the authority of civil laws; which extend, restrain, modify, and alter the rules of natural justice, ac-

tording to the particular convenience of each community. The laws have, or ought to have, a constant reference to the constitution of government, the manners, the climate, the religion, the commerce, the situation of each society. *What is a man's property?* Any thing which it is lawful for him, and for him alone, to use. *But what rule have we by which we can distinguish these objects?* Here we must have recourse to statutes, customs, analogies, precedents, and a hundred other circumstances; some variable and arbitrary. But the ultimate point in which they all professedly terminate is, the interest and happiness of human society. HUME.

K.

**THE KNOWLEDGE
OF HISTORICAL FACTS AND OF SPECULA-
TIVE OPINIONS IS NOT PROPAGATED IN
THE SAME MANNER.**

AN historical fact, while it passes by oral tradition from eye-witnesses and cotemporaries, is disguised in every successive narration, and may at last retain but very small, if any, resemblance of the original truth on which it was founded. The frail memories of men, their love of exaggeration, their supine carelessness; these principles, if not corrected by books and writing, soon pervert the accounts of historical events; where argument or reasoning has little or no place, nor can ever recal the truth which has once escaped those narrations. It is thus the fables of Hercules,

cules, Theseus, Bacchus, are supposed to have been originally founded in true history, corrupted by tradition. But with regard to speculative opinions, the case is far otherwise. If these opinions be founded in arguments so clear and obvious as to carry conviction with the generality of mankind, the same arguments which at first diffused the opinions will still preserve them in their original purity. If the arguments be more abstruse, and more remote from vulgar apprehension, the opinions will always be confined to a few persons; and as soon as men leave the contemplation of the arguments, the opinions will be immediately lost and buried in oblivion.

HUME.

SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE OF PARTICULAR EXISTENCE.

THERE can be nothing more certain, than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds; this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds when no such thing exists, no such object affects

their senses. But yet here, I think, we are provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting: For I ask any one, whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks on that flavour or odour? We as plainly find the difference there is between an idea revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas. If any one say, a dream may do the same thing, and all these ideas may be produced in us without any external objects; he may please to dream that I make him this answer: 1. That it is no great matter whether I remove this scruple or no; where all is but dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream, and we cannot thereby certainly know that any such thing as fire exists without us; I answer, that we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses;

senses; this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know, or to be.

LOCKE.

**KNOWLEDGE, PARTLY NECESSARY,
PARTLY VOLUNTARY.**

IF our knowledge were altogether necessary, all mens knowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is knowable: and if it were wholly voluntary, some men so little regard or value it, that they would have extremely little or none at all. Men that have senses cannot choose but receive some ideas by them; and if they have memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have any distinguishing faculty, cannot but perceive the agreement or disagreement of some of them one with another: as he that has his eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but see some objects, and perceive a difference in them. But though a man, with his eyes open in the light, cannot but see; yet there may be certain objects which he may choose whether he will turn his eyes to; there may be in his reach a book containing pictures and discourses capable to delight or instruct him, which yet he may never have the will to open, never take the pains to look into.

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There is also another thing in a man's power, and that is, though he turns his eyes sometimes toward an object, yet he may choose whether he will curiously survey it, and with an intent application endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it. But yet what he does see, he cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his will to see that black which appears yellow; nor to persuade himself, that what actually scalds him feels cold. The earth will not appear painted with flowers, nor the fields covered with verdure, whenever he has a mind to it: in the cold winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary if he will look abroad. Just thus is it with our understanding; all that is voluntary in our knowledge is the employing or with-holding any of our faculties from this or that sort of objects, and a more or less accurate survey of them: but they being employed, our will hath no power to determine the knowledge of the mind one way or other; that is done only by the objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. And therefore, as far as mens senses are conversant about external objects, the mind cannot but receive those ideas which are presented by them, and be informed of the existence of things without: and so far as mens thoughts converse with their own determined ideas, they cannot but, in some measure, observe the agreement or disagreement

ment that is to be found amongst some of them; which is so far knowledge: and if they have names for those ideas which they have thus considered, they must necessarily be assured of the truth of those propositions which express that agreement or disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of those truths. For what a man sees, he cannot but see; and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.

Thus he that hath got the ideas of numbers, and hath taken the pains to compare one, two, and three to six, cannot choose but know that they are equal: he that hath got the idea of a triangle, and found the ways to measure its angles and their magnitudes, is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, as of this truth, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be."

He also that hath the idea of an intelligent, but frail and weak being, made by and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, perfectly wise and good, will as certainly know that man is to honour, fear, and obey God, as that the sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind, and will turn his thoughts that way, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior, finite, and dependent, is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite, as he is certain to find, that
three,

three, four, and seven are less than fifteen, if he will consider and compute these numbers; nor can he be surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen, if he will but open his eyes and turn them that way. But yet these truths, being ever so certain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the pains to employ his faculties as he should, to inform himself about them.

LOCKE.

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LABOUR.

IT is necessary for the happiness of man, that pleasure should be the reward of labour; but of a moderate labour. If nature had of itself provided for all his wants, it would have made him the most pernicious of all presents; he would have passed his days in languor; the idly rich would have been without resource against *Ennui*. What palliative could there have been to this evil? None; if all the people were without wants, all would be equally opulent. Where then would the wealthy idler find men to procure him amusement?—The labour to which man was formerly, they say, condemned, was not a punishment of heaven, but a benefaction of nature. Labour supposes desire; and the man without desire vegetates without any principle of activity: the body and the soul remain; if I may use the expression,
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in the same attitude. Occupation is the happiness of man. Habit renders labour easy: if we do that always without pain which we are always doing, and if every means of acquiring pleasure ought to be reckoned among the pleasures, labour always fills up, in the most agreeable manner, the time that separates a gratified want from the next that shall arise, and consequently the twelve only hours of a day in which we suppose the greatest inequality in the happiness of men. But to be occupied and use exercise, what is necessary? A motive: and of all others that of hunger is the most powerful, and most general. It is this that commands the peasant to labour in the fields, and the savage to hunt and fish in the forest.—A want of another kind animates the artist and man of letters: the desire of reputation, of the public esteem, and of the pleasures they represent. Every want, every desire, compels men to labour; and when they have contracted an early habit, it becomes agreeable. For want of that habit, idleness renders labour hateful; and it is with aversion that men sow, reap, or even think.—One of the principal causes of the ignorance and sloth of the Africans, is the fertility of that part of the world; which supplies almost all necessaries without culture. The African therefore has no motive for reflection; and in fact he reflects but little. The same may be said of the Caribbs. If they

they be less industrious than the savages of North America, it is because they have less occasion to labour for subsistence.

HELVETIUS.

ON NATIONAL LABOUR.

THE annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always either in the immediate produce of that labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations.

According therefore as this produce, or what is purchased with it, bears a greater or smaller proportion to the number of those who are to consume it, the nation will be better or worse supplied with all the necessaries and conveniences for which it has occasion.

But this proportion must in every nation be regulated by two different circumstances; first, by the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which its labour is generally applied; and, secondly, by the proportion between the number of those who are employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed. Whatever be the soil, climate, or extent of territory of any particular nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply

supply must, in that particular situation, depend upon those two circumstances.

The abundance or scantiness of this supply, too, seems to depend more upon the former of those two circumstances than upon the latter. Among the savage nations of hunters and fishers, every individual who is able to work, is more or less employed in useful labour, and endeavours to provide, as well as he can, the necessities and conveniences of life, for himself, or such of his family or tribe as are either too old, or too young, or too infirm, to go a-hunting or fishing. Such nations, however, are so miserably poor, that, from mere want, they are frequently reduced, or, at least, think themselves reduced, to the necessity sometimes of directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning, their infants, their old people, and those afflicted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or to be devoured by wild beasts. Among civilized and thriving nations, on the contrary, though a great number of people do not labour at all, many of whom consume the produce of ten times, frequently of a hundred times, more labour than the greater part of those who work; yet the produce of the whole labour of the society is so great, that all are often abundantly supplied; and a workman, even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and industrious, may enjoy a greater share of the necessities and conveniences

conveniences of life than it is possible for any savage to acquire.

Whatever be the actual state of the skill, dexterity, and judgment, with which labour is applied in any nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply must depend, during the continuance of that state, upon the proportion between the number of those who are annually employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed. The number of useful and productive labourers is every where in proportion to the quantity of capital stock which is employed in setting them to work, and to the particular way in which it is so employed.

Nations tolerably well advanced as to skill, dexterity, and judgment, in the application of labour, have followed very different plans in the general conduct or direction of it; and those plans have not all been equally favourable to the greatness of its produce. The policy of some nations has given extraordinary encouragement to the industry of the country, that of others to the industry of towns. Scarce any nation has dealt equally and impartially with every sort of industry. Since the downfall of the Roman empire, the policy of Europe has been more favourable to arts, manufactures, and commerce, the industry of towns; than to agriculture, the industry of the country.

Though those different plans were, perhaps,

first introduced by the private interests and prejudices of particular orders of men, without any regard to, or foresight of, their consequences upon the general welfare of the society; yet they have given occasion to very different theories of political oeconomy: of which some magnify the importance of that industry which is carried on in towns, others of that which is carried on in the country. Those theories have had a considerable influence, not only upon the opinions of men of learning, but upon the public conduct of princes and sovereign states.

THE LAW OF NATURE.

THERE are some who say, that at the moment of our birth God engraves on our hearts the precepts of the natural law. Experience proves the contrary. If God is to be regarded as the author of the laws of nature, it is as being the author of corporeal sensibility, which is the mother of human reason. This sort of sensibility at the time of the union of men in society, obliged them to make among themselves conventions and laws; the assemblage of which composes what is called the laws of nature. But have those laws been the same among different nations? No: their greater or less perfection was always in proportion to the progress of the human mind; to the greater or less

less extent of knowledge that societies acquired of what was useful or prejudicial; and this knowledge has been in all nations the produce of time, experience, and reflection.

—HELVETIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

NATURAL right presupposes a law of nature which has established that right. But where is this law of nature to be found? Who has produced it? Law is the expression of will. The law of nature then must be the expression of will; but of whose will?—Of nature's? But what is nature? Or is it the expression of the will of God, who is sometimes called the Author of nature? But if this be the case, where is the difference between this and what is called the law of revelation?

Right is a mere legal term. Where no law is, there is no transgression, has been said; with equal truth it might be said, Where no law is, there is no right. A man acquires a right or property in a thing by the declaration of the legislator, that he may use and enjoy that thing; joined to a promise of the legislator, expressed or implied, that he will restrain every other person from depriving him of that thing, or from troubling him in the use or enjoyment of it. How is it that a man acquires a right to do or forbear any act? By the de-

claration of the legislator, that he may do or forbear it; joined to a promise of the legislator, expressed or implied, that he will restrain every other person from constraining him to forbear the one or to do the other.—As to things antecedently to law, a man may have the use and enjoyment of them, but he cannot have the right to them; that is, he may have possession, but he cannot have property. As to acts, he may be in the habit of doing or forbearing, but he cannot have the right of exercising that habit. For until there is some law, tacit or expressed, he cannot be sure that others will be restrained from troubling him in the exercise of it. He may be free, but without law he cannot have the right of freedom. When men talk of a law of nature, they mean only certain imaginary regulations, which appear to them to be fit and expedient. When they say that a man has a natural right to the use and enjoyment of any thing, or to do or forbear any act, I am apt to conceive they mean no more, than that it appears to them to be fit and expedient that such a right should be established.

LIND.

L A W S.

THE general object of legislature should be variously modified in different countries, agreeable to local situation, the character of the inhabitants,

bitants, and those other circumstances which require that every people should have a particular system of laws, not always the best in itself, but the best adapted to that state for which it is calculated.—Besides the maxims common to all nations, every people are possessed in themselves of some cause which influences them in a particular manner, and renders their own system of laws proper only for themselves. It is thus that, in ancient times among the Hebrews, and in modern times among the Arabians, religion was made the principal object of national concern; among the Athenians this object was literature; at Carthage and Tyre it was commerce; at Rhodes it was navigation, at Sparta war, and at Rome public virtue. ROUSSEAU.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

EVERY law that is not armed with force, or which from circumstances must be ineffectual, should not be promulgated. Opinion which reigns over the minds of men, obeys the slow and indirect impressions of the legislator, but resists them when violently applied; and useless laws communicate their insignificance to the most salutary, which are regarded more as obstacles to be surmounted, than as safe-guards of the public good. But, further, our perceptions being limited,

by enforcing the observance of laws which are evidently useless, we destroy the influence of the most salutary. BECCARIA:

CIVIL AND ECCLESIASTICAL LAWS.

NO ecclesiastical law should be in force till it has received formally the express sanction of the civil government: By this it was that Athens and Rome never had any religious quarrels.—Those quarrels appertain only to barbarous nations.—To permit or prohibit working on a holiday should only be in the magistrate's power; it is not the fit concern of priests to hinder men from cultivating their grounds.—Every thing relating to marriages should depend solely on the magistrate; and let the priests be limited to the august function of the solemnization.—Lending at interest ought to be entirely within the cognizance of the civil law, as by it commercial affairs are regulated.—All ecclesiastics whatever should, as the state's subjects, in all cases be under the control and animadversion of the government.—No priest should have it in his power to deprive a member of society of the least privilege on pretence of his sins: for a priest being himself a sinner, is to pray for sinners; he has no business to try and condemn them.—Magistrates, farmers, and priests, are alike to contribute to the expence of the

the state, as alike belonging to the state.—One weight, one measure, one custom. The punishments of criminals should be of use: when a man is hanged, he is good for nothing; whereas a man condemned to the public works still benefits his country, and is a living admonition.—Every law should be clear, uniform, and precise; explanations are for the most part corruptions.—The only infamy should be vice.—Taxes to be proportionate.—A law should never clash with custom; for if the custom be good, the law must be faulty.

VOLTAIRE.

INTERPRETATION OF LAWS.

THERE is nothing more dangerous than the common axiom, *The spirit of the laws is to be considered*. To adopt it, is to give way to the torrent of opinions. This may seem a paradox to vulgar minds, which are more strongly affected by the smallest disorder before their eyes, than by the most pernicious, though remote, consequences produced by one false principle adopted by a nation.—Our knowledge is in proportion to our ideas. The more complex these are, the greater is the variety of positions in which they may be considered. Every man hath his own particular point of view, and at different times sees the same objects in very different lights. *The spirit of the laws*

laws will then be the result of the good or bad logic of the judge; and this will depend on his good or bad digestion; on the violence of his passions; on the rank and condition of the accused, or on his connections with the judge; and on all these little circumstances which change the appearances of objects in the fluctuating mind of man. Hence we see the fate of a delinquent changed many times in passing through the different courts of judicature, and his life and liberty victims to the false ideas or ill-humour of the judge, who mistakes the vague result of his own confused reasoning for the just interpretation of the laws. We see the same crimes punished in a different manner at different times in the same tribunals; the consequence of not having consulted the constant and invariable voice of the laws, but the erring instability of arbitrary interpretation. The disorders which may arise from a rigorous observance of the letter of penal laws, are not to be compared with those produced by the interpretation of them. The first are temporary inconveniences, which will oblige the legislator to correct the letter of the law; the want of preciseness, and uncertainty of which, has occasioned these disorders: and this will put a stop to the fatal liberty of explaining; the source of arbitrary and venal declamations. When the code of laws is once fixed, it should be observed
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in the literal sense; and nothing more is left to the judge than to determine, whether an action be or be not conformable to the written law. When the rule of right is a matter of controversy, not of fact, the people are slaves to the magistrates.—These are the means by which security of person and property is best obtained; which is just, as it is the purpose of uniting in society; and it is useful, as each person may calculate exactly the inconveniences attending every crime.

BECCARIA.

THE CONTINUANCE OF LAWS DEPENDS ON
THE SILENCE OF THE LEGISLATURE.

THE principle of political life lies in the sovereign authority. The state doth not subsist by virtue of the laws, but by the legislative power. The statutes of yesterday are not in themselves necessarily binding to-day; but the tacit confirmation of them is presumed from the silence of the legislature, the sovereign being supposed incessantly to confirm the laws not actually repealed. Whatever is once declared to be the will of the sovereign, continues always so, unless it be abrogated.

Wherefore then is there so much respect paid to ancient laws? Even for this reason: It is rational to suppose, that nothing but the excellence
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of the ancient laws could preserve them so long in being; for that, if the sovereign had not found them always salutary and useful, they would have been repealed. Hence we see, that the laws, instead of losing their force, acquire additional authority by time in every well formed state: the prepossession of their antiquity renders them every day more venerable; whereas, in every country where the laws grow obsolete, and lose their force as they grow older, this alone is a proof that the legislative power is decayed and the state extinct.

ROUSSEAU.

THE EFFECT OF LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON HUMAN NATURE.

THE regularity and industry we find in common life are the effects of necessity; and that necessity is occasioned by fear. Hence that dissatisfaction and gloom which ever attend them. Man is not made to be forced even into happiness; and that society is ever ineffectual and miserable in proportion to the number and severity of its legal restraints. The mechanic regularity and order, which are the consequences of submitting all actions to the direction of laws, and to the influence of penalties, never produce happiness: they even destroy the first principle of

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it. This, however, is the consequence of public vices in communities which have been originally ill constituted; and which, from many causes not immediately arising from their constitution, have had their existence continued for many ages. This seems to be the case of China, where the government has survived the usual periods of prosperity, luxury, and vice; and has settled into an universal dominion of law, without moral virtue, and even at the expence of real wisdom and happiness. It would be difficult for a Chinese to perform an action which has not been referred to by some law, or some regulation. A wise and virtuous Chinese must of consequence be a phenomenon.

WILLIAMS.

LEGISLATURE AND ITS OMNIPOTENCE.

IF any one should ask, What is the civil liberty of a nation or community? I should lead him to answer himself, by putting this other question in return: What are the civil restraints by which a community can be bound? If this community is the whole of an independent nation, the idea of civil liberty seems not at all applicable to it, because it can be under no civil restraints. Being independent, it must make its own laws to be governed by: but these laws cannot bind the whole

as one body; for this one body can certainly repeal the whole at pleasure: and it is an inconsistency to say, that any person, individual or collective, is bound by a law which he can at pleasure repeal. I do not say that a nation cannot bind itself by a treaty or a promise made to a distinct nation: but this is not a civil tie; this tie has its strength from the laws of nature, from that branch of them called the laws of nations. If a part of an independent nation obtains the name of a community, it is evident that such community may be subject to civil laws; those made by the legislative power of the whole nation, wherever that resides. That the legislature is not omnipotent, as opposed to the whole people, is clear enough; for the whole people must include the members of the legislature: and it would be absurd to say, that the voice of the legislature alone should prevail over that which is the voice of the legislature and the rest of the people taken together. But this voice of the whole people cannot be had; it is as to practice an absolute chimera: and when once it is allowed to dispense with the actual unanimous consent of all individuals because we are under a necessity of dispensing with it, we must go on where the necessity of human affairs leads us; and that is, if I mistake not, to this point, that those to whom the ordinary powers of legislation in any state are

committed, must be considered as unconfined in the power of making laws.—What! Were the British parliament to enact a law, that no one, on pain of death, should taste food for a month; would every Englishman be bound to submit to such a law?—Extreme cases like this always bring with them all the remedy they are capable of. It is to no purpose to lay down rules about them beforehand: for when they happen, all rules and laws cease; violence alone has place. In vain would a man, in any particular circumstances, say at the time, This is an extreme case; and attempt to justify himself by arguments, in acting as if it really was so. It is trifling to argue about such cases; not merely because those who are involved in them will always act from feelings which preclude the effect of arguments, but because the cases cannot be reduced to any distinct general ideas, so as to become a proper subject for argumentation. Therefore, in all speculations, we may still consider the legislature as unbounded in its powers. HEY.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THE supreme power is not limited in itself; nor can it be said to have any assignable, any certain bounds, unless where limited by express convention. That to say, there is any act they can-

not do ;—to speak of any thing of theirs as being illegal—as being void ;—to speak of their exceeding their authority (whatever be the phrase)—their power—their right—is, however common, an abuse of language. The legislature cannot do it: the legislature cannot make a law to this effect. Why cannot? What is there that should hinder them? Why not *this* as well as many other laws murmured at, perhaps as inexpedient, yet submitted to without any question of the right? With men of the same party, with men whose affections are already lifted against the law in question, any thing will go down; any rubbish is good that will add fuel to the flame. But with regard to an impartial bystander, it is plain that it is not denying the right of the legislature, their authority, their power, or whatever be the word,—it is not denying that they *can* do what is in question;—it is not that, I say, or any discourse verging that way, that can tend to give him the smallest satisfaction. Grant even the proposition in general,—what are we the nearer? Grant that there are certain bounds to the authority of the legislature:—Of what use is it to say so, when these bounds are what nobody has ever attempted to mark out to any useful purpose; that is, in any such manner whereby it might be known beforehand what description a law must be of to fall within, and what to fall beyond, them? Grant that

that there are things which the legislature cannot do; grant that there are laws which exceed the power of the legislature to establish:—What rule does this sort of discourse furnish us for determining whether any one that is in question, is not of the number? As far as I can discover, none. Either the discourse goes on in the confusion it began; either all rests in vague assertions, and no intelligible argument at all is offered; or if any, such arguments as are drawn from the principle of utility; arguments which, in whatever variety of words expressed, come at last to neither more nor less than this, That the tendency of the law is, to a greater or less degree, pernicious. If this, then, be the result of the argument, why not come home to it at once? why turn aside into a wilderness of sophistry, when the path of plain reason is straight before us? What practical inferences those who maintain this language mean should be deduced from it, is not altogether clear; nor perhaps does every one mean the same. Some, who speak of a law as being void, would persuade us to look upon the authors of it as having thereby forfeited, as the phrase is, their whole power, as well that of giving force to the particular law in question as to any other.—These are they who, had they arrived at the same practical conclusion through the principle of utility, would have spoken of the law as being to

such a degree pernicious; as that, were the bulk of the community to see it in its true light, the probable mischief of resisting it would be less than the probable mischief of submitting to it. These point, in the first instance, at hostile opposition.—Those who say nothing about forfeiture are commonly less violent in their views. These are they who, were they to ground themselves on the principle of utility, and to use our language, would have spoken of the law as being mischievous indeed, but without speaking of it as being mischievous to the degree that has been just mentioned. The mode of opposition which they point to is one which passes under the appellation of a legal one.—Admit, then, the law to be void in their sense, and mark the consequences. The idea annexed to the epithet *void* is obtained from those instances in which we see it applied to a private instrument.—The consequence of a private instrument's being void is, that all persons concerned are to act as if no such instrument had existed. The consequence, accordingly, of a law's being void must be, that people shall act as if there was no such law about the matter; and therefore, that if any person, in virtue of the mandate of the law, should do any thing in coercion of another person, which without such law he would be punishable for doing, he would still be punishable, to wit, by appointment of the judicial

dicial power. Let the law, for instance, be a law imposing a tax: a man who should go about to levy the tax by force would be punishable as a trespasser: should he chance to be killed in the attempt, the person killing him should *not* be punishable as for murder: should he kill, he himself would perhaps be punishable as for murder. To whose office does it appertain to do those acts in virtue of which such punishment would be inflicted? To that of the judges. Applied to practice, then, the effect of this language is, by an appeal made to the judges, to confer on those magistrates a controlling power over the acts of the legislature. By this management, a particular purpose might perhaps by chance be answered: and let this be supposed a good one. Still what benefit would, from the *general* tendency of such a doctrine, and such a practice in conformity to it, accrue to the body of the people, is more than I can conceive. A parliament, let it be supposed, is too much under the influence of the Crown, pays too little regard to the interests of the people and their sentiments. Be it so. The people at any rate, if not so great a share as they might and ought to have, have had at least *some* share in choosing it. Give to the judges a power of annulling its acts, and you transfer a portion of the supreme power from an assembly which the people have had some share at least in choosing,

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choosing, to a set of men, in the choice of whom they have not the least imaginable share; to a set of men appointed solely by the Crown; appointed solely and avowedly, and constantly, by that very magistrate whose partial and occasional influence is the very grievance you seek to remedy.—In the heat of debate, some perhaps would be for saying of this management, that it was transferring at once the supreme authority from the legislative power to the judicial. But this would be going too far on the other side. There is a wide difference between a positive and a negative part in legislation. There is a wide difference, again, between a negative upon reasons given, and a negative without any. The power of repealing a law, even for reasons given, is a great power; too great indeed for judges, but still very distinguishable from, and much inferior to, that of making one. Notwithstanding what has been said, it would be in vain to dissemble, but that, upon occasion, an appeal of this sort may very well answer, and has indeed in general a tendency to answer in some sort the purposes of those who espouse the interests of the people. A public and authorized debate on the propriety of the law is by this means brought on: an opportunity is gained of impressing sentiments unfavourable to it, upon a numerous and attentive audience; from such an appeal we must expect no other effects

fects except a certainty of miscarriage. Let us now go back a little. In denying the existence of any assignable bounds to the supreme power, I added, unless where limited by express convention; for this exception I could not but subjoin, while there are such governments as the German empire, Dutch provinces, Swiss cantons, and hath been of old the Achæan league. In this mode of limitation I see not any thing to surprise us. By what is it that any degree of power (meaning political power) is established? It is neither more nor less, as we have already had occasion to observe, than a habit of and a disposition to obedience; habit, speaking with regard to past acts; disposition, with respect to future. This disposition it is as easy, or I am much mistaken, to conceive as being absent with regard to one sort of acts, as present with regard to another; for a body then, which is in other respects supreme, to be conceived as being, with respect to a certain sort of acts, limited, all that is necessary is, that this sort of act be in its description distinguishable from every other.

J. BENTHAM.

THE OMNIPOTENCE OF EVERY LEGISLATURE.

IN all states, great or small, the sentiments of that body of men in whose hands the supreme power

power of the society is lodged, must be understood to be the sentiments of the whole body. These deputies or representatives of the people will make a wrong judgment, and pursue wrong measures, if they consult not the good of the whole society, whose representatives they are; just as the people themselves would make a wrong judgment, and pursue wrong measures, if they did not consult their own good, provided they could be assembled for that purpose. No maxims or rules of policy can be binding upon them, but such as they themselves shall judge to be conducive to the public good. Their own reason and conscience are their only guide; and the people, in whose name they act, their only judge.—In large states, this ultimate seat of power, this tribunal, to which lies an appeal from every other, and from which no appeal can even be imagined, is too much hid, and kept out of sight by the present complex forms of government, which derive their authority from it. Hence hath arisen a want of clearness and consistency in the language of the friends of liberty. Hence the preposterous and slavish maxim, That whatever is enacted by that body of men in whom the supreme power of the state is vested, must in all cases be implicitly obeyed; and that no attempt to repeal an unjust law can be vindicated beyond a simple remonstrance addressed to the legislators. A case which
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is very intelligible, but which can never happen, will demonstrate the absurdity of such a maxim. Suppose the King of England and the two Houses of Parliament should make a law, in all the usual forms, to exempt the members of either House from paying taxes to the government, or to take to themselves the property of their fellow-citizens! A law like this would open the eyes of the whole nation, and show them the true principles of government and the power of governors. The nation would see that the most regular governments may become tyrannical, and their governors oppressive, by separating their interest from that of the people whom they govern. Such a law would show them to be but servants, and servants who had shamefully abused their trust. In such a case, every man for himself would lay his hand upon his sword; and the authority of the supreme power of the state would be annihilated. Where regular commissions from the abused public cannot be had, every man who has power, and who is actuated with the sentiments of the public, may assume a public character, and bravely redress public wrongs. In such dismal and critical circumstances, the stifled voice of an oppressed country is a loud call upon every man to exert himself; and whenever that voice shall be at liberty, it will ratify and applaud the action, which it could not formally authorise.

PRIESTLEY.

L L.

LIBERTY.

LIBERTY is the absence of coercion. Coercion is distinguishable into constraint and restraint; and, again, these into physical and moral: hence the ideas of physical and moral liberty. A man is deprived of his physical liberty, when he is constrained by physical force to do or to forbear certain acts: he is deprived of his moral liberty, when, by moral motives, that is, the threat of painful events, to happen in consequence of his doing or forbearing, he is constrained to do or forbear. But these motives must arise, these events must be brought about by foreign causes, by extraneous will, over which we have no power. The absence of physical coercion is physical liberty. The absence of moral coercion is moral liberty.—Liberty is nothing positive; it is only the absence of constraint as well as restraint.—The well-known story of Tarquin and Lucretia will illustrate this. Had Tarquin entered the chamber of Lucretia attended by the companions of his debaucheries; had they held the hapless victim while the prince satiated his lust, this would have been a physical coercion. Instead of this, what did Tarquin? He threatened her with instant death, and future infamy, if she refused to comply with his solicitations. This was applying
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not physical coercion, but moral.—It is this moral coercion that the legislator applies to make the subject obey the laws. He has not recourse to physical coercion, except when he means to compel a subject to undergo the penalty of having disobeyed the laws.—Thus, for instance, the legislator publishes a law, addressed to all his subjects, and says, “Deprive not another of his life.” To this he adds a penalty, “If thou dost, thou shalt lose thy own life.” This is moral coercion; our moral liberty alone is suspended.—But when a man has deprived another of life, then physical coercion is applied to compel that individual to stay for a certain time at a certain place; to appear at a certain time before certain persons; to go afterwards to another certain place, and there to submit to a certain punishment.

LIND.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

LIBERTY is the absence of restraint. The liberty of speaking, of petitioning, of remonstrating, is not understood to mean any thing more than the not being restrained from speaking, &c. Mr Lind has defined liberty as the absence of constraint and restraint. But it seems to me that constraint is understood to include something more than a mere deprivation of liberty. If a person
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by violence puts a pen into my hand, and then constrains or forces me to write certain words or sentences, I am indeed deprived of the liberty of holding my hand still, or of moving it the way that I choose. But that is not all. I am forced into one particular and determinate action; which is something more—there is a positive violence exerted upon me. The common notion of liberty seems therefore to be merely the absence of restraint. To be permitted to do any act is the same as having liberty to do it. Permission in the person, or authority permitting, produces liberty in the person permitted. This may be thought by some the best way of coming at the conception. HEY.

A GENERAL IDEA OF THE PERFECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTY.

THAT some civil society is necessary to peace and good order, that many of the restraints imposed by civil laws are of use, is easily understood. It may be added, that those restraints which do no good will probably do harm. Many of them, we know, are immediately hurtful, taken singly; but there is also something pernicious to be observed in the effect common to all restraints. One mischief attending them is, that they must by their nature operate in the way of general rules.

Special laws cannot be made to direct the actions of each individual; much less can the attention of the legislature be called out to every action of each. And it is found by experience, that at least such general rules as human foresight is able to invent, however useful in the main, are yet in many particular cases prejudicial. In the opinion of some, perhaps, we might go further, and say, that general rules, by their very essence, do harm, though formed in absolute perfection. — The mischief of restraints may be further seen by recollecting how nice a matter it is to bring the mind of man into such a frame that it will exert its faculties with the greatest energy. When it acts by rule, how dull and ineffective! When it goes out in pursuit of its own inclinations, how lively and forcible! There is—even in a state disturbed by licentiousness, there is an animation which is favourable to the human mind, and which puts it upon exerting its powers. The fear of punishment turns a man's attention upon himself and his own interests. If the restraints are very numerous, he is employed in watching himself in his intercourse with his fellow-citizens, that he may not be caught offending. This habit of caution and minute attention to his conduct damps or extinguishes those generous sentiments which might lead him out to promote the happiness of others, and prompt him to

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catch with eagerness every opportunity of advancing the public welfare. It is therefore by no means the part of a good and wise legislature to impose restraints where they are not necessary to the production of some good, which may counterbalance the evil of restraining.—If a law commands me to keep to my right hand in walking along the streets, it abridges my liberty. But if, by enjoining the same to every other passenger, it removes many obstructions that would retard me, I am upon the whole more at liberty in walking along than I should have been without the law. We may see also in this trifling instance the evil of laying a restraint where it is not wanting. If the number of passengers is so small as to cause no confusion, it would be a hardship upon people to be under the necessity of observing such a regulation. Nay, we may go still further with the same instance: it shows the imperfection of a general rule. When the streets are thin, the reason of the law ceases, and the advantages of it: the inconvenience remains, without any good to counterbalance it. But where restraints are the necessary means to increase happiness, the best part that human wisdom and human benevolence can act, is to impose them; and, when imposed, they may possibly promote the liberty of the peaceable citizen: not indeed his civil liberty, understood as the absence of civil restraints; for that
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must certainly be diminished by every additional civil restraint: but a law may, by tying up the hands of the violent and unprincipled, contribute more to the liberty of the peaceable citizen, than it takes away from his liberty by the new restraint which it does itself impose. So that, upon the whole, he becomes freer to follow his own will, and is less controlled in his actions than he was before. Not that we must expect this always to be the effect of a law, even in theory: there are other good purposes to be answered in legislation: national strength, commerce, the health of the people, must be attended to. But it is plain that an increase of liberty, upon the whole, may be owing to an immediate diminution of it by the laws of the community.

We seem, then, to be arrived at one useful principle by which a legislature may guide itself in the formation of laws: To avoid as much as possible multiplying restraints upon the subject. This principle leads to the point of perfection in civil liberty. It is the nature of society that each member of it can only be allowed to pursue his own happiness in a manner consistent with that of the other members; or we may say, that he ought to procure his private good through the medium (as it were) of the public good. Wherever that does not require him to be curbed, our principle would leave him as free as he himself

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can wish or conceive. If he is ambitious of being more free than the public good will allow, he forgets surely that he is a member of civil society.— But why should any civil restraints at all be imposed? For two reasons; the ignorance of men, and their moral depravity. Did every man perfectly understand his own interests and those of the persons with whom he lived in society, and were his passions and his faculties always under such regulation that he could exert himself with energy wherever his knowledge directed him, we should neither want chains to tie us up from being mischievous, nor a guide to keep us from missing our road. **HEY.**

CIVIL LIBERTY AND POLITICAL SECURITY.

LIBERTY is the absence of coercion. Perfect liberty would be a total absence of coercion. Civil liberty means not this. It means only a partial absence of coercion; and that enjoyed by one or more of that class of persons in a state of civil or political society who are called subjects; and with respect only to others of that same class, civil or political liberty consists in this: That no individual or body of subjects have the power of constraining another subject to do, or restraining him from doing, what the laws have ordered him to do or to forbear. This, then, is created by law

law, and is bestowed on one subject, or number of subjects, upon whom the law does *not* operate; and not upon all other subjects upon whom the law does operate.

Suppose, for instance, there were but one religion established, or even tolerated, in a country; and that the ministers of that religion were the only persons permitted to speak in public on the subject of religion. To this class of citizens, called ministers, the liberty of speaking in public on the subject of religion would be then reserved. But how? Not by any operation of the law on them, but by its operation on every other subject, whom it would restrain from troubling them in the free performance of this act. But the restraint upon other subjects in this case would be twofold: they would be restrained from troubling this particular class in the free performance of this particular act; and they would be again restrained from performing that act themselves. Supposing this last restraint never to have been imposed, and all the subjects in this instance would have been free: supposing the restraint to be taken off, and they would again become free. This liberty is bestowed by the operation of the law, not on the individual who means to do the act in question, but on every other person who may attempt to restrain him from doing it.—It may be said, that this idea of civil liberty is imperfect; that civil

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liberty

liberty includes an absence of coercion, with respect not only to all others of the class called subjects, but likewise with respect to that person or assemblage of persons who are called governors. It does not appear practicable to establish such liberty by law. Law is the expression of will. That person or assemblage of persons, the expression of whose will constitutes law, are governors. Is it possible that they should give liberty against themselves? The very attempt to do it, directly and openly, would be destructive of civil liberty properly so called. For the truth of this I may appeal to the history of Rome in ancient days, to that of Poland in our own. In both these states, in proportion as the power of governors has been openly and directly checked, the civil liberty of the subject has been checked with it. The governors, as such, could not indeed infringe the liberty of the subject; but then neither could they protect the accused against the abuse of power on the part of the magistrate, nor the feeble against the oppression of the more powerful individual. Add too, that when this impotence of the governors has produced, as it naturally must produce, a state of anarchy and confusion, they have been compelled to have recourse to the most violent methods to protect the state against either the attacks of foreign foes, or the cabals of factious and overpowerful citizens. Such was, at Rome, the
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appointment of a Dictator, or of a Consul armed with the dictatorial power, conveyed by that arbitrary and unlimited commission of—*Videat Consul ne quid Respublica detrimenti capiat*. Such is, in Poland, the more dreadful tyranny of a confederation. No bounds can be set to the supreme power; the very term of supreme power precludes the idea. In a state where the supreme power is distributed among different ranks and bodies of men, against each of these ranks, taken separately, there may be liberty; bounds may be prescribed to them; they as well as individuals may be restrained by law: against the whole there can be no liberty; united, they are omnipotent. The coronation-oath is frequently urged as a proof that the supreme power not only may be, but actually is, circumscribed within certain bounds. The fact is, that this oath is not a convention between the supreme power and the people, but a promise only from one of the constituent parts of the supreme power;—a very different thing:—each part may have certain limits; and yet the whole, united, be illimited. Notwithstanding this omnipotency of the supreme power in every state, there is a wide difference between a free and despotic state. In a free state, besides civil or political liberty, the subject enjoys what is often confounded with it, though very different from it, civil or political security. This security
arises

arises not from any limitation of the supreme power, but from such a distribution of the several parts of it as shall best insure the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

If this distinction could so be made as to render the interests of the governors and governed perfectly undistinguishable, this end would be completely obtained, and the subject would enjoy perfect political security: this security is more or less perfect as these interests are less or more distinguishable. But it is at first sight apparent, that political security cannot be produced in the same manner as civil liberty. This latter is produced by a positive operation of the law; that is, by a positive act of those persons in whose hands is lodged the power of making and executing laws: But political security cannot be so produced; for this plain reason, because whatever produces it, is to operate against those very persons in whose hands the power is lodged.

Political security, or the assurance the people may have that the powers of government will be applied to the production of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, must be created by the manner of distributing the several portions of power, which, when united, form the supreme power; of arranging the functions of the several classes of governors who, taken together, compose what is meant by government. The happy effects

effects arising from a proper arrangement of the functions and power of the several classes of governors are exemplified in the English constitution. LIND.

THE DIFFERENT SORTS OF LIBERTY.

NATURAL liberty is that which the laws of nature allow, or the absence of restraints imposed by the laws of nature. Physical, moral, religious, and civil liberty, are the absence of physical restraints, of moral, of religious, of civil restraints. There is a liberty which is the result of natural and civil liberty, as it were, mixed together. Natural restraints bind a man in one action, civil restraints bind him in another: the liberty left him upon the whole, is less than either his natural or civil liberty taken singly. Many actions are forbidden by the laws of nature, as hurtful merely to the individual who commits them; such as drunkenness and acts of imprudence. About these we generally find civil laws to be silent. On the other hand, natural laws are silent about many particulars in which the laws of civil society prescribe to us; as about the modes of transferring property. Sometimes a civil law merely enforces a prohibition of nature. Again, it very frequently happens, that a civil law, though it has the same action for its object as some law of nature, does yet narrow our liberty, by being more minute and

and circumstantial in its prohibition. And it seems, that the name of civil liberty is sometimes given to this compounded or resulting liberty, which we enjoy upon the whole by the joint permission of natural and civil laws. HEY.

POLITICAL AND CIVIL LIBERTY IN BARBAROUS AGES.

THE great body of the people, in barbarous and licentious ages, enjoy much less true liberty, than where the execution of the laws is the most severe, and where subjects are reduced to the strictest subordination and dependance on the civil magistrate.—The reason is derived from the excess itself of that liberty.—Men must guard themselves at any price against insults and injuries; and where they receive no protection from the laws and magistrate, they will seek it by submission to superiors, and by herding in some inferior confederacy, which acts under the direction of a powerful chieftain.—And thus all anarchy is the immediate cause of tyranny, if not over the state, at least over many of the individuals.—A barbarous people may be pronounced incapable of any true or regular liberty; which requires such a refinement of laws and institutions, such a comprehension of views, such a sentiment of honour, such a spirit of obedience,
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and such a sacrifice of private interest and connections to public order, as can only be the result of great reflection and experience, and must grow to perfection during several ages of a settled and established government. HUME.

LOVE ONLY A DESIRE OF ENJOYMENT.

WHEN a person imagines that he loves only the soul of a woman, it is certainly her person that he desires; and here, to satisfy his wants, and especially his curiosity, he is rendered capable of every thing. This truth may be proved from the little sensibility most spectators show at the theatre, for the affection of a man and his wife; when the same spectators are so warmly moved by the love of a young man for a young woman. What can produce these different sensations, if it be not the different sensations which they themselves have experienced in these two relations? Most of them have felt, that as they will do every thing for the favours desired, they will do little for the favours obtained; that in the case of love, curiosity being once gratified, they easily comfort themselves for the loss of one who proves unfaithful, and that then the misfortune of a lover is very supportable. Love, therefore, can never be any thing but a disguised desire of enjoyment.

HELVETIUS.

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THE PHYSICAL CAUSE OF LOVE.

WHEN we have before us such objects as excite love and complacency, the body is affected in the following manner: The head reclines something on one side; the eye-lids are more closed than usual, and the eyes roll gently with an inclination to the object; the mouth is a little opened, and the breath drawn slowly, with now and then a low sigh; the whole body is composed, and the hands fall idly to the sides. All this is accompanied with an inward sense of melting and languor. These appearances are always in proportion to the degree of beauty in the object and of sensibility in the observer. And this gradation, from the highest pitch of beauty and sensibility even to the lowest of mediocrity and indifference, and their correspondent effects, ought to be kept in view; else this description will seem exaggerated, which it certainly is not. But from this description it is almost impossible not to conclude, that beauty acts by relaxing the solids of the whole system. There are all the appearances of such a relaxation; and a relaxation somewhat below the natural tone seems to me to be the cause of all positive pleasure. Who is a stranger to that manner of expression so common in all times and in all countries, of being softened, relaxed,

laxed, enervated, dissolved, melted away by pleasure? The universal voice of mankind, faithful to their feelings, concurs in affirming this uniform and general effect: and although some odd and particular instance may, perhaps, be found, wherein there appears a considerable degree of positive pleasure, without all the characters of relaxation; we must not, therefore, reject the conclusion we had drawn from a concurrence of many experiments, but we must still retain it, subjoining the exceptions which may occur, according to the judicious rule laid down by Sir Isaac Newton in the third book of his Optics. This position is confirmed by the genuine constituents of beauty having each of them, separately taken, a natural tendency to relax the fibres; and by the appearance of the human body, when all these constituents are united together before the sensory. So that we may venture to conclude, that the passion called love is produced by this relaxation. We may also conclude, that as a beautiful object presented to the sense, by causing a relaxation in the body, produces the passion of love in the mind; so if by any means the passion should first have its origin in the mind, a relaxation of the outward organs will as certainly ensue in a degree proportioned to the cause.

BURKE.

LUXURY.

EVERY refinement of conveniency, of elegance, and of splendour, which soothe the pride, or gratify the sensuality of mankind, have been severely arranged by the moralists of every age; and it might perhaps be more conducive to the virtue, as well as happiness of mankind, if all possessed the necessaries, and none the superfluities, of life. But in the present imperfect condition of society, luxury, though it may proceed from vice or folly, seems to be the only means that can correct the unequal distribution of property. The diligent mechanic, and the skilful artist, who have obtained no share in the division of the earth, receive a voluntary tax from the possessors of the land; and the latter are prompted, by a sense of interest, to improve those estates, with whose produce they may purchase additional pleasures. These operations impress the political machine with new degrees of activity, and are productive of the happiest effects in every society.

GIBBON.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

LUXURY is a word of an uncertain signification, and may be taken in a good as well as in a bad

bad sense. In general, it means great refinement in the gratification of the senses; and any degree of it may be innocent or blameable, according to the age, or country, or condition of the person. The bounds between the virtue and the vice cannot here be fixed exactly, more than in other moral subjects. To imagine that the gratifying any of the senses, or indulging any delicacy in meats, drinks, or apparel, is of itself a vice, can never enter into any head that is not disordered by the frenzies of enthusiasm. These indulgencies are only vices when they are pursued at the expence of some virtue, as liberality or charity; in like manner, they are follies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himself to want and beggary. Where they intrench upon no virtue, but leave ample subject whence to provide for friends, family, and every proper object of generosity or compassion, they are entirely innocent, and have in every age been acknowledged as such by almost all moralists. To be entirely occupied with the luxury of the table, for instance, without any relish for the pleasure of ambition, study, or conversation, is a mark of stupidity, and is incompatible with any vigour of temper or genius. To confine one's expence entirely to such a gratification, without regard to friends or family, is an indication of a heart devoid of humanity or benevolence. But if a man

reserve time sufficient for all laudable pursuits, and money sufficient for all generous purposes, he is free from every shadow of blame or reproach. HUME.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IT is in vain to attempt a precise definition of luxury. The word luxury, like that of greatness, is one of those comparative expressions that do not offer to the mind any determinate idea; that only expresses the relation two or more objects have to each other. It has no fixed sense till the moment it is put, if I may use the expression, into an equation; and we compare the luxury of one nation, class of men, or private person, with that of others of the same rank. An English peasant, well clothed and fed, is in a state of luxury compared with a French peasant. The man dressed in a coarse cloth, is in a state of luxury, compared to a savage covered with a bear's skin. All things, even to the feathers that adorn the cap of a wild Indian, may be regarded as luxury.

HELVETIUS.

LUXURY

LUXURY AND REFINEMENT OF MANNERS
FAVOURABLE TO LIBERTY.

IN rude unpolished ages, when the arts are neglected, all labour is bestowed on the cultivation of the ground; and the whole society is divided into two classes, proprietors of land and their vassals or tenants. The latter are necessarily dependant, and fitted for slavery and subjection; especially where they possess no riches, and are not valued for their knowledge in agriculture; as must always be the case where the arts are neglected. The former naturally erect themselves into petty tyrants; and must either submit to an absolute master, for the sake of peace and order; or if they will preserve their independency, like the ancient barons, they must fall into feuds and contests among themselves, and throw the whole society into such confusion, as is perhaps worse than the most despotic government. But where luxury nourishes commerce and industry, the peasants, by proper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent; while the tradesmen and merchants acquire a share of the property, and draw authority and consideration to that middling rank of men, who are the best and firmest basis of public liberty. These submit not to slavery like the peasants, from poverty and meanness of spirit;

and having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they are not tempted, for the sake of that gratification, to countenance the tyranny of their sovereign. They covet equal laws, which may secure their property, and preserve them from monarchical as well as aristocratical tyranny.

HUME.

THE EFFECTS OF LUXURY DISCOVERABLE
BY A COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT COTEMPORARY NATIONS.

TO declaim against present times, and magnify the virtue of remote ancestors, is a propensity almost inherent in human nature: And as the sentiments and opinions of civilized ages alone are transmitted to posterity, hence it is that we meet with so many severe judgments pronounced against luxury and even science; and hence it is that at present we give so ready assent to them. But the fallacy is easily perceived by comparing different nations that are contemporaries; where we both judge more impartially, and can better set in opposition those manners with which we are sufficiently acquainted. Treachery and cruelty, the most pernicious and most odious of all vices, seem peculiar to uncivilized ages; and by the refined Greeks and Romans were ascribed to all the barbarous nations which

which furrounded them. They might justly, therefore, have presumed, that their own ancestors, so highly celebrated, possessed no greater virtue, and were as much inferior to their posterity in honour and humanity as in taste and science. An ancient Frank or Saxon may be highly extolled: but I believe every man would think his life or fortune much less secure in the hands of a Moor or Tartar, than in those of a French or English gentleman; the rank of men the most civilized in the most civilized nations.

HUME.

LUXURIOUS AGES MOST HAPPY.

HUMAN happiness, according to the most received notions, seems to consist in three ingredients; action, pleasure, and indolence: and though these ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the dispositions of the person; yet no ingredient can be entirely wanting, without destroying, in some measure, the relish of the whole composition. Indolence or repose, indeed, seems not of itself to contribute much to our enjoyment; but, like sleep, is requisite as an indulgence to the weakness of human nature, which cannot support an uninterrupted course of business or pleasure. That quick march of the spirits, which takes a man from
himself,

himself, and chiefly gives satisfaction, does in the end exhaust the mind, and requires some intervals of repose, which, though agreeable for a moment, yet, if prolonged, beget a languor and lethargy that destroys all enjoyment. Education, custom, and example, have a mighty influence in turning the mind to any of these pursuits; and it must be owned, that where they promote a relish for action and pleasure, they are so far favourable to human happiness. In times when industry and the arts flourish, men are kept in perpetual occupation, and enjoy, as their reward, the occupation itself, as well as those pleasures which are the fruit of their labour. The mind acquires new vigour; enlarges its powers and faculties; and by an assiduity in honest industry, both satisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which commonly spring up when nourished by ease and idleness. Banish those arts from society, you deprive men both of action and pleasure; and leaving nothing but indolence in their place, you even destroy the relish of indolence; which never is agreeable but when it succeeds to labour, and recruits the spirits, exhausted by too much application and fatigue.—The spirit of the age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once roused from their lethargy, and put into a fermentation, turn themselves on all sides, and carry improvements into every

every art and science. Profound ignorance is totally banished, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleasures of the mind as well as those of the body.—The more these refined arts advance, the more sociable men become: nor is it possible that, when enriched with science, and possessed of a fund of conversation, they should be contented to remain in solitude, or live with their fellow-citizens in that distant manner which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock into cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge, to show their wit or their breeding, their taste in conversation or living, in cloaths and furniture. Curiosity allures the wise; vanity the foolish; and pleasure both. Particular clubs and societies are every where formed; both sexes meet in an easy and sociable manner; and the tempers of men as well as their behaviour refine apace. So that, besides the improvements which they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, it is impossible but they must feel an increase of humanity, from the very habit of conversing together and contributing to each other's pleasure and entertainment. Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity, are linked together by an indissoluble chain; and are found, from experience as well as reason, to be peculiar to the more polished, and what are commonly
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denominated the more luxurious ages.—Nor are these advantages attended with disadvantages that bear any proportion to them. The more men refine upon pleasure, the less will they indulge in excesses of any kind; because nothing is more destructive to true pleasure than such excesses. One may safely affirm, that the Tartars are oftener guilty of beastly gluttony, when they feast on their dead horses, than European courtiers with all their refinements of cookery. And if libertine love, or even infidelity to the marriage-bed be more frequent in polite ages, when it is often regarded only as a piece of gallantry; drunkenness, on the other hand, is much less common; a vice more odious, and more pernicious both to body and mind. HUME.

LUXURY AND REFINEMENT OF MANNERS FAVOURABLE TO GOVERNMENT.

THE increase and consumption of all commodities which serve to the ornament and pleasure of life, are advantageous to society; because at the same time that they multiply those innocent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of store-house of labour, which, in the exigencies of a state, may be turned to the public service. In a nation where there is no demand for such superfluities, men sink into indolence, and lose
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all enjoyment of life; and are useless to the public, which cannot maintain nor support its fleets and armies from the industry of such slothful members.—The bounds of all the European kingdoms are at present nearly the same they were two hundred years ago: But what a difference is there in the power and grandeur of those kingdoms? which can be ascribed to nothing but the increase of art and industry.—This industry is much promoted by the knowledge inseparable from ages of art and refinement; as on the other hand this knowledge enables the public to make the best advantage of the industry of its subjects. Laws, order, police, discipline; these can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reason has refined itself by exercise, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at least of commerce and manufactures. Not to mention, that all ignorant ages are infested with superstition, which throws the government off its bias, and disturbs men in the pursuit of their interest and happiness.—Knowledge in the arts of government naturally begets mildness and moderation, by instructing men in the advantages of humane maxims above rigour and severity, which drive subjects into rebellion, and render the return to submission impracticable by cutting off all hopes of pardon. When the tempers of men are softened, as well as their knowledge improved, this humanity

manity appears still more conspicuous; and is the chief characteristic which distinguishes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance. Fac-tions are then less inveterate, revolutions less tragical, authority less severe, and seditions less frequent. Even foreign wars abate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle, where honour and interest steel men against compassion as well as fear, the combatants divest themselves of the brute, and resume the man.—Luxury and refinement of manners in destroying ferocity do not annihilate the martial spirit. If anger, which is said to be the whetstone of courage, loses somewhat of its asperity by politeness and refinement; a sense of honour, which is a stronger, more constant, and more governable principle, acquires fresh vigour by that elevation of genius which arises from knowledge and a good education.—Refinement on the pleasures and conveniences of life has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption. The disorders in the Roman state, which have been ascribed to luxury and refinement, really proceeded from an ill-modelled government, and the unlimited extent of conquests. The value which all men put upon any particular pleasure depends on comparison and experience; nor is a porter less greedy of money which he spends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier who purchases champagne and ortolans. Riches

are valuable at all times to all men, because they always purchase pleasures, such as men are accustomed to and desire: nor can any thing restrain or regulate the love of money, but a sense of honour and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound most in ages of knowledge and refinement.

HUME.

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OF MADMEN AND IDIOTS.

THOSE who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have but little matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand and make use of language, or judge or reason, to any tolerable degree; but only a little, and imperfectly, about things present, and very familiar to their senses. And indeed any of the forementioned faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce suitable defects in mens understandings and knowledge.

The defect of *naturals* seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties; whereby they are deprived of reason: whereas *madmen*, on the other side, seem

seem to suffer by the other extreme. For they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning; but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths; and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles: For by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right inference, require suitable attendance, respect, and obedience: Others, who have thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies. Hence it comes to pass, that a man who is very sober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may in one particular be as frantic as any in *Bedlam*; if either by any very sudden strong impression, or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts, incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully as to remain united. But there are degrees of madness as of folly; the disorderly jumbling ideas together is in some more and some less. In short, herein seems to be the difference between idiots and madmen, that madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason right from them: but idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all.

LOCKE.

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MAD-

MADNESS.

THE causes of madness are of two kinds, bodily and mental. That which arises from bodily causes is nearly related to drunkenness, and to the deliriums attending diseases. That from mental causes is of the same kind with temporary alienations of the mind during violent passions, and with the prejudices and opinionativeness which much application to one set of ideas only occasions.

We may thus distinguish the causes for the more easy conception and analysis of the subject; but in fact they are both united for the most part. The bodily cause lays hold of that passion or affection which is most disproportionate; and the mental cause, when that is primary, generally waits till some bodily distemper gives it full scope to exert itself. Agreeably to this, the prevention and cure of all kinds of madness require an attention both to the body and mind.

It is observed, that mad persons often speak rationally and consistently upon the subjects that occur, provided that single one which most affects them be kept out of view. And the reason of this may be, that whether they first become mad because a particular original mental uneasiness falls in with an accidental bodily disorder, or because

cause an original bodily disorder falls in with an accidental mental one; it must follow, that a particular set of ideas shall be extremely magnified, and consequently an unnatural association of sameness or repugnancy between them generated; all other ideas and associations remaining nearly the same. When one false position of this kind is admitted, it begets more of course, the same bodily and mental causes also continuing; but then this process stops after a certain number of false positions are adopted from their mutual inconsistency, unless the whole nervous system is deranged. The memory is often much impaired in madness; which is both a sign of the greatness of the bodily disorder and a hindrance to mental rectification, and therefore a bad prognostic. If an opposite state of body and mind can be introduced early, before the unnatural associations are too much cemented, the madness is cured; if otherwise, it will remain though both the bodily and mental cause should be at last removed.

In dissections after madness, the brain is often found dry, and the blood-vessels much distended; which are arguments that violent vibrations took place in the internal parts of the brain, the peculiar residence of ideas and passions; and that it was much compressed, so as to obstruct the natural course of association.

As in mad persons the vibrations in the inter-

nal parts of the brain are preternaturally increased, so they are defective in the external organs, in the glands, &c. Hence maniacs eat little, are costive, make little water, and take scarce any notice of external impressions. The violence of the ideas and passions may give them great muscular strength upon particular occasions: But maniacs are often sluggish as well as insensible, from the great prevalence of the ideal vibrations; just as persons in a state of deep attention are. Bodily labour, with a variety of mental occupations, and a considerable abstemiousness in the quantity and quality of diet, ought always to be prescribed, and are the best preservatives in hereditary and other tendencies to madness.

HARTLEY.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THERE are different kinds of madmen; some who are so very mad, that they lose all use of their reason, and are as little able to deduce consequences as to establish principles. Others again deduce consequences, and argue very justly, but are still mad; because they reason from principles that have no reality out of their own heated and disordered imaginations. Instances of this kind of madness are to be found in every form of life; even among those who are reputed sober and wise,
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and who are really such, except on some particular subject. All are in this predicament, whose imaginations are run away with by the prejudices of education on religious and political subjects.

BOLINGBROKE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

BY madness, is meant the distemper of the organs of the brain, which necessarily hinders a man from thinking and acting like others. An important observation here is, that this man is not without ideas; he has them, whilst waking, like all other men, and often in his sleep. It may be asked, how his soul, being spiritual and immortal, and residing in his brain, whither all the ideas are conveyed to it by the senses very plain and distinct, yet never forms a right judgment of them? It sees objects equally as the souls of Aristotle, Plato, Locke, and Newton; it hears the same sounds, it has the same sense of the touch: how happens it, then, that with the same perceptions as the wisest men, it makes a wild incoherent jumble without being able to help itself? If this simple and eternal substance has the same instruments for acting as the souls of the wisest brains, it should reason like them; what can hinder it? If this madman sees red, and the sensible men blue; if when this hears music, the madman hears
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the braying of an ass; if when they hear yes, he hears no; I must of necessity conclude, that his soul must think differently from the others. But this madman has the like perceptions as they; and there is no apparent reason why his soul, having through the senses received all its tools, cannot make use of them. It is said to be pure, to be of itself subject to no infirmity, to be provided with all necessary helps; and whatever happens in the body, its essence remains unalterable, yet it is carried in its case to bedlam. This reflection may give rise to an apprehension, that the faculty of thinking with which man is endued is liable to be disordered like the other senses. A madman is a patient whose brain suffers, as a gouty man is a patient whose feet and hands suffer: he thought by means of the brain as he walked with his feet, without knowing any thing of his incomprehensible power to walk, or of his no less incomprehensible power to think.

VOLTAIRE.

MAHOMETANISM.

IT was an error, to suppose it was by allowing a free indulgence to the passions that Mahomet gained so many followers: His doctrine, however absurd and stupid it may seem when compared with Christianity, was severe and rigorous, in
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comparison to the extravagant and licentious manners that prevailed in Arabia.—Frequent prayers, charities, fasting, the prohibition of that crime which defeats the views of nature, by deceiving her with respect to the object of her desires, the denying the use of wine, and the forgiveness of injuries, were all so many yokes on a people, with whom the passions, inflamed by example, had obliterated every appearance of justice. It was not therefore, as is generally asserted, by favouring licentiousness, that Mahomet made so many proselytes to his opinions, but by proposing a more noble and virtuous system than that which they before followed; which is the only method of persuading any people whatever.—Men love the practice of vice, but they are also fond of contemplating virtue.—If we examine different sects, we shall find that they generally affected the appearance of austerity; and if they at any time indulged licentious manners, they carefully concealed it: the reason is, virtue has such a natural influence over our minds, that we cannot destroy it but by assuming her venerable dress.

MEHEGAN.

MANUFACTURES.

MANUFACTURES are founded in poverty: It is the multitude of poor without land in a country.

try, and who must work for others at low wages or starve, that enables undertakers to carry on a manufacture, and afford it cheap enough to prevent the importation of the same kind from abroad, and to bear the expence of its own exportation. But no man who can have a piece of land of his own, sufficient by his labour to subsist his family in plenty, is poor enough to be a manufacturer and work for a master. Hence, while there is land in a country sufficient for the people upon easy terms, there can be no manufactures to any amount or value. It is an observation founded upon facts, that the natural livelihood of the thin inhabitants of a forest country is hunting; that of a greater number, pasturage; that of a middling population, agriculture; and that of the greatest, manufactures; which last must subsist the bulk of the people in a full country, or they must be subsisted by charity, or perish.

FRANKLIN.

MARRIAGE.

THAT the human, like every other species of animals should multiply by the copulation of the two sexes, and be propagated by their care to nurse and breed up their young, is undoubtedly a law of nature. Self-love, the great spring of human actions, prompts to both. But as it is more immediately determined, and more strongly stimu-

stimulated by instinct and by nature, to the one than to the other; it becomes necessary to give this principle, by reason and by art, to let it lose none that it had. For this purpose it was necessary that parents should know certainly their own respective broods; and that as a woman cannot doubt whether she is the mother of the child she bears, so a man should have all the assurance law can give him that he is the father of the child he begets. Thus matrimony forms families, which could not be formed without it; and families form states, which could not be formed without them. It was the first natural union which preceded, and prepared mankind for political or civil union: and the bonds of this second union were more effectually strengthened by those of paternal and filial affection and of consanguinity, than they could have been by those alone of accidental interests liable to vary, and of covenants liable to be broken. On such principles, and for such purposes, matrimony was instituted. They are evidently derived from the law of nature. The institution therefore is conformable to the law of nature, as far as it is subservient to these ends. But when it is carried further than these ends require, and that which is consistent with them, or even conducive to them, is forbid, it is, in every such respect, a mere arbitrary imposition.—Great attention has been had in every well-regulated government

vernment to promote the multiplication of mankind: and this attention must be alway necessary; for if the human race is daily increasing, it is daily decreasing likewise; and it would be trifling to maintain that celibacy is less hurtful, or polygamy less necessary, than they were formerly. Men who were advanced in years, and had never been married, were stigmatised at Sparta; and as well there as at Rome, and in many other places, great immunities, prerogatives, and other encouragements, were granted to those who had a large legitimate issue. The Talmudists carry the obligation so far of getting children, that they declare the neglect of it to be a sort of homicide.—All the ends of matrimony are answered by polygamy; and the custom for one man to have several wives has prevailed always, and it still prevails generally, if not universally, either as a reasonable indulgence to mankind, or as a proper, and in the early ages a necessary, expedient to increase their numbers. Such it is, no doubt; such it must be in the order of nature: and when we are told that it has not this effect among the people who retain the custom to this day, either the fact asserted by men, who cannot be competent judges of it, may be untrue; or Sodomy and abortions, in conjunction with other causes as unnatural, may prevent the natural effect of polygamy. Polygamy was allowed by the
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the Mosaical law, and was authorised by God himself. The zeal of the Jews to promote the observation of the precept, To increase and multiply, was so great, that besides the establishment and regulation of polygamy, their doctors descended into many particulars for the same purpose; and among the rest were careful to appoint stated periods, beyond which it was not lawful to neglect the performance of conjugal duty in any form of life. The periods were marked even to the artificer, the countryman, and the seaman; and the wife had her remedy if the law was not observed. Polygamy is quite conformable to the law of nature, and provides the most effectual means for the generation and education of children. Monogamy, on the other hand, or the confinement of one husband to one wife, whilst they both live, will unite the care of both parents in breeding up subjects of the commonwealth; but will not serve as effectually, nor in as great numbers, to the begetting them. The prohibition of polygamy, therefore, is not only a prohibition of what nature permits in the fullest manner, but what she requires also in the same manner, and often in a greater degree than ordinary, for the reparation of states exhausted by wars, by plagues, and other calamities.—The reasons that determined the lawgivers of Greece and Rome, and of some few other states, to forbid

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a plurality of wives, which was permitted in almost all countries, may have been such as these: They saw that polygamy would create large families, and large families a greater expence than could be borne by men who were reduced to live in cities, and other fixed habitations, where property was distinguished, and where no one could afford to spend more than his legal possessions, his labour, and his industry gave him. Monogamy was a sort of sumptuary law, and might be thought the more reasonable, because even in those countries where polygamy was established, men were not permitted to marry more women than they were able to maintain.—But of all the reasons by which we may account for the prevalence of single marriages in opposition to polygamy, divorces constituted the principal and the most effectual. With them, monogamy may be thought a reasonable institution; without them, it is an absurd, unnatural, and cruel imposition. It crosses the intention of nature doubly, as it stands in opposition to the most effectual means of multiplying the human species, and as it forbids the sole expedient by which this evil can be lessened in any degree, and the intention of Nature can be, in many cases, at all carried on.—The institution of divorces was of such absolute necessity where a plurality of wives was forbid, and of so much convenience where this plurality was allowed,

ed, that it continued on the same foot among the Romans till Christianity was established fully in the empire; and that it continues still among the Jews in the east; if not practised, for prudential reasons, in the same manner, and as openly in the west.

BOLINGBROKE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

MARRIAGE has two objects: the one the preservation of the species; the other the pleasure and happiness of the two sexes. To what shall we refer the uniformity of its institution? I answer, To the conformity between this mode of matrimony and the primitive state of the inhabitants of Europe, that is, the state of peasants. In that rank, the man and woman have one common object of desire, which is the improvement of the land they occupy; this improvement results from their mutual labours. The man and wife constantly occupied in their farm, and always useful to each other, support, without disgust, and without inconvenience, their indissoluble union.—The law of indissolubility in marriage is a cruel and barbarous law, (says Fontenelle.) The few happy marriages prove the necessity of a reformation in this matter.—There are countries where the lover and his mistress do not marry till after they have lived together three years. During that

time they try the sympathy of their characters. If they do not agree, they part, and the girl goes to another.

These African marriages are the most proper to secure the happiness of the parties. But how then must the children be provided for? By the same laws that secure their maintenance in countries where divorces are permitted. Let the sons remain with the father, and the daughters go with the mother; and let a certain sum be stipulated in the marriage-articles for the education of such children. The inconvenience of divorces will then be insignificant, and the happiness of the married parties secured. But it may be said, that divorces will enormously increase under a law so favourable to human inconstancy. Experience proves the contrary.—To conclude, if the variable and ambulatory desires of men and women urge them sometimes to change the object of their tenderness, why should they be deprived of the pleasure of variety, if their inconstancy, by the regulation of wise laws, be not detrimental to society.—In France, the women are too much mistresses; in the East, too much slaves: they are there a sacrifice to the pleasure of men. But why should they be a sacrifice? If the two parties cease to love, and begin to hate each other, why should they be obliged to live together? Marriage frequently represents nothing more than the picture

ture of two unfortunate people who are chained together, to be a reciprocal torment to each other.

HELVETIUS.

DEGREES OF MARRIAGE.

THE natural reason why marriage in certain degrees is prohibited by the civil laws, and condemned by the moral sentiments of all nations, is derived from mens care to preserve purity of manners; while they reflect, that if a commerce of love were authorised between the nearest relations, the frequent opportunities of intimate conversation, especially during early youth, would introduce an universal dissoluteness and corruption.—But as the customs of countries vary considerably, and open an intercourse, more or less restrained, between different families, or between the several members of the same family; so we find, that the moral precept varying with its cause, is susceptible, without any inconvenience, of very different latitude in the several ages and nations of the world.—The extreme delicacy of the Greeks permitted no converse between persons of two sexes, except where they lived under the same roof; and even the apartments of a step-mother and her daughters were almost as much shut up against visits from the husband's sons, as against those from any strangers or more remote

relations: Hence, in that nation, it was lawful for a man to marry, not only his niece, but his half sister by the father. A liberty unknown to the Romans, and other nations, where a more open intercourse was authorised between the sexes.

HUME.

MARRIAGE BETWEEN RELATIONS.

WITH regard to marriages between relations, it is a thing extremely delicate to fix exactly the point at which the laws of nature stop, and where the civil laws begin. For this purpose we must establish some principles.—The marriage of the son with the mother confounds the state of things: the son ought to have an unlimited respect to his mother, the wife an unlimited respect to her husband; therefore the marriage of the mother to the son would subvert the natural state of both. Besides, Nature has forwarded in women the time in which they are able to have children, but has retarded it in men; and for the same reason, women sooner lose the ability and men later. If the marriage between the mother and the son were permitted, it would almost always be the case, that when the husband was capable of entering into the views of nature, the wife would be incapable. The marriage between the father and the daughter is contrary to nature

nature as well as the other; but it is less contrary because it has not those two obstacles. Thus the Tartars, who may marry their daughters, never marry their mothers, as we see in accounts of that nation. This law is very ancient among them. Attila, (says Priscus) in his embassy, stopt in a certain place to marry Esca his daughter. A thing permitted, he adds, by the laws of the Scythians.

It has ever been the natural duty of fathers to watch over the chastity of their children. Intrusted with the care of their education, they are obliged to preserve the body in the greatest perfection, and the mind from the least corruption; to encourage whatever has a tendency to inspire them with virtuous desires, and to nourish a becoming tenderness.

As children dwell, or are supposed to dwell, in their father's house, marriages between fathers and children, between brothers and sisters, are prohibited, in order to preserve natural modesty in families. On the same principle, marriages between the son-in-law with the mother-in-law, the father-in-law with the daughter-in-law, are prohibited by the law of nature. In this case, the resemblance has the same effect as the reality, because it springs from the same cause. There are nations among whom cousin-germans are considered as brothers, because they commonly dwell
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in the same house; there are others where this custom is not known. Among the first, the marriage of cousin-germans ought to be regarded as contrary to nature; not so among the others. But the laws of nature cannot be local; therefore, when these marriages are forbidden, or permitted, it must be done according to the circumstances by a civil law.

It is not a necessary custom for the brother-in-law and the sister-in-law to dwell together in the same house. The marriage between them is not then prohibited to preserve chastity in the family; and the law which forbids or permits it, is not a law of nature, but a civil law, regulated by circumstances, and dependent on the custom of each country.

The prohibitions of the law of nature are invariable; the father, the mother, and the children, necessarily dwell in the same house. The prohibitions of the civil laws are accidental, because they depend on accidental circumstances; cousin-germans and others dwelling in the house by accident. This explains why the law of Moses, those of the Egyptians, and of many other nations, permitted the marriage of the brother-in-law with the sister-in-law, whilst these very marriages were disallowed by other nations.

In India they have a very natural reason for admitting this sort of marriages. The uncle is there

there considered as the father, and is obliged to maintain and educate his nephew, as if he were his own child. This proceeds from the disposition of these people, which is good-natured and full of humanity. This law or the custom has produced another: If a husband has lost his wife, he does not fail to marry her sister; which is extremely natural, for his new consort becomes the mother of her sister's children, and not a cruel stepmother.

MONTESQUIEU.

MARRIAGE WITH A BROTHER'S WIDOW.

MARRIAGE, in this degree of affinity, is indeed prohibited in Leviticus; but it is natural to interpret that prohibition as a part of the Jewish ceremonial or municipal law: And though it is there said in the conclusion, that the Gentile nations, by violating these degrees of consanguinity, had incurred the Divine displeasure, the extension of this maxim to every precise case before specified, is supposing the Scriptures to be composed with a minute accuracy and precision, to which, we know with certainty, the sacred penmen did not think proper to confine themselves.—The descent of mankind from one common father, obliged them, in the first generation, to marry in the nearest degrees of consanguinity: instances of a like nature occur among the patriarchs: and the marriage

marriage of a brother's widow was, in certain cases, not only permitted, but even enjoined as a positive precept by the Mosaic law.—It is in vain to say, that this precept was an exception to the rule, and an exception confined merely to the Jewish nation.—The inference is still just, that it can contain no natural or moral turpitude; otherwise God, who is the author of all purity, would never in any case have enjoined it.

HUME.

MATTER.

WISE men, on being asked, What the soul is? answer, They are entirely ignorant of it: And if asked what matter is, give the like answer. This almost unknown being, is it eternal? So all antiquity believed. Has it of itself an active force? This is the opinion of several philosophers. Have they who deny it any superior reason for their opinion? You do not conceive that matter can, intrinsically, have any property; but how can you affirm that it has not, intrinsically, such properties as are necessary to it? You know nothing of its nature, and yet deny it to have modes which reside in its nature: for, after all, as matter exists, it must have a form and figure; and being necessarily figured, is it impossible that there are other modes annexed to its configuration? Matter exists, this

this you know; but you know it no further than by your sensations. We weigh, we measure, we analyse, we decompound matter; but on offering to go a step beyond these operations, we find ourselves bewildered, and an abyss opens before us. How can we conceive that what is without succession has not always been? Were the existence of matter not necessary, why exists it? And if it was to exist, why should it not always have existed? Never was an axiom more universally received than this: Nothing produces nothing. The contrary, indeed, is incomprehensible: all nations have held their chaos anterior to the divine disposition of the world. Matter, therefore, was looked on in the hands of God as clay under the potter's wheel; if such faint images may be used to express the divine power. Matter being eternal, should have eternal properties; as configuration, the inert power, motion, and divisibility. But this divisibility is no more than the consequence of motion; as without motion there can be no division, separation, and arrangement: therefore motion was looked on as essential to matter. The chaos had been a confused motion; and the arrangement of the universe was a regular motion impressed on all bodies by the Deity. But how should matter of itself have motion; as, according to all the ancients, it has extension and impenetrability? It cannot, however, be conceived without extension, and

and it may without motion. To this the answer was, It is impossible but matter must be permeable; and if permeable, something must be continually passing into its pores: Where is the use of passages, if nothing passes through them? The system of the eternity of matter has, like all other systems, very great difficulties. That of matter formed out of nothing is not less incomprehensible. Happily, which ever system is espoused, morality is hurt by neither; for what signifies it whether matter be made, or only arranged? God is equally our absolute master. Whether the chaos was only put in order, or whether it was created of nothing, still it behoves us to be virtuous: Scarce any of these metaphysical questions have a relation to the conduct of life. Disputes are like table-talk; every one forgets after dinner what he has said, and goes away where his interest or inclination leads him. VOLTAIRE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IT has at all times been alternately asserted, That matter felt, or did not feel. If a precise idea had been affixed to the word matter, it would have been perceived, if I may use the expression, that men were the creators of matter; that matter was not a being; that in nature there were only individuals to which the name of body had

been given; and that this word *matter* could import no more than the collection of properties common to all bodies. The meaning of this word being determined, all that remained was to know, whether extent, solidity, and impenetrability were the only properties common to all bodies; and whether the discovery of a power, such, for instance, as attraction, might not give rise to a conjecture that bodies had some properties hitherto unknown, such as that of sensation, which though evident only in the organized members of animals, might yet be common to all individuals?—The question being reduced to this, it would have appeared, that if, strictly speaking, it is impossible to demonstrate that all bodies are absolutely insensible, no man, unless instructed by a particular revelation, can decide the question otherwise than by calculating and comparing the probability of this opinion with that of the contrary.

HELVETIUS.

DEMONSTRATIONS OF MATTERS OF FACT.

THERE is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments *a priori*; because nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction.—Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction.—Whatever we conceive

as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent.—There is therefore no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction; consequently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable.

HUME.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

WHEN we once assume the existence of any thing as a fact, the non-existence of the cause implies the non-existence of the effect, or of the thing assumed as a fact.—Nothing, it is said by Mr Hume, that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction.—Is it distinctly conceivable, that there should be a first cause of all things? If it be not, the necessary existence of the Deity is established.—Whatever we conceive as existent, we can, according to that Philosopher, conceive also as non-existent.—Not so; we conceive space as existent: Can we conceive it as non-existent? The utmost stretch of the imagination cannot annihilate space; therefore its existence is necessary, and its non-existence implies a contradiction.—So it is with the first cause, or the Deity.—Allow the existence of one thing, and of but a single atom, and the non-existence of its primary cause, or the Deity, involves an absurdity.

MELAN.

MELANCHOLY.

VAPOURS, hypochondriacal and hysterical disorders, are comprehended under this class. The causes of it are self-indulgence in eating and drinking, and particularly in fermented liquors, want of due bodily exercise, injuries done to the brain by fevers, concussions, &c. too much application of the mind, especially to the same objects and ideas, violent and long continued passions, profuse evacuations, and an hereditary disposition; which last we may suppose to consist chiefly in an undue make of the brain. In women, the uneasy states of the uterus are propagated to the brain, both immediately and mediately; *i. e.* by first affecting the stomach, and thence the brain. In men, the original disorder often begins, and continues a long time, chiefly in the organs of digestion.

The *causa proxima* of melancholy, is an irritability of the medullary substance of the brain, disposing it upon slight occasions to such vibrations as enter the limits of pain; and particularly such kinds and degrees as belong to the passions of fear, sorrow, anger, jealousy, &c. And as these vibrations, when the passions are not in great excess, do not much transgress the limits of pleasure, it will often happen that hypochondriac and

hysteric persons shall be transported with joy from trifling causes, and be at times disposed to mirth and laughter. They are also very fickle and changeable, as having their desires, hopes, and fears, increased far beyond their natural state, when they fall in with such a state of the brain as favours them.

It often happens to these persons to have very absurd desires, hopes, and fears, and yet at the same time to know them to be absurd, and in consequence thereof to resist them. While they do this, we may reckon the disease within the bounds of melancholy; but when they endeavour to gratify very absurd desires, or are permanently persuaded of the reality of very groundless hopes and fears, and especially if they lose the connecting consciousness in any great degree, we may reckon the disease to have passed into madness strictly so called.

THE DIFFERENT RACES OF MEN.

NONE but the blind can doubt that the Whites, the Negroes, the Albinos, the Hottentots, the Laplanders, the Chinese, the Americans, are races entirely different.

No curious traveller ever passed through Leyden, without seeing part of the reticulum mucosum of a Negro dissected by the celebrated Ruysch.

This

This membrane is black; and communicates to Negroes that inherent blackness, which they do not lose but in such disorders as may destroy this texture, and allow the grease to issue from its cells and form white spots under the skin.

Their round eyes, squat noses, and invariable thick lips, the different configurations of their ears, their woolly heads, and the measure of their intellects, make a prodigious difference between them and other species of men; and what demonstrates that they are not indebted for this difference to their climates is, that Negro men and women being transported into the coldest countries, constantly produce animals of their own species; and that Mulattoes are only a bastard race of black men and white women. The Albinoes are, indeed, a very small and scarce nation; they inhabit the centre of Africa. Their weakness does not allow them to make excursions far from the caverns which they inhabit, the Negroes, nevertheless, catch some of them at times, and these we purchase of them as curiosities. To say that they are dwarf Negroes, whose skin has been blanched by a kind of leprosy, is like saying that the Blacks themselves are Whites blackened by the leprosy. An Albino no more resembles a Guinea Negro than he does an Englishman or a Spaniard. Their whiteness is not like ours; it does not appear like flesh, it has no mixture of white and brown; it

is the colour of linen, or rather of bleached wax; their hair and eye-brows are like the finest and softest silk; their eyes have no sort of similitude with those of other men, but they come very near partridges eyes. Their shape resembles that of the Laplanders, but their head that of no other nation whatever; as their hair, their eyes, their ears, are all different; and they have nothing that seems to belong to man but the stature of their bodies, with the faculty of speaking and thinking, but in a degree very different from ours.

The apron, which nature has given to the Caffres, and whose flabby and lank skin falls from their navel half way down their thighs; the black breasts of the Samoides women, the beard of the males of our continent, and the beardless chins of the Americans, are such striking distinctions, that it is scarce possible to imagine that they are not each of them of different races.

But now if it should be asked, From whence came the Americans? it should be asked, From whence came the inhabitants of the Terra Australis? And it has been already answered, That the same Providence which placed men in Norway, planted some also in America and under the antarctic circle, in the same manner as it planted trees and made grass to grow there.

Several of the learned have surmised, that some races of men, or animals approximating to men, have

have perished: The Albinos are so few in number, so weak, and so ill-used by the Negroes, that there is reason to apprehend this species will not long exist.

With respect to the duration of the life of man (if you abstract that line of Adam's descendants consecrated by the Jewish books), it is probable that all the races of man have enjoyed a life nearly as short as our own; as animals, trees, and all productions of nature, have ever had the same duration.

But it should be observed, that commerce, not having always introduced among mankind the productions and disorders of other climates, and men being more robust and laborious in the simplicity of a country life, for which they are born, they must have enjoyed a more equal health, and a life somewhat longer, than in effeminacy, or in the unhealthy works of great cities; that is to say, that if in Paris or London one man in 20,000 attains the age of a hundred years, it is probable that 20 men in 20 years arrived formerly at that age. This is seen in several parts of America, where mankind have preserved a pure state of nature.—The plague and the small-pox, which Arabian caravans communicated in a course of years to the people of Asia and Europe, were for a long time unknown. Thus mankind in Asia and the fine climates of Europe multiplied more easily than

than elsewhere. Accidental disorders, and some wounds, were not indeed cured as they are at present; but the advantage of never being afflicted with the plague or small-pox, compensated all the dangers attendant on our nature; so that, every thing considered, it is to be believed, that human kind formerly enjoyed, in the favourable climates, a more healthy and happy life than since the foundation of great empires.

VOLTAIRE.

AN ORIGINAL INFERIORITY IN THE INTELLECTUAL ABILITIES OF MEN BEYOND THE POLAR CIRCLES AND BETWEEN THE TROPICS.

THERE is some reason to think, that all the nations which live beyond the polar circles, or between the tropics, are inferior to the rest of the species, and are incapable of all the higher attainments of the human mind. The poverty and misery of the northern inhabitants of the globe, and the indolence of the southern from their few necessities, may perhaps account for this remarkable difference, without having recourse to physical causes. Though it may be suspected, that the Negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds), are naturally inferior to the Whites, there scarcely ever

ever was a civilized nation of any other complexion than White, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures among them; no arts; no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the Whites, such as the ancient Germans and present Tartars, have still something eminent about them; in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if Nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies; there are Negro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity, though few people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one Negro as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few words plainly.

Hume.

NO ORIGINAL DISTINCTION IN THE INTELLECTUAL ABILITIES OF MEN IN ANY PART OF THE GLOBE.

DAVID HUME, in a note to his Essay on National Characters, says, "I am apt to suspect that

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" the Negroes, and in general all the other spe-
 " cies of men (for there are four or five different
 " kinds), are inferior to the Whites. There ne-
 " ver was a civilized nation of any other com-
 " plection than White, nor even any individual,
 " eminent either in action or speculation: No in-
 " genious manufactures among them; no arts, no
 " sciences; not to mention our colonies, there are
 " Negro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of which
 " none have ever discovered any symptoms of in-
 " genuity."

This suspicion (for it seems scarcely to have
 matured into an opinion) concerning an original
 distinction in the breeds of men, has unaccount-
 ably given occasion to some writers to quote Hume
 as an advocate for the slavery of the Negroes;
 which, if his facts were admitted, is foreign to
 his argument. — But his assertions are doubtless
 too general. Were the Carthaginians, a civilized
 African nation, white? Were Hannibal or Ju-
 gurtha, both Africans, of great merit and emi-
 nence, white? No instances, it is true, can be
 produced among the Negroes; but examples taken
 under the disadvantages of that oppression in
 which they are usually seen by Europeans, will be
 reasonably objected to. The bad qualities of slaves
 may with more justice be attributed, not to their
 complexion or climate, but to the abject servility
 of their condition, which represses emulation, and
 extin-

extinguishes whatever is great and noble in the mind. Many instances, however, prove, that when opportunities have occurred of relief from the severity of their bondage, the Negroes are capable of instruction both in arts and sciences.—With respect to their disposition in their own country, Adanson, in his history of Senegal, says, that they are good-natured, civil, and obliging; and that he was convinced a considerable abatement ought to be made in the accounts he had heard and read of the savage character of the Africans. Bosman, a Dutch governor, who resided some years in Africa, relates, that they are friendly to strangers; that they discover in conversation a great quickness of parts and understanding; and that they have a variety of mechanical arts, and some curious manufactures; among them; particularly that of gold and silver hat-bands, in which he doubts if they can be rivalled by the most polished nations. Barbet, Brue, and Holben, who also resided in the country, unite in the favourable representation which they give of their capacity for civil government and the administration of justice.

These testimonials, extracted from writers who had resided on the spot, evidently overthrow the fallacious foundation on which Hume had hazarded his speculation.

STRENGTH

adheres tenaciously to his general resolutions; and is neither seduced by the allurements of pleasure, nor terrified by the menaces of pain; but keeps still in view those distant pursuits, by which he at once ensures his happiness and his honour.

HUME.

MIRACLES.

A MIRACLE, in the energetic sense of the word, means something wonderful; and thus every thing is a miracle. The order of nature, the activity of light, the life of animals, are perpetual miracles. According to the received notion, however, a miracle is a violation of the divine and eternal laws. A dead man walking two leagues with his head in his hands, is what we call a miracle. Several naturalists affirm, that, in this sense, there are no miracles; and their arguments are these: A miracle is a breach of the mathematical, divine, immutable, eternal laws; now this definition alone makes a miracle a contradiction in terms. A law cannot be both immutable and broken. But it is answered, Cannot a law of God's making be suspended by its Author? They boldly answer, No; and it cannot be that the infinitely wise Being should have made laws, and afterwards break them. If, say they, he made any alteration in his machine, it would be to

make it go the better. Now it is clear that God has framed this immense machine as good as it possibly could be: if he saw that any imperfection hereafter would be occasioned by the nature of the materials, he at first provided against any such future defect; so that there would be no cause for any after-change. Besides, God can do nothing without reason: now, what reason could induce him to disfigure his own work for any time? It is for man's sake, say their opponents. It is to be hoped then, answer they, that it is for the sake of all men; it being impossible to conceive that the Divine Nature should work for some particular men, and not for all mankind. But supposing that God had been pleased to distinguish a small number of men by particular favours, must he therefore alter what he has settled for all times and all places? Must he suspend or alter the eternal play of those immense springs on which depends the motion of the universe? He certainly can favour his creatures without any such inconsistency and change: his favours are comprised in his very laws: every thing has been wisely contrived and arranged for their good; and they all irrevocably obey the force which he has originally implanted in nature.—Wherefore is God to work a miracle? to accomplish a design he has for some living beings? That is making God to say, I have not been able, by the fabric of the universe,

verse, by my divine decrees, by my eternal laws, to compass such a design: I see I must make an alteration in my eternal ideas, my immutable laws, as what I intended cannot be executed by those means. This would be an acknowledgment of weakness, not a declaration of power: it would be the most inconceivable contradiction. So that to suppose God works any miracles, is, if men can insult God, a downright insult to him: it is no less than saying to him, You are a weak and inconsistent Being.—A further reply to these philosophers is, Your crying up the immutability of the Supreme Being, the eternity of his laws, with the regularity of his infinite worlds, signifies nothing: our small heap of dirt has been covered with miracles: in history, prodigies are as frequent as natural events. Name me one nation where incredible prodigies have not been performed, especially in times when reading and writing were little known.—A philosopher was one day asked, What he would say if the sun stood still; that is, if the motion of the earth round that body ceased? if all the dead arose? and if all the mountains went and threw themselves into the sea? and all this to prove some important truth. What I should say I answered the philosopher: I would turn Manichean; and say, that there is a principle which undoes what the other has done.

VOLTAIRE

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

I HAVE seen the birth of many miracles of my time, which, although they were still-born, yet have we not failed to foresee what they would have come to had they lived. It is but finding the end of the clue, and a man may wind off as much as he will; and there is a greater distance betwixt nothing and the minutest thing in the world, than there is betwixt that and the greatest. Now, the first that are tinged with the beginning of novelty, when they set out their history, find, by the opposition they meet with, where the difficulty of persuasion lies, and caulk that place with some false piece. Besides that, *Infita hominibus libidine alendi de industria humores*; "men having a natural lust to propagate reports;" we naturally make a conscience of restoring what has been lent us, without some usury and addition of our own invention. Private error first creates public error; and afterwards, in turn, public error causes a particular one. Thus all this fabric rises by patch-work from hand to hand; so that the remotest witness knows more than the nearest; and the last informed is more certain than the first. It is a natural progress; for whoever believes any thing, thinks it a work of charity to persuade another into the same opinion: which the

the better to do, he will make no difficulty of adding as much of his own invention as he conceives necessary to obviate the resistance or want of conception he supposes in others. There is nothing to which men commonly are more inclined than to give way to their own opinions. Where the ordinary means fail us, we add command and force, fire and sword. It is a misfortune to be at that pass, that the best touchstone of the truth must be the multitude of believers, in a crowd where the number of fools so much exceed the wise. *Quasi vero quidquam sit tam valde, quam nihil sapere, vulgare. Sanitatis patrocinium est insanientium turba.* "As if any thing were so common as ignorance." "The mob of fools is a protection to the wise." It is hard for a man to form his judgment against the common opinions. The first persuasion taken of the very subject itself possesses the simple; and from that it spreads to the wise, by the authority of the number and antiquity of the witnesses. For my part, what I would not believe from one, I would not believe from a hundred; and I do not judge of opinions by the years. It is not long since one of our princes, in whom the gout has spoiled an excellent natural genius and sprightly disposition, suffered himself to be so far persuaded with the report of the wonderful operations of a certain priest, who by words and gestures cured all sorts of diseases, as

to go a long journey to seek him out; and, by the force of his apprehension, for some time so persuaded and laid his legs asleep for several hours, as to obtain that service from them which they had a long time left off. Had fortune packed together five or six such accidents, it had been enough to have brought this miracle into nature. There was after this discovered so much simplicity, and so little art, in the architect of such operations, that he was thought too contemptible to be punished; as would be the case of most such things, were they examined to the bottom. *Miramur ex intervallo fallentia*, "We admire at things that deceive by their distance." So does our sight often represent to us strange things at a distance, that vanish in approaching them near. *Nunquam ad liquidum fama perducitur*, "Fame never reports things in their true light." It is to be wondered at from how many idle beginnings and frivolous causes such famous impressions commonly proceed. This it is that obstructs the information; for whilst we seek out the causes, and the great and weighty ends worthy of so great a name, we lose the true ones. They escape our sight by their littleness: and, in truth, a prudent, diligent, and subtle inquirer is necessary in such researches; one who is indifferent, and not prepossessed.

MONTAIGNE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

A MIRACLE is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable that all men must die; that lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or a miracle, to prevent them? Nothing is a miracle if it happen in the common course of nature. Sometimes an event may not in *itself* seem to be contrary to the laws of nature; and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a miracle, because in fact it is contrary to these laws. Thus, if a person claiming a divine authority should command a sick person to be well, the clouds to pour rain; in short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there

is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature, than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, *A transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.* A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force for that purpose, is a real miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us. —No event can be miraculous unless contrary to uniform experience. Uniform experience amounts to a proof; there is therefore a direct and a full proof, from the nature of the fact, against every miracle; nor can such proof be destroyed but by an opposite superior proof.

HUME.

A MIRACLE DESTROYS THE TESTIMONY FOR IT, AND THE TESTIMONY DESTROYS ITSELF.

IN matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and it is impossible the religions of ancient

ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China, should all of them be true. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles on which that system was established: So that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts; and the evidence to these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other. When we believe any miracle of Mahomet, &c. we have for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians; and, on the other hand, we are to regard the testimony of all the witnesses, Grecians, Chinese, and Roman Catholic, in the same light as if they had mentioned that Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument is not different from the reasoning of a judge, who supposes, that the credit of two witnesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the testimony of two others, who affirm him to have been 200 miles distant at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed.

SOME

SOME MIRACLES OR VIOLATIONS OF THE
USUAL COURSE OF NATURE MAY ADMIT
OF PROOF FROM HUMAN TESTIMONY.

SUPPOSE all authors, in all languages, agree, that from the first of January 1600 there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days; suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people; that all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bringing us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction: it is evident, that our philosophers, instead of doubting that fact, ought to receive it for certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many analogies, that any phenomenon which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe, comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and uniform.

HUME.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

A MIRACLE is, in a particular fact, an immediate act of Divine power, a sensible change in the order of nature, a real and visible exception

to

to its laws. Such is the idea, from which we must not wander, if we would be understood in reasoning on this subject. Now this idea presents two queries, which it is necessary for us to resolve. The first is, Can the Deity work miracles? that is to say, Can he break through those laws which he hath established? To treat this question seriously, would be impious, if not absurd: to punish the man who should resolve it in the negative, would be doing him too much honour; he should be confined to straw and a dark chamber. But then who hath ever denied the power of the Deity to work miracles? A man must be a very Jew, to ask if God Almighty could spread a table in the wilderness?—The second question is, Would the Deity work miracles? This is another thing. This question, considered merely in itself, is perfectly indifferent. It by no means interests the glory of God, whose designs we cannot penetrate. I will go still further, and say, if there were any difference with regard to faith, in the manner of answering it, the highest ideas we can entertain of the wisdom and majesty of the Divine Being would induce us to reply in the negative. It is nothing but human vanity that could object to it. Thus far can reason go, and no further. As for any thing else, this question is futile and frivolous; as, in order to resolve it, we ought to be able to read the eternal decrees

decrees of Heaven; for, as we shall see presently, it is impossible to determine it by facts. These are mysteries; and so much respect is due to the Infinite Essence, as not to come to any determination about an object of which we know nothing but its immensity. — And yet when a mere mortal comes to us, and boldly affirms that he hath seen a miracle, he determines this great question at once. Judge, then, if he ought to be believed merely on his word.

It is gross sophistry to employ moral proofs to ascertain facts that are physically impossible; as in that case the very principle of credibility, founded on natural possibility, is in fault. Though men are willing, in such a cause, to admit of this proof in matters of mere speculation, or in regard to facts that are in nowise interesting, we may be assured they would be more difficult with respect to any thing that in the least affected their temporal interest. Let us suppose that a dead man should return to demand his estate and effects of his heirs, affirming that he is restored again to life, and requiring to be admitted to prove it. Is there a tribunal upon earth would grant him leave? But, not to enter into this controversy, we will admit the facts to have all the certitude ascribed to them, and content ourselves with distinguishing between what is apparent to the sense, and what is deducible from reason.

As a miracle is an exception to the laws of nature, it is necessary, in order to enable us to judge of it, that we should be fully acquainted with those laws; and in order to judge of it with certainty, that we should be acquainted with them all. For if there should be but one we are ignorant of, it may, in some circumstances unknown to the spectators, alter the effect of those which may be known. Hence every one who takes upon him to say, that such or such an act is a miracle, declares himself to be perfectly acquainted with all the laws of nature, and that he knows this act to be an exception.

But where is the man who knows all the laws of nature? Newton himself never pretended to such knowledge. A sensible man, being witness to an unheard of act, may affirm that he saw such a fact, and we may believe him. But neither that sensible man, nor any other sensible man upon earth, will take upon him to affirm, that such fact, how new and astonishing soever, is a miracle; for how can he know it?

The most that can be said in favour of a person who boasts his working miracles is, that he does things very extraordinary. But who will deny the possibility or reality of things very extraordinary?

New discoveries are daily made in the operations of nature, while human industry is hourly proceeding towards perfection. The curious art

of chemistry alone hath its transmutations, precipitations, detonations, explosions, its phosphorus, its earthquakes, and a thousand other wonders, to operate on the beholders — With such instruments, as cannon, the loadstone, the barometer, and optical instruments, what prodigies might not be worked among ignorant people? The Europeans have, in consequence of their arts, always passed for Gods among the Barbarians. And yet if, in the midst even of these arts, of sciences, colleges, and academies; if, in the midst of Europe, in France, or in England, a person had started up, in the last century, armed with all those miracles of electricity, which are now common to the meanest of our experimentalists, it is probable he would have been burnt for a forcerer, or followed as a prophet.—The spectators of marvellous things are naturally led to cry them up with exaggeration. In deceiving others on this head, therefore, men may frequently, without ill intention, deceive themselves. When things are ever so little above our knowledge or comprehension, we are apt to think them above that of human reason in general; and the mind is at length induced to see a prodigy, where the heart is so strongly inclined to find one.

From what is here advanced, I conclude, that mere facts, though ever so well attested and admissible in all their circumstances, serve to prove
nothing;

nothing; and that we may suspect an exaggeration of their circumstances, without suspecting the sincerity of those who have related them. The discoveries which are daily making in the laws of nature, those which probably will be made hereafter, and those which may ever remain to be made; the past and present progress of human industry; the different bounds which people set to the impossible, according as they have more or less knowledge; all these things serve to prove that we are unacquainted with those bounds. And yet, in order to a miracle's being really such, it must surpass them. Whether there be truly any miracles or not, therefore, it is impossible for a wise man to be assured that any fact whatever is truly such.

ROUSSEAU.

MIRACLES ESTABLISHED ONLY BY HUMAN TESTIMONY, NO PROOF OF THE DIVINE ORIGINAL OF ANY RELIGION.

IF we extend our theology beyond the prospect of the universe and the proper use of our faculties, we must have recourse to extraordinary means. These means cannot depend on the authority of men: for all men being of the same species, they have all the same natural means of knowledge, and one man is as likely to be deceived as another. Faith, therefore, must depend

not on hearsay, but on proofs. The testimony, therefore, of mankind is, at the bottom, that of reason, and adds nothing to the natural means God hath given us for the discovery of truth.—What can even the apostle of truth have to tell us, of which we are not still to judge? *But God himself* hath spoken; listen to the voice of revelation. *But to whom hath he spoken?* and how comes it that he hath appointed others to teach his word? There would have been much less risk of deception, if every individual had heard him speak; and this would have been no difficult matter to Omnipotence. It may be said, we are secure from deception by his manifesting the mission of his messengers by miracles. Where are these miracles to be seen? Are they related only in books? Who wrote these books? Men. Who were witnesses of these miracles? Men. Always human testimony! It is always men that tell us what other men have told them. What a number of these are constantly between us and the Deity! We are always reduced to the necessity of examining, comparing, and verifying such evidence.

This occasions a very intricate discussion, for which we stand in need of immense erudition. We must recur back to the earliest antiquity; we must examine, weigh, confront prophecies, revelations, facts, with all the monuments of faith that have made their appearance in all the countries

countries of the world, to ascertain their time, place, authors, and occasions. There is great sagacity requisite to enable us to distinguish between pieces that are supposititious and those which are authentic; to compare objections with their replies, translations with their originals; to judge of the impartiality of witnesses, of their good sense, of their capacity; to know if nothing be suppressed or added to their testimony, if nothing be changed, transposed or falsified; to obviate the contradictions that remain; to judge what weight we ought to ascribe to the silence of our opponents, in regard to facts alleged against them; whether they did not disdain them too much to make any reply; whether books were common enough for ours to reach them; or if we were honest enough to let theirs have a free circulation among us, and to leave their strongest objections in full force.

Again, supposing all these monuments acknowledged to be incontestable, we must proceed to examine the proofs of the mission of their authors. It would be necessary for us to be perfectly acquainted with the laws of chance, and the doctrine of probabilities, to judge what prediction could not be accomplished without a miracle; to know the genius of the original language, in order to distinguish what is predictive in these languages, and what is only figurative. It would

be requisite for us to know what facts are agreeable to the established order of nature, and what are not so; to be able to say how far an artful man may not fascinate the eyes of the simple, and even astonish the most enlightened spectators; to know of what kind a miracle should be, and the authenticity it ought to bear, not only to claim our belief, but to make it criminal to doubt it; to compare the proofs of false and true miracles, and discover the certain means of distinguishing them; and, after all, to tell why the Deity should choose, in order to confirm the truth of his word, to make use of means which themselves require so much confirmation, as if he took delight in playing upon the credulity of mankind, and had purposely avoided the direct means to persuade them.

Suppose that the Divine Majesty hath really condescended to make man the organ of promulgating its sacred will; is it reasonable, is it just, to require all mankind to obey the voice of such a minister, without his making himself known to be such? Where is the equity or propriety of furnishing him, for universal credentials, with only a few particular tokens displayed before a handful of obscure persons, and of which all the rest of mankind know nothing but hearsay? In every country in the world, if we should believe all the prodigies to be true which the common people,

people, and the ignorant, affirm to have seen, every sect would be in the right; there would be more miraculous events than natural ones; and the greatest miracle of all would be to find that no miracles had happened where fanaticism had been persecuted. The Supreme Being is best displayed by the fixed and unalterable order of nature. Who is there will venture to determine how many eye-witnesses are necessary to render a miracle worthy of credit? If the miracles intended to prove the truth of a doctrine, stand themselves in need of proof, of what use are they? There might as well be none performed at all.

The most important examination, after all, remains to be made into the truth of the doctrines delivered; for as those who say that God is pleased to work these miracles, pretend that the devil sometimes imitates them, we are not a jot nearer than before, though such miracles should be ever so well attested. As the magicians of Pharaoh worked the same miracles, even in the presence of Moses, as he himself performed by the express command of God, why might not they, in his absence, from the same proofs, pretend to the same authority? Thus, after proving the truth of the doctrine by the miracle, we are reduced to prove the truth of the miracle by that of the doctrine, lest the works of the devil should be mistaken for those of the Lord.—The doctrine
coming

coming from God ought to bear the sacred characters of the Divinity; and should not only clear up those confused ideas which unenlightened reason excites in the mind, but should also furnish us with a system of religion and morals agreeable to those attributes by which only we form a conception of his essence..

ROUSSEAU.

THE PASSION OF SURPRISE AND WONDER FAVOURABLE TO MIRACLES.

THE passion of surprise and wonder arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events from which it is derived.—With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received; their descriptions of sea and land monsters, &c.? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality. What greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? If, by the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man has first made a convert of himself, and entered seriously into the delusion; who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds.

frauds in support of so holy and meritorious a cause? The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame. The gazing multitude receive greedily, without examination, whatever soothes superstition, and promotes wonder. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence: what judgment they have, they renounce by principle; or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence; and his impudence overpowers their credulity. The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous; and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind. We judge, therefore, in conformity to experience and observation, when we account for them by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of all the laws of nature?

HUME.

ML

MIRACLES ABOUND IN IGNORANT AND BARBAROUS AGES.

IT forms a very strong presumption against all miraculous relations, that they are observed to abound chiefly among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority which always attend received opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations, we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into a new world. Pestilences, famines, death, &c. are never the effects of those natural causes which we experience. Prophecies, omens, oracles, judgments, quite obscure the few natural events that are intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvellous; and that though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.

The advantages are so great of starting an imposture

posture among an ignorant people, that, even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generality of them (which, though seldom, is sometimes the case), it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad. None of their countrymen have large enough correspondence, or sufficient credit and authority, to contradict and beat down the delusion. Mens inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance.

HUME.

MIRACLES CAN NEVER BE PROVED BY HUMAN TESTIMONY, SO AS TO BE THE FOUNDATION OF A SYSTEM OF RELIGION.

IF a miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion, men, in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat; and sufficient with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without further examination. Though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed be Almighty,

mighty, it does not, upon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation; and obliges us to compare the instances of the violations of truth in the testimony of men, with those of the violations of the laws of nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely or probable. As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles than in that concerning any other matter of fact, this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a resolution, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretext it may be covered.

HUME.

PRINCIPLES OF THE MONKS, NOT A PROPER STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

AMONG the different principles adopted as a standard of right and wrong, is the principle of the Monks; or, as it is more frequently called, the *ascetic* principle, or *asceticism*; a term from a Greek word which signifies *exercise*. The practices by which the Monks sought to distinguish them-

themselves from other men, were called their exercises. These exercises consisted in so many contrivances they had for tormenting themselves. By this they thought to ingratiate themselves with the Deity. For the Deity, said they, is a Being of infinite benevolence: now a Being of the most ordinary benevolence is pleased to see others make themselves as happy as they can; therefore to make ourselves as unhappy as we can is the way to please the Deity. If any body asked them, What motive they could find for doing all this? Oh! said they, you are not to imagine that we are punishing ourselves for nothing: we know very well what we are about. You are to know, that for every grain of pain it costs us now, we are to have a hundred grains of pleasure by and by. The case is, that God loves to see us torment ourselves at present: indeed he has as good as told us so. But this is done only to try us, in order just to see how we should behave; which it is plain he could not know, without making the experiment. Now, then, from the satisfaction it gives him to see us make ourselves as unhappy as we can make ourselves in this present life, we have a sure proof of the satisfaction it will give him to see us as happy as he can make us in a life to come.

By the principle of *asceticism* therefore is meant, that principle which, like the principle of *utility*, approves or disapproves of any action, according to

the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; but in an inverse manner: approving of actions in as far as they tend to diminish his happiness; disapproving of them in as far as they tend to augment it. It is evident that any one who reprobates any the least particle of pleasure, as such, from whatever source derived, is *pro tanto* a partizan of the principle of asceticism. It is only upon that principle, and not from the principle of utility, that the most abominable pleasure which the vilest of malefactors ever reaped from his crime would be to be reprobated, if it stood alone. The case is, that it never does stand alone; but is necessarily followed by such a quantity of pain (or, what comes to the same thing, such a chance for a certain quantity of pain), that the pleasure, in comparison of it, is as nothing: and this is the true and sole, but perfectly sufficient, reason for making it a ground for punishment.

There are two classes of men of very different complexions, by whom the principle of asceticism appears to have been embraced: the one a set of moralists; the other a set of religionists. Different accordingly have been the motives which appear to have recommended it to the notice of these different parties. Hope, that is, the prospect of pleasure, seems to have animated the former: hope,

hope, the aliment of philosophic pride; the hope of honour and reputation at the hands of men. Fear, that is, the prospect of pain, the latter: fear, the offspring of superstitious fancy; the fear of future punishment at the hands of a splenetic and revengeful Deity. I say in this case, fear; for of the invisible future, fear is more powerful than hope. These circumstances characterize the two different parties among the partizans of the principle of asceticism; the parties and their motives different, the principle the same.

The religious party, however, appear to have carried it further than the philosophical: they have acted more consistently and less wisely. The philosophical party have scarcely gone further than to reprobate pleasure: the religious party have frequently gone so far as to make it a matter of merit and of duty to court pain. The philosophical party have hardly gone further than the making pain a matter of indifference. It is no evil, they have said: they have not said, It is a good. They have not so much as reprobated all pleasure in the lump. They have discarded only what they have called the gross; that is, such as are organical, or of which the origin is easily traced up to such as are organical: they have even cherished and magnified the refined. Yet this, however, not under the name of pleasure: to cleanse itself from the sordes of its impure original, it was

necessary it should change its name: the honourable, the glorious, the reputable, the becoming, the *honestum*, the *decorum*, it was to be called; in short, any thing but pleasure.

From these two sources have flowed the doctrines from which the sentiments of the bulk of mankind have all along received a tincture of this principle; some from the philosophical, some from the religious, some from both. Men of education more frequently from the philosophical; as more suited to the elevation of their sentiments: the vulgar more frequently from the superstitious, as more suited to the narrowness of their intellect, undiluted by knowledge; and to the abjectness of their condition, continually open to the attacks of fear. The tinctures, however, derived from the two sources, would naturally intermingle, inasmuch that a man would not always know by which of them he was most influenced; and they would often serve to corroborate and enliven one another. It was this conformity that made a kind of alliance between parties of a complexion otherwise so dissimilar; and disposed them to unite upon various occasions against the common enemy, the partizan of the principle of utility, whom they joined in branding with the odious name of Epicurean.

The principle of asceticism, however, with whatever warmth it may have been embraced by its partizans as a rule of private conduct, seems not

to

to have been carried to any considerable length when applied to the business of government. In a few instances it has been carried a little way by the philosophical party: witness the Spartan regimen. Though then, perhaps, it may be considered as having been a measure of security; and an application, though a precipitate and perverse application, of the principle of utility. Scarcely in any instances, to any considerable length, by the religious: for the various monastic orders, and the societies of the Quakers, Dumplers, Moravians, and other religionists, have been free societies, whose regimen no man has been astricted to without the intervention of his own consent. Whatever merit a man may have thought there would be in making himself miserable, no such notion seems ever to have occurred to any of them, that it may be a merit, much less a duty, to make others miserable; although it should seem, that if a certain quantity of misery were a thing so desirable, it would not matter much whether it were brought by each man upon himself, or by one man upon another. It is true, that from the same source from whence, among the religionists, the attachment to the principle of asceticism took its rise, flowed other doctrines and practices, from which misery in abundance was produced in one man by the instrumentality of another: witness the holy wars, and the persecutions for religion.

But the passion for producing misery in these cases proceeded upon some special ground: the exercise of it was confined to persons of particular descriptions; they were tormented, not as men, but as heretics and infidels. To have inflicted the same miseries on their fellow-believers and fellow-sectaries, would have been as blameable in the eyes even of these religionists, as in those of a partizan of the principle of utility. For a man to give himself a certain number of stripes was indeed meritorious; but to give the same number of stripes to another man, not consenting, would have been a sin. We read of saints, who for the good of their souls, and the mortification of their bodies, have voluntarily yielded themselves a prey to vermin: but though many persons of this class have wielded the reins of empire, we read of none who have set themselves to work, and made laws on purpose, with a view of stocking the body politic with the breed of highwaymen, housebreakers, or incendiaries. If at any time they have suffered the nation to be preyed upon by swarms of idle pensioners, or useless placemen, it has rather been from negligence and imbecillity, than from any settled plan for oppressing and plundering of the people. If at any time they have sapped the sources of national wealth, by cramping commerce, and driving the inhabitants into emigration, it has been with other views, and in pursuit of

of other ends. If they have declaimed against the pursuit of pleasure, and the use of wealth, they have commonly stopt at declamation; they have not, like Lycurgus, made express ordinances for the purpose of banishing the precious metals. If they have established idleness by law, it has been, not because idleness, the mother of vice and misery, is itself a virtue; but because idleness (say they) is the road to holiness. If, under the notion of fasting, they have joined in the plan of confining their subjects to a diet, thought by some to be of the most nourishing and prolific nature, it has been not for the sake of making them tributaries to the nations by whom that diet was to be supplied, but for the sake of manifesting their own power, and exercising the obedience of the people. If they have established, or suffered to be established, punishments for the breach of celibacy, they have done no more than comply with the petitions of those deluded rigorists, who, dupes to the ambitious and deep-laid policy of their rulers, first laid themselves under that idle obligation by a vow.

The principle of asceticism seems originally to have been the reverie of certain hasty speculators, who having perceived, or fancied, that certain pleasures, when reaped in certain circumstances, have, at the long run, been attended with pains more than equivalent to them, took occasion to quarrel with

with every thing that offered itself under the name of pleasure. Having then got thus far, and having forgot the point which they set out from, they pushed on, and went so much further as to think it meritorious to fall in love with pain. Even this, we see, is at bottom but the principle of utility misapplied.

The principle of utility is capable of being consistently pursued; and it is but tautology to say, that the more consistently it is pursued, the better it must ever be for human-kind. The principle of asceticism never was, nor ever can be, consistently pursued by any living creature. Let but one tenth part of the inhabitants of this earth pursue it consistently, and in a day's time they will have turned it into a hell. *See the article RIGHT and WRONG.* J. BENTHAM.

MORALITY.

THE truths of morality, like all other truths, are discovered only by trials and experiments. The principles of moral conduct would be totally insignificant if they did not lead to some ends; and if a certain manner of exercising our faculties, a certain manner of acting, had not been found, by repeated experiments, to have made us happy, and a different manner to have made us unhappy, we should never have had any principles of

of morals. This science, therefore, which, under its own name, but more especially under that of religion, has been considered as a matter of mere speculation, and abounding with doubts and uncertainties and difficulties, is as plain and as clear as geometry; it depends on facts, which cannot easily be mistaken, because the whole world is collecting and observing them; and it has this advantage over other sciences, that all men have an equal interest in the success of their inquiries.

WILLIAMS.

THE ORIGIN OF MORAL RULES.

THE rules of morality are ultimately founded on experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve or disapprove of. We do not originally approve or condemn particular actions, because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or inconsistent with a certain general rule. The general rule, on the contrary, is formed, by finding from experience, that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or disapproved of. To the man who first saw an inhuman murder, committed from avarice, envy, or unjust resentment, and upon one too who loved and trusted the murderer; who beheld the last agonies of the dying person;

person; who heard him with his expiring breath complain more of the perfidy and ingratitude of his false friend, than of the violence which had been done to him; there could be no occasion, in order to conceive how horrible such an action was, that he should reflect that one of the most sacred rules of conduct was what prohibited the taking away the life of an innocent person; that this was a plain violation of that rule, and consequently a very blameable action. His detestation of this crime, it is evident, would arise instantaneously, and antecedent to his having formed to himself any such general rule. The general rule, on the contrary, which he might afterwards form, would be founded upon the detestation which he felt necessarily arise in his own breast at the thought of this and every other particular action of the same kind. When we read in history or romance the account of actions either of generosity or of baseness, the admiration which we conceive for the one, and the contempt which we feel for the other, neither of them arise from reflecting that there are certain general rules which declare all actions of the one kind admirable, and all actions of the other contemptible. Those general rules, on the contrary, are all formed from the experience we have had of the effects which actions of all different kinds naturally produce upon us. An amiable action, a respectable action

tion, an horrid action, are all of them actions which naturally excite the love, the respect, or the horror of the spectator, for the person who performs them. The general rules which determine what actions are, and what are not, the objects of each of those sentiments, can be formed no other way than by observing what actions actually and in fact excite them. When these general rules indeed have been formed, and when they are universally acknowledged and established by the concurring sentiments of mankind, we frequently appeal to them, as to the standards of judgment, in debating concerning the degree of praise or blame that is due to certain actions of a complicated and dubious nature. They are upon these occasions commonly cited as the ultimate foundations of what is just or unjust in human conduct: and this circumstance seems to have misled several eminent authors to draw up their systems in such a manner, as if they had supposed that the original judgments of mankind, with regard to right or wrong, were formed, like the decisions of a court of judicatory, by considering, first, the general rule; and then, secondly, whether the particular action under consideration fell properly within its comprehension. *See the article RIGHT and WRONG.*

A. SMITH.

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GENERAL STATE OF MORALS IN DIFFER- ENT CLIMATES.

IN point of morality in general, it is agreed, that the manners of cold climates far exceed those of warm; in the latter, the passions are naturally very strong, and likewise kept in a perpetual state of irritation from the high degree of sensibility that prevails, which causes a great multiplication of crimes, by multiplying the objects of temptation. Many desires and passions arise there, from causes that would either never occur in a cold climate, or be easily resisted; but in a warm one the passion or inclination is stronger, and the power of restraint less. In cold climates, the desires are but few in comparison, and not often of a very immoral kind; and those repressed with less difficulty, as they are seldom very violent. In temperate climates, the passions are in a middle state, and generally inconstant in their nature; sufficiently strong, however, to furnish motives for action, though not so powerful as to admit of no restraints from considerations of prudence, justice, or religion.

FALCONER.

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THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEAS OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

EVERY person feels a gleam of pleasure the moment that light is introduced into a dark room; and disagreeable sensations, tending to melancholy, and sometimes verging towards the borders of terror, upon passing suddenly from a light into a perfectly dark place. These feelings are instantaneous and constant, and to appearance *simple*; yet they are unquestionably the offspring of association, but formed by a thousand sensations and ideas, which it is impossible to analyse or separate; and they vary exceedingly in different persons, especially according to the circumstances of their early lives.

The ideas annexed to the words *moral right* and *wrong* are likewise far from being simple in reality; though the association of their parts has become so intimate and perfect in a long course of time, that, upon first naming them, they present that appearance. So the motion of the head, and of any particular limb, may seem to be a very simple thing, though a great number of muscles are employed to perform it.

The first rudiments of the ideas of *right*, *wrong*, and *obligation*, seem to be acquired by a child when he finds himself checked and controuled by

a superior power. At first, he feels nothing but mere *force*; and consequently he has no idea of any kind of restraint but that of mere *necessity*. He finds he cannot have his will, and therefore he submits. Afterwards, he attends to many circumstances, which distinguish the authority of a *father* or of a *master*, from that of other persons. Ideas of reverence, love, esteem, dependence, accompany those commands; and by degrees he experiences the peculiar advantages of filial subjection. He sees also, that all his companions, who are noticed and admired by others, obey their parents, and that those who are of a refractory disposition are universally disliked.

These and other circumstances now begin to alter and modify the idea of mere necessity, till by degrees he considers the commands of a parent as something that *must not* be resisted or disputed, even though he has a power of doing it; and all these ideas coalescing, form the ideas of moral right and moral obligation, which are easily transferred from the commands of a parent to those of a magistrate, of God, and of conscience. It is plainly apparent to every person who has attended to the ideas of children, that their ideas of moral right and moral obligation are formed very gradually and slowly, from a long train of circumstances, and that it is a considerable time before they become at all distinct and perfect.

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This opinion of the gradual formation of the ideas of moral right and wrong from a great variety of elements, easily accounts for that prodigious diversity in the sentiments of mankind respecting the objects of moral obligation; and they seem unaccountable on any other hypothesis. If the idea of moral obligation was a simple idea, arising from the view of certain actions or sentiments, why should it not be as invariable as the perception of colours and sounds? But though the shape and colour of a flower appear the same to every human eye, one man practises as a moral duty what another looks upon with abhorrence, and reflects upon with remorse. Now a thing that varies with education and instruction, as moral sentiments are known to do, certainly has the appearance of being generated by a series of different impressions, in the manner here described.

The most shocking crimes that men can commit are those of *injustice* and *murder*; and yet it is hardly possible to define any circumstances in which some part of mankind have not, without the least scruple or remorse, seized the property or taken away the lives of others: so that the definition of these crimes must vary in almost every country. Now an idea or feeling, that depends upon arbitrary definition, cannot be, properly speaking, natural, but must be factitious.

A crime the least liable to variation in its definition,

nition, is that of a lie; and yet a child will, upon the slightest temptation, tell an untruth as readily as the truth; that is, as soon as he can suspect that it will be to his advantage; and the dread that he afterwards has of telling a lie is acquired principally by his being threatened, punished, and terrified by those who detect him in it; till at length a number of painful impressions are annexed to the telling of an untruth, and he comes even to shudder at the thought of it. But where this care has not been taken, such a facility in telling lies, and such an indifference to truth, are acquired, as is hardly credible to persons who have been differently educated.

But whether the feelings which accompany the ideas of virtue and vice be instinctive or acquired, their operation is the very same; so that the interests of virtue may be equally secured on this scheme as on any other. There is a sufficient provision in the course of our lives to generate moral principles, sentiments, and feelings, in the degree in which they are wanted in life; and with those variations, with respect to modes and other circumstances, which we see in different ages and countries; and which the different circumstances of mankind, in different ages and countries, seem to require.

PRIESTLEY.

MORAL

MORAL RULES, AND SENSE OF DUTY.

THE regard to the general rules of morality is what is properly called a sense of duty; a principle of the greatest consequence in human life, and the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are capable of directing their actions. There is scarce any man who, by discipline, education, and example, may not be so impressed with a regard to these general rules of conduct, as to act upon almost every occasion with tolerable decency, and through the whole of his life avoid any tolerable degree of blame. Without this sacred regard to the general rules of morality, there is no man whose conduct can be much depended upon. It is this which constitutes the most essential difference between a man of principle and honour, and a worthless fellow. The one adheres, on all occasions, steadily and resolutely to his maxims, and preserves through the whole of his life one even tenor of conduct. The other acts variously and accidentally, as humour, inclination, or interest, chance to be uppermost. Nay, such are the inequalities of humour to which all men are subject, that without this principle, the man who, in all his cool hours, had the most delicate sensibility to the propriety of conduct, might often be

led to act absurdly upon the most frivolous occasions, and when it was scarcely possible to assign any serious motive for his behaving in this manner. Upon the tolerable observance of these rules depends the very existence of human society, which would crumble into nothing if mankind were not generally impressed with a reverence for those important rules of conduct. False notions of religion are almost the only causes which can occasion any very gross perversion of the general rules of morality; and that principle, which ought to give the greatest authority to the rules of duty, is alone capable of distorting our ideas of them in any considerable degree. In all other cases, common sense is sufficient to direct us, if not to the most exquisite propriety of conduct, yet to something which is not very far from it; and provided we are in earnest desirous to do well, our behaviour will always, upon the whole, be praise-worthy. But wherever the natural principles of religion are not corrupted by the factious and party zeal of some worthless cabal; wherever the first duty which it requires is to fulfil all the obligations of morality; wherever men are not taught to regard frivolous observances as more immediate duties of religion than acts of justice and beneficence; and to imagine, that by sacrifices and ceremonies, and vain supplications, they can bargain with the Deity for fraud and perfidy and violence; it
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establishes and confirms the general rules of morality. A. SMITH.

THE MORAL SENSE.

THE moral sense is formed by time and experience, and not born with us. So are all the natural senses, not one of which is born with us: they are all created; some instantaneously, some in a little time, some in a long time; but all by experience. The moral sense differs from a natural one, as much as the effect of reflection differs from simple feeling. But the conformation given by nature and education may be so exquisitely just in some men, that they may be said to judge of actions and principles by a kind of instantaneous sensation; which may be very properly called a moral sense. The eye, as a sense, is formed by the experience of many years: but when it is formed, it judges of distances and magnitude, of beauty and deformity, apparently by an immediate sensation; but in fact by a process which is the effect of experience. The mind is in the same state as to morals: it has judged of causes by effects, on all material occasions; it has so associated virtue with pleasure, and vice with pain, that when the actions and principles under those denominations present themselves, they seem to act on the mere sense, not as virtues or vices; but

but as pleasures or pains. The present fashionable affectation of sentiment arises from the same cause. Persons whose organization is just, perfect, and delicate, are susceptible of very lively impressions, from those principles and actions which experience has taught them to be good or bad. When they present themselves again, the associated ideas of pleasure or pain immediately present themselves; and before any judgment can be made, that is, before those circumstances, which have been often and sufficiently examined, can undergo a second examination. In time, they forget that experience and reason had any share in classing the virtues and vices; and finding this moral intelligent sensibility seldom err, they refer every thing to it: so that we very commonly hear people say, We act from our feelings; or, We judge of men and things according as they excite our sensibility.

WILLIAMS.

MORAL SYSTEMS.

IF there is a universal system of morality, it cannot be the effect of a particular cause. It has been the same in past ages, and it will continue the same in future times; it cannot then be grounded on religious opinions, which, ever since the beginning of the world, and from one pole to the other, have continually varied. Greece had
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vicious deities, the Romans had them likewise: the senseless worshipper of the Fetiche adores rather a devil than a God. Every people made gods for themselves, and gave them such attributes as they pleased: to some they ascribed goodness, to others cruelty; to some immorality, to others the greatest sanctity and severity of manners. One would imagine that every nation intended to deify its own passions and opinions. Notwithstanding that diversity in religious systems and modes of worship, all nations have perceived that men ought to be just: they have all honoured as virtues, goodness, pity, friendship, fidelity, paternal tenderness, filial respect, sincerity, gratitude, patriotism; in short, all those sentiments that can be considered as so many ties adapted to unite men more closely to one another. The origin of that uniformity of judgment, so constant, so general, ought not then to be looked for in the midst of contradictory and fluctuating opinions. If the ministers of religion have appeared to think otherwise, it is because by their system they were enabled to regulate all the actions of mankind; to dispose of their fortunes, and command their wills; and to secure to themselves, in the name of heaven, the arbitrary government of the world.—The veil is now removed. At the tribunal of philosophy and reason, morality is a science whose object is the preservation and common happiness of the human species.

species. To this double end all its rules ought to tend. Their natural, constant, eternal principle is in man himself, and in a resemblance there is in the general organization of man; which includes a similarity of wants, of pleasures and pains, of force and weakness; a resemblance from whence arises the necessity of society, or of a common opposition against such dangers as are equally incident to each individual, which proceed from nature herself, and threaten man on all sides. Such is the origin of particular duties and of domestic virtues; such is the origin of general duties and public virtues; such is the source of the notion of personal and public utility; the source of all compacts between individuals, and of all laws of government.—Several writers have endeavoured to trace the first principles of morality in the sentiments of friendship, tenderness, compassion, honour, and benevolence; because they found them engraved on the human heart: But did they not also find there hatred, jealousy, revenge, pride, and the love of dominion? For what reason therefore have they founded morality on the former principles rather than on the latter? It is because they found that the former were of general advantage to society, and the others fatal to it. The very sentiments which these philosophers adopted as the ground-work of morality, because they appear to be serviceable to the common good; if
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left to themselves would be very prejudicial to it. How can we determine to punish the guilty, if we listen only to the pleas of compassion?—How shall we guard against partiality, if we consult only the dictates of friendship?—How shall we avoid being favourable to idleness, if we attend only to the sentiments of benevolence? All these virtues have their limits, beyond which they degenerate into vices: and those limits are settled by the invariable rules of essential justice; or, which is the same thing, by the common interests of men united together in society, and the constant object of that union.

These limits, it is true, have not yet been ascertained; nor indeed could they, since it has not been possible to fix what the common interest itself was. And this is the reason why among all people, and at all times, men have formed such different ideas of virtue and vice; why hitherto morality has appeared to be but a matter of mere convention among men. That so many ages should have passed away in an entire ignorance of the first principles of a science so important to our happiness, is a certain fact; but so extraordinary, that it should appear incredible. We cannot imagine how it has not been sooner discovered, that the uniting of men in society has not, and indeed could not have, any other design but the general happiness of individuals; and therefore, that
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there is not, and cannot be, any other social tie between them than that of their common interest; and that nothing can be consistent with the order of societies, unless it be consistent with the common utility of the members that compose them: that it is this principle which necessarily determines virtue and vice; and that our actions are consequently more or less virtuous, according as they tend more or less to the common advantage of society; that they are more or less vicious, according as the prejudice, society receives from them, is greater or less.

Is it on its own account that valour is ranked among the number of virtues? No; it is on account of the service it is of to society. This is evident from hence, that it is punished as a crime in a man whom it causes to disturb the public peace. Why then is drunkenness a vice? Because every man is bound to contribute to the common good; and to fulfil that obligation, he has occasion for the free exercise of his faculties. Why are certain vices more blamable in a magistrate than in a private man? Because greater inconveniences result from them to society.

As society ought to be beneficial to every one of its members, it is but just that each of its members should contribute to the advantage of society. To be virtuous, therefore, is to be useful; to be vicious, is to be useless or hurtful.

This is morality. This, indeed, is universal morality.—That morality which, being connected with the nature of man, is connected with the nature of society; that morality which can vary only in its application, but never in its essence: that morality, in short, to which all law should refer, and to which they should be subordinate:

RAYNAL.

THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF MORALITY, AND THEIR INFLUENCE.

IN every civilized society, in every society where the distinction of ranks has once been completely established, there have been always two different schemes or systems of morality current at the same time; of which the one may be called the *strict* or *austere*; the other the *liberal*, or, if you will, the *loose* system. The former is generally admired and revered by the common people: The latter is commonly more esteemed and adopted by what are called people of fashion. The degree of disapprobation with which we ought to mark the vices of levity, the vices which are apt to arise from great prosperity, and from the excess of gaiety and good-humour, seems to constitute the principal distinction between those two opposite schemes or systems. In the liberal or loose system, luxury, wanton and even disorderly mirth, the pursuit of pleasure to some degree of

intemperance, the breach of chastity, at least in one of the two sexes, &c. provided they are not accompanied with gross indecency, and do not lead to falsehood or injustice, are generally treated with a good deal of indulgence, and are easily either excused or pardoned altogether. In the austere system, on the contrary, those excesses are regarded with the utmost abhorrence and detestation. The vices of levity are always ruinous to the common people; and a single week's thoughtlessness and dissipation is often sufficient to undo a poor workman for ever, and to drive him, through despair, upon committing the most enormous crimes. The wiser and better sort of the common people, therefore, have always the utmost abhorrence and detestation of such excesses, which their experience tells them are so immediately fatal to people of their condition. The disorder and extravagance of several years, on the contrary, will not always ruin a man of fashion; and people of that rank are very apt to consider the power of indulging in some degree of excess as one of the advantages of their fortune; and the liberty of doing so without censure or reproach, as one of the privileges which belong to their station. In people of their own station, therefore, they regard such excesses with but a small degree of disapprobation, and censure them either very slightly or not at all.

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Almost all religious sects have begun among the common people, from whom they have generally drawn their earliest, as well as their most numerous profelytes. The austere system of morality has, accordingly, been adopted by those sects almost constantly, or with very few exceptions; for there have been some. It was the system by which they could best recommend themselves to that order of people to whom they first proposed their plan of reformation upon what had been before established. Many of them, perhaps the greater part of them, have even endeavoured to gain credit by refining upon this austere system, and by carrying it to some degree of folly and extravagance; and this excessive rigour has frequently recommended them more than any thing else to the respect and veneration of the common people.

A man of rank and fortune is by his station a distinguished member of a great society, who attend to every part of his conduct, and who thereby oblige him to attend to every part of it himself. His authority and consideration depend very much upon the respect which this society bears to him. He dare not do any thing which would disgrace or discredit him in it; and he is obliged to a very strict observation of that species of morals, whether liberal or austere, which the general consent of this society prescribes to persons

sons of his rank and fortune. A man of low condition, on the contrary, is far from being a distinguished member of any great society. While he remains in a country village, his conduct may be attended to, and he may be obliged to attend to it himself. In this situation, and in this situation only, he may have what is called a character to lose. But as soon as he comes into a great city, he is sunk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct is observed and attended to by nobody; and he is therefore very likely to neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every sort of low profligacy and vice. He never emerges so effectually from this obscurity, his conduct never excites so much the attention of any respectable society, as by his becoming the member of a small religious sect. He from that moment acquires a degree of consideration which he never had before. All his brother sectaries are, for the credit of the sect, interested to observe his conduct; and if he gives occasion to any scandal, if he deviates very much from those austere morals which they almost always require of one another, they punish him by what is always a very severe punishment, even where no civil effects attend it, expulsion or excommunication from the sect. In little religious sects, accordingly, the morals of the common people have been almost always remarkably regular and orderly; generally much more

more so than in the established church. The morals of those little sects, indeed, have frequently been rather disagreeably rigorous and unsocial.

There are two very easy and effectual remedies, however, by whose joint operation the state might, without violence, correct whatever was unsocial or disagreeably rigorous in the morals of all the little sects into which the country was divided.

The first of those remedies is the study of science and philosophy, which the state might render almost universal among all people of middling or more than middling rank and fortune; not by giving salaries to teachers in order to make them negligent and idle, but by instituting some sort of probation, even in the higher and more difficult sciences, to be undergone by every person before he was permitted to exercise any liberal profession; or before he could be received as a candidate for any honourable office of trust or profit. If the state imposed upon this order of men the necessity of learning, it would have no occasion to give itself any trouble about providing them with proper teachers. They would soon find better teachers for themselves than any whom the state could provide for them. Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition; and where all the superior ranks

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of people were secured from it, the inferior-ranks could not be much exposed to it.

The second of those remedies is the frequency and gaiety of public diversions. The state, by encouraging, that is, by giving entire liberty to all those who for their own interest would attempt, without scandal or indecency, to amuse and divert the people by painting, poetry, music, dancing, by all sorts of dramatic representations and exhibitions, would easily dissipate, in the greater part of them, that melancholy and gloomy humour which is almost always the nurse of popular superstition and enthusiasm. Public diversions have always been the objects of dread and hatred, to all the fanatical promoters of those popular frenzies. The gaiety and good-humour which those diversions inspire were altogether inconsistent with that temper of mind, which was fittest for their purpose, or which they could best work upon. Dramatic representations besides, frequently exposing their artifices to public ridicule, and sometimes even to public execration, were upon that account, more than all other diversions, the objects of their peculiar abhorrence.

In a country where the law favoured the teachers of no one religion more than those of another, it would not be necessary that any of them should have any particular or immediate dependency upon

on the sovereign or executive power; or that he should have any thing to do, either in appointing, or in dismissing them from their offices. In such a situation he would have no occasion to give himself any concern about them, further than to keep the peace among them, in the same manner as among the rest of his subjects; that is, to hinder them from persecuting, abusing, or oppressing one another. But it is quite otherwise in countries where there is an established or governing religion. The sovereign can in this case never be secure, unless he has the means of influencing in a considerable degree the greater part of the teachers of that religion.

The clergy of every established church constitute a great incorporation. They can act in concert, and pursue their interest upon one plan and with one spirit, as much as if they were under the direction of one man; and they are frequently too under such direction. Their interest as an incorporated body is never the same with that of the sovereign, and is sometimes directly opposite to it. Their great interest is to maintain their authority with the people; and this authority depends upon the supposed certainty and importance of the whole doctrine which they inculcate, and upon the supposed necessity of adopting every part of it with the most implicit faith, in order to avoid eternal misery. Should the sovereign have the

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imprudence to appear either to deride or doubt himself of the most trifling part of their doctrine, or from humanity attempt to protect those who did either the one or the other, the punctilious honour of a clergy, who have no sort of dependency upon him, is immediately provoked to prescribe him as a profane person, and to employ all the terrors of religion, in order to oblige the people to transfer their allegiance to some more orthodox and obedient prince. Should he oppose any of their pretensions or usurpations, the danger is equally great. The princes who have dared in this manner to rebel against the church, over and above this crime of rebellion, have generally been charged too with the additional crime of heresy, notwithstanding their solemn protestations of their faith and humble submission to every tenet which she thought proper to prescribe to them. But the authority of religion is superior to every other authority. The fears which it suggests conquer all other fears. When the authorised teachers of religion propagate through the great body of the people doctrines subversive of the authority of the sovereign, it is by violence only, or by the force of a standing army, that he can maintain his authority. Even a standing army cannot in this case give him any lasting security; because if the soldiers are not foreigners, which can seldom be the case, but drawn from the great

great body of the people, which must almost always be the case, they are likely to be soon corrupted by those very doctrines. The revolutions which the turbulence of the Greek clergy was continually occasioning at Constantinople, as long as the eastern empire subsisted; the convulsions which, during the course of several centuries, the turbulence of the Roman clergy was continually occasioning in every part of Europe; sufficiently demonstrate how precarious and insecure must always be the situation of the sovereign who has no proper means of influencing the clergy of the established and governing religion of his country.

Articles of faith, as well as all other spiritual matters, it is evident enough, are not within the proper department of a temporal sovereign, who, though he may be very well qualified for protecting, is seldom supposed to be so for instructing the people. With regard to such matters, therefore, his authority can seldom be sufficient to counterbalance the united authority of the clergy of the established church. The public tranquillity, however, and his own security, may frequently depend upon the doctrines which they may think proper to propagate concerning such matters. As he can seldom directly oppose their decision, therefore, with proper weight and authority, it is necessary that he should be able to influence it; and he can influence it only by the fears and expectations

pectations which he may excite in the greater part of the individuals of the order. Those fears and expectations may consist in the fear of deprivation or other punishment, and in the expectation of further preferment.

A. SMITH.

THE PRINCIPLE OF MORAL VIRTUE.

MEN are no more to be told what they must believe, and how they must act, than an instrument is to be told what harmony it is to afford. The thoughts and actions of a man result from his construction, as harmony does from that of an instrument. That construction is good or evil, and will lead to virtue or vice, according as he has been originally formed by nature; according as he has been attuned in his childhood; according as he has been educated in his youth; and according to the company and friends he has been connected with. This organization of the mind, or this moral constitution, is the true principle of human actions. When this is right, truly or nobly, or delicately harmonized; virtues of a noble or of an amiable aspect, and every species of genuine happiness, will be the effects. When this is wrong, when it is defective or disarranged, the effect is vice; and no precepts, no instructions, no doctrines from heaven or hell, will make
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dissonance harmony, darkness light, or vice to be virtue. If a god had descended, and told the world, in a language to be understood from pole to pole, This you are to believe, and thus you are to act:—What would have been the consequence? Exactly what we see to be the consequence in the Christian world, where every true believer is thoroughly persuaded that God Almighty came from heaven; laid down in his gospel every thing necessary to be believed and practised, in order to bear things patiently here, and to be everlastingly happy hereafter. And are men the wiser, or the better? We must be thoroughly blinded by prejudice, and extremely ignorant of history, to say they are.

WILLIAMS.

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NATIONAL CHARACTERS.

DIFFERENT reasons are assigned for national characters: some account for them from *moral*, and others from *physical* causes. By moral causes we may understand all circumstances which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us. Of this kind are the nature of government, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like circumstances. By physical causes we may understand those qualities of the air and climate which are supposed to work insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the body, and giving a particular complexion;

plexion; which though reflection and reason may sometimes overcome it, yet it will prevail among the generality of mankind, and have an influence on their manners. That the character of a nation will depend much on moral causes, is evident to every observer; since a nation is nothing but a collection of individuals; and the manners of individuals are frequently determined by these causes. As poverty and hard labour debase the minds of the common people, and render them unfit for any science or ingenious profession; so where any government becomes very oppressive to all its subjects, it has a proportional effect on their temper and genius, and banishes all the liberal arts from among them.

As to *physical causes*, their operation is doubtful: in this particular, men seem to owe nothing of their temper or genius to the air, food, or climate. The contrary opinion seems, at first sight, probable; since we find those circumstances have an influence over every other animal. The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. Where a number of men are united into one political body, the occasions of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defence, commerce, and government, that, together with

the same speech or language, they must acquire a resemblance in their manners, and have a common and national character, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual. Now, though nature produces all kinds of temper and understanding in great abundance, it follows not that she always produces them in like proportions, and that in every society the ingredients of industry and indolence, valour and cowardice, humanity and brutality, wisdom and folly, will be mixed after the same manner. In the infancy of society, if any of these dispositions be found in greater abundance than the rest, it will naturally prevail in the composition, and give a tincture to the national character. If, on the first establishment of a republic, a Brutus should be placed in authority, and be transported with such an enthusiasm for liberty, as to overlook all the ties of nature as well as private interest, such an example will naturally have an effect on the whole society, and kindle the same passion in every bosom. Whatever it be that forms the manners of one generation, the next must imbibe a deeper tincture of the same die; men being more susceptible of all impressions during infancy, and retaining these impressions as long as they remain in the world. All national characters, where they depend not on fixed moral causes, proceed from such accidents as these; and physical causes appear not to have any discernible

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operation on the human mind. It is a maxim in all philosophy, That causes which do not appear are to be considered as not existing. The Chinese have the greatest uniformity of character imaginable; though the air and climate, in different parts of those vast dominions, admit of very considerable variations. Athens and Thebes were but a short day's journey from each other; though the Athenians were as remarkable for ingenuity, politeness, and gaiety, as the Thebans for dullness, rusticity, and a phlegmatic temper. Strabo (*lib. ii.*) rejects, in a great measure, the influence of climate upon men. "All is custom and education," says he; "It is not from nature that the Athenians are learned, the Lacedæmonians ignorant, and the Thebans too, who are still nearer neighbours to the former. Even the difference of animals," he adds, "depends not on climate."

The same national character commonly follows the authority of government to a precise boundary; and upon crossing a river, or passing a mountain, one finds a new set of manners, with a new government. Is it conceivable, that the qualities of the air should change exactly with the limits of an empire? Any set of men, scattered over distant nations; who have a close communication together, acquire a similitude of manners, and have but little in common with the nations

amongst whom they live. Thus the Jews in Europe, and the Armenians in the East, have a peculiar character.

Where a difference of language or religion keeps two nations, inhabiting the same country, from mixing with each other, their manners will be very distinct, and even opposite. The Turks and modern Greeks have very different characters.

The same set of manners will follow a nation, and adhere to them, over the whole globe, as well as the same language and laws.—The manners of a people change very considerably from one age to another. The ingenuity, industry, and activity of the ancient Greeks, have nothing in common with the stupidity and indolence of the present inhabitants of those regions. Candour, bravery, and love of liberty, formed the character of the ancient Romans; as subtlety, cowardice, and a slavish disposition, do that of the modern.

Where the government of a nation is altogether republican, it is apt to beget a particular set of manners. Where it is altogether monarchic, it is more apt to have the same effect; the imitation of superiors spreading the national manners faster among the people. If the governing part of a state consists altogether of merchants, as in Holland, their uniform way of life will fix their character. If it consist chiefly of nobles and landed gentry, like Germany, France, and Spain, the

same

same effect follows. The genius of a particular sect of religion is also apt to mould the manners of a people. If the characters of men depended on the air, the degrees of heat and cold would naturally be expected to have a mighty influence, since nothing has a greater effect on all plants and animals. And indeed there is some reason to think, that all the nations that live beyond the polar circles, or between the tropics, are inferior to the rest of the species. The poverty of the northern inhabitants, and the indolence of the southern from their few necessities, may perhaps account for this difference without physical causes. This, however, is certain, that the character of nations is very promiscuous in the temperate climates; and that almost all the general observations which have been formed of the more southern or more northern nations in these climates, are found to be uncertain and fallacious.

HUME.
THE CHARACTER OF NATIONS, AND THE
CAUSES OF THEIR ALTERATIONS.

Each nation has its particular manner of feeling and feeling, which forms its character: and in every nation its character either changes on a sudden, or alters by degrees, according to the sudden or insensible alterations in the form of its

government, and consequently of its public education; for the form of government under which we live always makes a part of our education. That of the French, which has been for a long time gay, was not always so. The Emperor Julian says of the Parisians, "I like them, because their character, like mine, is austere and serious."

The characters of nations, therefore, change: but at what period is the alteration most perceptible? At the moment of revolution, when a people pass on a sudden from liberty to slavery. Then from bold and haughty they become weak and pusillanimous: they dare not look on the man in office: they are enthralled. This dejected people say, like the ass in the fable, *Whoever be my master, I cannot carry a heavier load.* As much as a free citizen is zealous for the honour of his nation, so much is a slave indifferent to the public welfare. His heart is deprived of activity and energy; is without virtue, without spirit, and without talents; he becomes indifferent to the arts, commerce, agriculture, &c. It is not for servile hands, say the English, to till and fertilize the lands. Simonides entered the empire of a despotic sovereign, and found there no traces of men. A free people are courageous, open, humane, and loyal. A nation of slaves are base, perfidious, malicious, and barbarous: they push their cruelty to the greatest excess. If the severe
officer

officer has all to fear from the resentment of the injured soldier on the day of battle, that of sedition is in like manner, for the slave oppressed, the long-expected day of vengeance; and he is the more enraged in proportion as fear has held his fury the longer restrained.

What a striking picture of a sudden change in the character of a nation does the Roman history present us with! What people, before the elevation of the Cæsars, showed more force, more virtue, more love of liberty, and horror for slavery? And what people, when the throne of the Cæsars was established, showed more weakness or depravity? Their baseness disgusted Tiberius.

Indifferent to liberty, when Trajan offered it, they refused it: they disdained that liberty their ancestors had purchased with so much blood. All things were then changed in Rome; and that determined and grave character, which distinguished its first inhabitants, was succeeded by that light and frivolous disposition with which Juvenal reproaches them in his tenth Satire.—Let us exemplify this matter by a more recent change. Compare the English of the present day with those under Henry VIII. Edward VI. Mary and Elizabeth. This people, now so humane, indulgent, learned, free, and industrious, such lovers of the arts and philosophy, were then nothing more than a nation of slaves, inhuman and superstitious; with-
out

out arts, and without industry.—When a prince usurps over his people a boundless authority, he is sure to change their character; to enervate their souls; to render them timid and base. From that moment, indifferent to glory, his subjects lose that character of boldness and constancy proper to support all labours, and brave all dangers. The weight of arbitrary power destroys the spring of their emulation. Does a prince, impatient of contradiction, give the name of factious to the man of veracity? he substitutes in his nation the character of falsity for that of frankness. If, in those critical moments, the prince, giving himself up to flatterers, finds that he is surrounded by men void of all merit, whom should he blame? Himself; for it is he that has made them such. Who could believe, when he considers the evils of servitude, that there were still princes mean enough to wish to reign over slaves; and stupid enough to be ignorant of the fatal changes that despotism produces in the character of their subjects? What is arbitrary power? The seed of calamities, that, sown in the bosom of a state, springs up to bear the fruit of misery and devastation. Let us hear the King of Prussia: *Nothing is better*, said he, in a discourse pronounced to the Academy of Berlin, *than an arbitrary government, under princes just, humane, and virtuous, nothing worse under the common race of kings.* Now, how many kings
are

are there of the latter sort? and how many such as Titus, Trajan, and Antoninus? These are the thoughts of a great man. What elevation of mind, what knowledge, does not such a declaration suppose in a monarch?—What, in fact, does a despotic power announce? Often ruin to the despot, and always to his posterity. The founder of such power sets his kingdom on a sandy foundation. It is only a transient ill-judged notion of royalty, that is, of pride, idleness, or some similar passion, which prefers the exercise of an unjust and cruel despotism over wretched slaves, to that of a legitimate and friendly power over a free and happy people. Arbitrary power is a thoughtless child, who continually sacrifices the future to the present.—The most formidable enemy of the public welfare is not riot and sedition, but despotism: it changes the character of a nation, and always for the worse: it produces nothing but vices. Whatever might be the power of an Indian Sultan, he could never form magnanimous subjects; he would never find among his slaves the virtues of free men. Chemistry can extract no more gold from a mixed body than it includes; and the most arbitrary power can draw nothing from a slave but the baseness he contains. Experience, then, proves, that the character and spirit of a people change with the form of government; and that a different government gives by turns,

turns, to the same nation, a character noble or base, firm or fickle, courageous or cowardly. If the Persian have no idea of liberty, and the savage no idea of servitude, it is the effect of their different instruction. **HELVE TIUS.**

NATIONAL FAITH.

WHEN a number of political societies are erected, and maintain a great intercourse together, a new set of rules are immediately discovered to be useful in that particular situation; and accordingly take place under the title of the *laws of nations*. The rules of justice, such as prevail among individuals, are not entirely suspended among political societies. All princes pretend a regard to the rights of other princes; and some, no doubt, without hypocrisy. Alliances and treaties are every day made between independent states, which would be only so much waste of parchment, if they were not found by experience to have some influence and authority. But here is the difference between kingdoms and individuals. Human nature cannot by any means subsist without the association of individuals; and that association never could have place, were no regard paid to the laws of equity and justice. Disorder, confusion, the war of all against all, are the necessary consequences of such a licentious conduct. But
nations

nations can subsist without intercourse. They may even subsist, in some degree, under a general war. The observance of justice, though useful among them, is not guarded by so strong a necessity as among individuals; and the moral obligation holds proportion with the usefulness. All politicians will allow, and most philosophers, that reasons of state may, in particular emergencies, dispense with the rules of justice, and invalidate any treaty or alliance, where the strict observance of it would be prejudicial in a considerable degree to either of the contracting parties. But nothing less than the extremest necessity, it is confessed, can justify individuals in a breach of promise or an invasion of the properties of others. In a confederated commonwealth, such as the Achæan republic of old, or the Swiss Cantons and the United Provinces in modern times; as the league has here a peculiar utility, the conditions of union have a peculiar sacredness and authority; and a violation of them would be regarded as equally criminal, or even as more criminal than any private injury or injustice.

HUME.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

WHEN two nations conclude a treaty between them, they have, like private persons, no other object

object than their reciprocal advantage and happiness; when this reciprocal advantage no longer subsists, the treaty becomes void: one of the two nations may break it. Ought they to do it? No, if there result but a small damage to them from observing it: for then it would be better to suffer that damage, than be regarded as too easy violators of their engagements. Now, in the motives themselves that make those two people observe their treaty, we see the right that every people have to disannul a treaty when it is evidently destructive to their happiness.

HELVE TIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IF treaties between nations were as sacred as promises between individuals, nations would be perpetually sacrificed to the folly and inattention of their rulers; who ought always to consult the interest of the community, and not their own reputation for integrity when it must be injurious to the people.

HELVE TIUS.

THE PUPIL OF NATURE.

Was it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place without any communication with his own species, he could

could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty and deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind. To a man who from his birth was a stranger to society, the objects of his passions, the external bodies which either pleased or hurt him, would occupy his whole attention. The passions themselves, the desires or aversions, the joys or sorrows, which those objects excited, though of all things the most immediately present to him, would scarce ever be the objects of his thoughts. The idea of them could never interest him so much as to call upon his attentive consideration. The consideration of his joy could in him excite no new joy, nor that of his sorrow any new sorrow, though the consideration of the causes of those passions might often excite both. Bring

him into society, and all his own passions will immediately become the causes of new passions. He will observe that mankind approve of some of them, and are disgusted by others. He will be elevated in the one case, and cast down in the other; his desires and aversions, his joys and sorrows, will now become the causes of new desires and new aversions, new joys and new sorrows: they will now therefore interest him deeply, and often call upon his most attentive consideration.

A. SMITH.

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

IS not the will necessarily determined by what appears to be the best reason?—It no doubt is so; nor is it possible to conceive any creature willing what he does not think best. But this is improperly called necessity: for necessity is always from without, and cannot be without two things; an agent who applies force and violence, and a patient who suffers it. Nothing therefore can force itself: so that when we say the intellect is necessarily determined by the strongest reason, we can mean nothing, but that necessity which is in the nature of every thing, and is the same by which a triangle, or any other geometrical figure, has all the properties belonging to its nature.

L. MONTBODDO.

ON

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IF moral motives are certain in their operation, is not man as much a machine as if he were impelled by a mechanical force? If the Deity proposes a motive which I cannot resist, am I in that case a free agent? Are not my elective powers absolutely over-ruled and determined to one particular choice? On the contrary, if moral motives are not certain in their effects, there will be a difficulty in reconciling divine fore-knowledge and man's free-will. In reply to this it may be answered, That even admitting the certain operation of moral motives, man is not so much a machine as if he were impelled by mere mechanical force. The very asking, If he be not as much a machine as some others? necessarily implies a comparative gradation in machinery: so that a man may even be admitted to be a machine, and yet possess a capacity of being actuated by moral motives, which none but rational machines are. For distinction sake, he may be called a moral machine; possessed of a principle of self-determination or volition, in which he is infinitely superior to inanimate machines. In the operation, however, of the moral motives by which he is actuated, and the actions subsequent thereto, he is as very a mechanical machine as a piece of clock-work.

work. How should it be otherwise, when the operations of the Deity himself in the government of the world are mechanical? The universe itself is one great machine, moved by the power of its great Creator. It is pride, therefore, alone which makes man ashamed to be thought a microcosm, subject to similar laws of motion: he is ambitious of being thought a god, capable of willing and moving solely of himself.

KENRICK.

THE ORIGIN OF OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY.

IF we examine the operations of bodies, and the production of effects from their causes, we shall find, that all our faculties can never carry us further in our knowledge of this relation, than barely to observe, that particular objects are constantly conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a customary transition, from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject, men still entertain a strong propensity to believe, that they penetrate further into the powers of nature, and perceive something like a necessary connection between the cause and effect. When, again, they turn their reflections towards the operation

ration of their own minds, and feel no such connection of the motive and the action, they are apt from thence to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects resulting from material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence. But being once convinced, that we know nothing further of causation of any kind, than merely the *constant conjunction* of objects, and the consequent *inference* of the mind from one to another; and finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions, we may thence be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes.

The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for from another cause, viz. a false sensation or seeming experience which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference in many of our actions. The necessity of any action, whether of matter or mind, is not, properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking intelligent being, who may consider the action; and it consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects; as liberty, when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain looseness or indifference, which we feel in passing, or not passing, from the idea of one object to that of any succeeding one. Now we may observe, that, though,

in *reflecting* on human actions, we seldom feel such a looseness and indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives, and from the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, that in *performing* the actions themselves, we are sensible of something like it: and as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other, this has been employed as a demonstrative, and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions; and imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or a velocity, as it is called in schools), even on that side on which it did not settle. This image, or faint motion, we persuade ourselves, could at that time have been completed into the thing itself; because should that be denied, we find, upon a second trial, that at present it can. We consider not, that the fantastical desire of showing liberty is here the motive of our actions. And it seems certain, that, however we imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper,

per, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition. Now this is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.

HOME.

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY.

IT is universally allowed, that matter in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force; and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause, that no other effect, in such particular circumstance, could possibly have resulted from the operation of that cause. Would we, therefore, form a just and precise idea of *necessity*, we must consider whence that idea arises, when we apply it to the operation of bodies. It seems evident, that if all the scenes of nature were shifted continually in such a manner, that no two events bore any resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any similitude to whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have attained the least idea of necessity, or of a connection among those objects, or of cause and effect. Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end. Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity in the operations of nature; where similar objects are constantly

stantly conjoined together, and the mind is, by custom, determined to infer the one from the other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity we ascribe to matter. And these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of the mind. The constant conjunction of similar events in voluntary actions, appears from their uniformity in all nations and ages. The same motives produce always the same actions. The same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprizes which have ever been observed among mankind. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. The records of wars, intrigues, and factions, are collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science; in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher is acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, &c. by experiments. Nor are the earth, water, or other elements, examined by Aristotle and Hippocrates, more like to those which at present lie under our observation, than the men described by Polybius and

and Tacitus are to those who now govern the world. The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be suspected, when he describes the supernatural courage of Alexander, by which he was hurried on singly to attack multitudes, as when he describes his supernatural force and activity, by which he was able to resist them. So readily and universally do we acknowledge an uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body. Hence likewise the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and a variety of business and company, in order to instruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as speculation. By means of this guide we mount up to the knowledge of mens inclinations and motives, from their actions, expressions, and even gestures; and again descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind. We must not, however, expect, that this uniformity of actions should be carried to such a length, as that all men, in the same circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner, without making any allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices,

prejudices, and opinions. Such an uniformity in every particular is found in no part of nature. An artificer who handles only dead matter, may be disappointed of his aim as well as the politician, who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent beings. It is from the variety of conduct in different men we form a greater variety of maxims, which still support a degree of regularity. Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? We learn thence the great force of custom and education. Even the characters which are peculiar to each individual have an uniformity in their influence; otherwise our acquaintance with the persons, and our observation of their conduct, could never teach us their dispositions, nor serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them. The irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation. Even when an action, as sometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for, either by the person himself or by others; we know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain degree, inconstant and irregular. This is in a manner the constant character of human nature; though it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to some persons, who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a continued course of caprice

price and inconstancy. The internal principles and motives, however, may operate uniformly, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities.

HUME.

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY, A DISPUTE OF WORDS.

MEN begin at the wrong end of the question concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding, and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple question, viz. the operations of body, and of brute unintelligent matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity, except that of a constant conjunction of objects, and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another. If these circumstances form, in reality, the whole of that necessity which we conceive in matter, and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the dispute is merely verbal.

HUME.

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY.

WHOEVER desires to injure himself, say the Stoics, and without motives should throw himself into

into the fire, the sea, or out of a window, would be justly thought a madman: for in his natural state man pursues pleasure and flies pain; and in all his actions is necessarily determined by a desire of happiness, real or apparent. Man, therefore, is not free. His will is as necessarily the effect of his ideas, and consequently of his sensations, as pain is the effect of a blow. Beside, add the Stoics, is there a single instant when the liberty of man can be referred to the different operations of the same mind? If, for example, the same thing cannot, at the same instant, be and not be, it is not therefore possible, that at the moment the mind acts, it could act otherwise; that at the moment it chooses, it could choose otherwise; that at the moment it deliberates, it could deliberate otherwise; that at the moment it wills, it could will otherwise. Now if it be my will, such as it is, that makes me deliberate; if my deliberation, such as it is, makes me choose; if my choice, such as it is, makes me act; and if, when I deliberated, it was not possible for me (considering the love I have for myself) not to deliberate; it is evident that that liberty does not consist in the actual volition, nor in the actual deliberation, nor in the actual choice, nor in the actual action; and, in short, that liberty does not relate to any of the operations of the mind. If that were the case, the same thing must be and not be at the same instant.

instant. Now, add the Stoics, this is the question we ask the philosophers, Can the mind be free, if when it wills, when it deliberates, and when it chooses, it is not free?

HELVETIUS.

THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL IS NECESSITY.

WHEN the word liberty is applied to the will, nothing more can be understood by it than the free power of willing or not willing a thing. But this power would suppose that there could be wills without a motive, and consequently effects without a cause. And it would follow, that we could equally wish ourselves good and evil; a supposition absolutely impossible. In fact, if the desire of happiness be the true principle of all our thoughts and of all our actions; if all men really tend towards their true or apparent happiness; it will follow, that all our wills are no more than the effect of this tendency. In this sense, therefore, no adequate idea can be annexed to the word liberty. But it will be said, if we are under a necessity of pursuing happiness wherever we discern it, we are at least at liberty in making choice of the means for procuring our happiness. Yes, it may be answered; but then liberty is only a synonymous term for knowledge. The more or less

a person understands of the law, or the more or less able the counsellor is by whom he is directed in his affairs, the more or less eligible will be his measures. But whatever his conduct be, the desire of happiness will always induce him to take those measures which appear to him the best calculated to promote his interest, his disposition, his passions, and, in fine, whatever he accounts his happiness. There are some who consider the suspension of the mind as a proof of liberty. They are not aware, that in volition, suspension is no less necessary than precipitancy. When, for want of consideration, we have drawn on ourselves some misfortune, self-love renders suspension absolutely necessary. The word deliberation is equally mistaken. We conceive, for instance, that while we are choosing between two pleasures nearly equal, that we are deliberating. But what we consider as deliberation, is only the slowness with which the heavier of two weights, nearly equal, makes one of the scales of a balance subside. How can the problem of liberty be philosophically solved, if, as Mr Locke has proved, we are disciples of friends, parents, books, and, in fine, all the objects that surround us? All our thoughts and wills must then be either the immediate effects, or necessary consequences, of the impressions we have received.

HELVETIUS.

LI-

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

WHEN any past perception is brought into view again; whether by any conatus or exertion of the percipient, or *ab extra* only, or without any design of his, such being in view is what we call memory. The perceptions of living beings may be related to each other two ways extremely different; the one, when a being exerts an internal power to make a past perception again present; the other, when the perception, or the resemblance of it, is offered by some external cause, without any exertion on the part of the percipient. Hence it appears that there are two kinds of memory specifically different, an active and a passive memory.—Reason implies or supposes memory in general; for without memory, whatever is in the mind would be a train of unconnected and unrelated perceptions, which is inconsistent with a power producing a chain of depending consequences; and without active memory, whatever is in the mind, would be related by accident only with respect to us; which is inconsistent with a power, by which we bring together any two perceptions or ideas, that we may see their agreement and diversity. In a word, reasoning supposes our comparing, and comparing supposes our bringing together, perceptions, that

are in nature successive, and consequently distant; that is, it supposes active memory. Since reason implies and supposes active memory, it follows that it implies or supposes liberty; this kind of memory being only the power of reflecting back, and applying voluntarily our attention to any past perception, and consequently to any part of our past consciousness within certain limits at least. The power of reflecting and applying, is here opposed to the necessity of doing it on the one hand, and the necessity of not doing it on the other. But we are not free in seeing the identities, diversities, agreements, or disagreements of our ideas: we are not free in seeing the natures, and habitudes, and relations of those perceptions, upon which we have thus freely and voluntarily reflected back our attention. For every percipient, if it shall bring together and compare any two perceptions, must of necessity, according to its faculty of discernment, see whether they agree or disagree, or how far they are the same or different. It must by its original constitution be thus far purely passive in its perception, being active and free only in reflecting and applying its attention to it. So that it is wonderful that there should ever have been any dispute in the world, whether a rational creature could be a free creature; since the pronouncing a creature rational is the same thing as the pronouncing it free in other words.

words. It happens to human liberty, as to motion, that it is easier to feel it, and be certain of the reality of it, than accurately to explain its nature. The friends of common sense and sound philosophy should therefore deduce their instances of it from the first and highest kind of liberty, that over the perceptions of the mind, which is the cause; rather than from the motions of the body, which are but the consequence and effect of the other.

BAXTER.

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY AND LIBERTY IN MAN.

ACCORDING to Newton and others, the infinitely free Being has communicated to man a limited portion of that liberty; and by liberty here, is not understood the simple power of applying our thoughts to such or such an object, and of beginning the motion: not only the faculty of willing is meant, but that of willing in the most free and efficacious manner; and even of willing without any other reason than the will itself. There is not a man on the earth who does not believe that he sometimes feels himself possessed of this liberty. Many philosophers however think the contrary; and that all the liberty we enjoy, is that of wearing sometimes freely the fetters of fatality. Collins is of this opinion: he calls man

a necessary agent. Clarke says, if this be true, man is no longer an agent. But who does not see that this is true chicanery? Whatever produces necessary effects, Collins calls a necessary agent. Is it of any consequence whether he be called agent or patient? The point is to know whether he be necessarily determined.

If only one single case can be found where man is really free with a liberty of indifference, that alone seems sufficient to decide the question. Now what case shall we find more proper than that where our liberty is put to a trial? For instance, it is proposed to me to turn to the right or the left, or to do some other action, to which neither pleasure attracts, nor disgust diverts. I then choose, and do not follow the dictates of my understanding which represents to me the best; for in this case there is neither better nor worse. How do I act? I exercise a right, God has given me of willing and acting in certain cases without any other reason than my own will. I enjoy a right and power to begin the motion, and begin it on which side I please. If in this case my will directs me, why should any other cause be sought than my own will? It seems probable, therefore, that in indifferent things we have the liberty of indifference. For who can say that God has or has not been able to confer on us this gift? And if he is able, and we feel this power in ourselves, how

How can it be affirmed that we do not enjoy it? — This liberty of indifference is, however, treated as a chimera: it is said, that to determine without a reason, belongs only to madmen. But it should be remembered, that madmen are distempered persons, without any liberty. They are necessarily determined by the disorder of their organs. They are not their own masters; they choose nothing. He is free who determines for himself. Now, why shall we not in things indifferent determine ourselves merely by our own will?

We enjoy, in all other cases, the liberty called spontaneity; that is, our will is determined by motives when there are any; and these motives are always the last result of the understanding or instinct. Thus, when my understanding represents to itself, that it is better for me to obey than break the law, I conform to the law with a spontaneous liberty; I perform voluntarily what the last dictamen of my understanding leads me to perform. This species of liberty is never better perceived, than when our will opposes our desires. I have a violent passion for something; but my understanding tells me, I must resist this passion; it represents to me a greater good in victory, than in a compliance with my appetite. This last motive preponderates, and I oppose my desires by my will. This command of my reason

I necessarily and willingly obey. I do not what I desire, but what I will; and in this case I am free, and enjoy all the liberty of which such a circumstance can make me susceptible.

In fine, I am free in no respect, when my passion is too strong, and my understanding too weak, or when my organs are disordered; and this unfortunately is very often the case of men. So that spontaneous liberty is to the soul what health is to the body: some persons enjoy it entirely and constantly; many are often deprived of it; and others are sick during their whole life: all the other faculties of man are subject to the same variation. Sight, hearing, taste, strength, cogitation, are sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker: our liberty, like every thing else, is limited, variable: in a word, very trifling; because man is himself inconsiderable.

The difficulty of reconciling human actions with God's eternal prescience, was no obstacle to Newton; he avoided that labyrinth. Liberty being once proved, it is not for us to determine how God foresees what we shall freely do. We know not how God sees what passes at present. We have no idea of his mode of seeing: why then should we have any of his mode of foreseeing? We should consider all his attributes as equally incomprehensible.

It must be owned, that against this idea of liberty

liberty there are objections which startle. It is immediately seen that this liberty of indifference would be but a trivial present, if it extended no further than spitting to the right or left, or choosing either odd or even. The business is whether Cartouche and Shah Nadier have a liberty of not shedding human blood? Of what consequence is the liberty of putting the left or right foot first? This liberty of indifference is then found to be impossible; for how can we be said to determine without reason? You will, but why will you? You are asked even or odd; you choose even, without being aware of the motive; which is, that even presents itself to your mind at the instant you make the choice.

Every thing has its cause: consequently your will is not excepted. There is then no willing, but in consequence of the last idea received. No person can know what idea he will have the next moment; therefore, no person is master of his own ideas; therefore no person is master of willing or not willing. Were he master of these, he might perform the contrary of what God has disposed in the concatenation of the things of this world. Thus every person might and actually would, change the Eternal order.

All the liberty the wise Locke knew, was the power of doing what one wills. Free-will seemed to him only a chimera. A patient during the
paroxysm

paroxysm of the gout has not the liberty of walking; nor the prisoner that of going abroad: the one becomes free when cured; the other on opening to him the gate.

To place these difficulties in a stronger light, I will suppose that Cicero is attempting to prove to Catiline that he ought not to conspire against his country. Catiline tells him, it is out of his power; that his conferences with Cethegus have imprinted in his mind the idea of the conspiracy; that this idea pleases him beyond any other; and that we only will in consequence of our last decision. But you might, answers Cicero, adopt other ideas as well as I, by listening attentively to me, and reflecting on the duty of consulting the good of your country. It is of no consequence, returns Catiline, your ideas offend me; and the desire of assassinating you prevails. I am sorry for your madness, says Cicero; endeavour to take some of my medicines. If I am mad, replies Catiline, I cannot command my endeavours to be cured. But, urged the consul, men are endued with reason, which they may consult, and may cure the disorder of the organs, which renders you thus perverse, thus hardened in so horrid a crime; especially if this disorder be not too strong. Show me, says Catiline, the point where this disorder is curable. For my part, I own, that from the first moment I began the conspiracy,
all

all my reflections have tended to make me persevere in the undertaking. When did you first take this fatal resolution? asks the consul. When I had lost my money at play. And could not you have abstained from play? No; for the idea of play predominated at that time in my mind above all other ideas; and had I not played, I should have discomposed the order of the universe, by which Quartilla was to win 400000 sesterces of me; with this money she was to purchase a house and a gallant; by this gallant she was to have a son; Cethegus and Lentulus were to come to my house, and we were to conspire against the republic. Destiny has made me a wolf, and you a shepherd's dog: destiny will decide which is to cut the throat of the other. To this Cicero could have answered only by an oration. It must indeed be allowed, that the objections against liberty can hardly be answered but by a vague eloquence: a subject on which the wiser a person is, the more he fears to consider it. But whichever system we embrace, by whatever fatality we suppose all our actions are governed, we shall always act as if we were free.

VOLTAIRE,

Pht.

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY, AND THE LIBERTY OF INDIFFERENCE.

1. PLANTS are organised beings, in which every thing is done necessarily. Some plants belong to the animal-kingdom, and are, in effect, animals attached to the earth.

2. Can these animal-plants, with roots, leaves, and sensations, be supposed to have liberty? No, surely.

3. Have not animals a perception, an instinct, a reason begun, a measure of ideas and of memory? What, in reality, is instinct? Is it not one of those secret springs we can never know? Nothing can be known but by analysis, or a consequence of what are called the first principles. Now, what analysis, or what synthesis, can explain the nature of instinct? We only perceive that this instinct is always necessarily accompanied with ideas. A silk worm has a perception of the leaf which nourishes it; the partridge, of the worm which it seeks and swallows; the fox, of the partridge which it eats; the wolf, of the fox which it devours. Now it is not very likely that these beings possess what we call liberty: may we not, therefore, have ideas without being free?

4. Men receive and combine ideas in their sleep; but they cannot be said to be then free.

Is not this a fresh proof, that we may have ideas without being free?

5. Man has, above other animals, the gift of a more comprehensive memory: this memory is the sole source of all his thoughts. Can this source, common to animals and men, produce liberty? The ideas of reflection in one brain, can they be any other than ideas of reflection in another?

6. Are not all men determined by their instinct? And is not this the reason why they never change their character? Is not this instinct what we call the disposition?

7. Were we free, where is the man who would not change his disposition? But was ever a man seen on earth, who gave himself one single propensity? Was there ever a man born with an aversion to dancing, that gave himself a taste for dancing? A sluggish and sedentary man, that gave himself an inclination to seek motion? Do not age and regimen diminish the passions, which reason fancies it has subdued?

8. Is not the will the last consequence of the last ideas received? If these ideas are necessary, is not the will also necessary?

9. Is liberty any thing more than the power of acting or not acting? And was not Locke in the right to call liberty, Power?

10. A wolf has the perception of sheep feeding in a meadow; his instinct prompts him to de-

vour them, but is prevented by the dogs. A conqueror has the perception of a province, which his instinct leads him to invade; he finds fortresses and armies to obstruct his passage. Where is the great difference between the wolf and the conqueror?

11. Does not this universe appear in all its parts subjected to immutable laws? If a man might at his pleasure direct his will, is it not plain, that he might discompose these immutable laws?

12. By what privilege should man be exempted from the same necessity, to which the stars, animals, plants, and every thing else in nature are subjected?

13. Is it justly said, that in the system of this universal fatality, punishments and rewards would be useless and absurd? Is it not rather evident, that the inutility and absurdity of punishments and rewards appears in the system of liberty? In short, if a highwayman is possessed of a free will, determining itself solely by itself, the fear of punishment may very well fail of determining him to renounce robbery: but if the physical causes act alone; if the sight of the gibbet and wheel make a necessary and violent impression; they then necessarily correct the villain, while he is gazing at the execution of another.

14. To know if the soul be free, should we not first know what this soul is? Can any one
boast

boast that his reason alone demonstrates to him the spiritual nature, the immortality of the soul? It is the general opinion of physicians, that the principle of sensation resides in the place where the nerves unite in the brain. But this place is not a mathematical point. The origin of every nerve is extended. There is in that place a bell on which the fine organs of our senses strike; but who can conceive that this bell occupies no point of space? Are we not automata; born to will always, to do sometimes what we will, and sometimes the contrary? Stars at the centre of the earth, without us and within us, every essence, every substance is to us unknown. We see only appearances. We are in a dream.

15. Whether in this dream we believe the will free or subject; the organised earth of which we are formed endued with an immortal or perishable faculty; whether we think like Epicurus or like Socrates, the wheels that move the machine of the universe will be always the same.

VOLTAIRE.

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

EVERY one finds in himself a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in himself. From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions

of the man, which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity.

All the actions that we have any idea of, reducing themselves to these two, viz. thinking and motion; so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it; there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. A little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear.

A tennis-ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free agent. If we inquire into the
reason,

reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any volition or preference of motion to rest, or *vice versa*; and therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent; but both its motion and rest come under our idea of necessary, and are so called. Likewise a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition; and therefore therein he is not free. So a man striking himself, or his friend, by a convulsive motion of his arm which it is not in his power, by volition or the direction of his mind, to stop or forbear; nobody thinks he has in this liberty; every one pities him, as acting by necessity and constraint.

Again, suppose a man to be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a room, where is a person he longs to see and speak with; and to be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable company, which he stays willingly in, *i. e.* prefers his stay to going away; I ask, Is not this stay voluntary? I think nobody will doubt it: and yet being locked fast in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay; he has not freedom to be gone. So that

liberty is not an idea belonging to volition or preferring; but to the person having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, and no further. For wherever restraint comes to check that power, or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting; there liberty and our notion of it presently ceases.

We have instances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies. A man's heart beats, and the blood circulates, which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to stop; and therefore, in respect of these motions, where rest depends not on his choice, nor would follow the determination of his mind, if it should prefer it, he is not a free agent. Convulsive motions agitate his legs, so that though he will it ever so much, he cannot by any power of his mind stop their motion (as in that odd disease called *chorea sancti Viti*), but he is perpetually dancing: he is not at liberty in this action, but under as much necessity of moving as a stone that falls, or a tennis-ball struck with a racket. On the other side, a palsy or the stocks hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind, if it would thereby transfer his body to another place. In all these there is want of freedom; though the fitting still even of a paralytic, whilst he prefers it

to a removal, is truly voluntary. Voluntary, then, is not opposed to necessary, but to involuntary. For a man may prefer what he can do to what he cannot do; the state he is in to its absence or change, though necessity has made it in itself unalterable.

As it is in the motions of the body, so it is in the thoughts of our minds: where any one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man, being under the necessity of having some ideas constantly in his mind, is not at liberty to think or not to think; no more than he is at liberty, whether his body shall touch any other or no: but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another, is many times in his choice; and then he is in respect of his ideas as much at liberty as he is in respect of bodies he rests on: he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another. But yet some ideas to the mind, like some motions to the body, are such as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himself with other contemplations; and sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather choose. But as soon as the mind regains the
power

power to stop or continue, begin or forbear, any of these motions of the body without, or thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then consider the man as a free agent again.

Wherever thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of thought; there necessity takes place. This, in an agent capable of volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to that preference of his mind, is called Compulsion; when the hindering or stopping any action is contrary to his volition, it is called Restraint. Agents that have no thought, no volition at all, are in every thing necessary agents.

If this be so (as I imagine it is), I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and I think unreasonable, because unintelligible, question, viz. Whether man's will be free or no? For if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, that the question itself is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant as to ask whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square; liberty being as little applicable to the will, as swiftness of motion is to sleep or squareness to virtue. Every one would laugh at the absurdity of such a question as either of these; because it is obvious, that the modifications of motion belong not to sleep, nor the difference of figure

figure to virtues: and when any one well considers it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is also but a power.

I think the question is not proper, Whether the will be free? but, Whether a man be free? Thus I think,

That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence, of that action, and *vice versa*, make it to exist or not exist; so far he is free. For if I can, by a thought directing the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at rest, or *vice versa*; it is evident, that in respect of that I am free: and if I can, by a like thought of my mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words or silence, I am at liberty to speak or hold my peace. And as far as this power reaches, of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free. For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will? And so far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or rest to any action, produce that action or rest; so far can he do what he will. For such a preferring of action to its absence, is the willing of it; and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able

able to do what he will. So that in respect of actions within the reach of such a power in him, a man seems as free as it is possible for freedom to make him.

But the inquisitive mind of man, willing to shift off from himself, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal necessity, is not content with this; freedom, unless it reaches further than this, will not serve the turn: and it passes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a man's liberty, there yet therefore is raised this further question, Whether a man be free to will? Which I think is what is meant, when it is disputed whether the will be free. And as to that I imagine,

That willing or volition, being an action and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man, in respect of willing, or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest: for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist or not exist; and its existence or not existence following perfectly the determination and preference of his will; he cannot avoid willing the existence or not existence of that action: it is absolutely necessary

cessary that he will the one or the other; *i. e.* prefer the one to the other: since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it; for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the act of willing, a man in such a case is not free: liberty consisting in a power to act or not to act; which, in regard of volition, a man, upon such a proposal, has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man's power which is once so proposed to his thoughts: a man must necessarily will the one or the other of them; upon which preference or volition, the action, or its forbearance, certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man, in respect of that act of willing, is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless necessity and freedom can consist together, and a man can be free and bound at once.

This then is evident, that in all proposals of present actions, a man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing; liberty consisting in a power to act or forbear acting, and in that only. For a man that sits still is said yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it: but if a man sitting still has not a
power

power to remove himself, he is not at liberty. So likewise a man falling down a precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would. This being so, it is plain that a man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty whether he will determine himself to walk or give off walking or no: he must necessarily prefer one or the other of them; walking or not walking. And so it is in regard of all other actions in our power so proposed; which are the far greater number. For considering the vast number of voluntary actions that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the will, till the time they are to be done; and in all such actions, as I have shewn, the mind, in respect of willing, has not a power to act or not to act, wherein consists liberty. The mind in that case has not a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid some determination concerning them, let the consideration be as short, the thought as quick, as it will; it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking, or changes it; continues the action, or puts an end to it. Whereby it is manifest, that it orders and directs one, in preference to or with neglect to the other; and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

Since, then, it is plain, that, in most cases, a man is not at liberty whether he will or no, the next thing demanded is, Whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, motion or rest? This question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself, that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced that liberty concerns not the will. For to ask, Whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest, speaking or silence, which he pleases? is to ask, Whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with? A question which, I think, needs no answer; and they who can make a question of it, must suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that, and so on *in infinitum*.

To avoid these and the like absurdities, nothing can be of greater use than to establish in our minds determined ideas of the things under consideration. If the ideas of liberty and volition were well fixed in the understandings, and carried along with us in our minds, as they ought, through all the questions that are raised about them, I suppose a great part of the difficulties that perplex mens thoughts, and entangle their understandings, would be much easier resolved; and we should perceive where the confused signification of terms, or where the nature of the thing, caused the obscurity.

It is carefully to be remembered, that freedom consists in the dependence of the existence or not existence of any action upon our volition of it; and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference. A man standing on a cliff is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the sea; not because he has a power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do; but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap or not to leap. But if a greater force than his either holds him fast, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that case; because the doing or forbearance of that particular action is no longer in his power. He that is a close prisoner in a room twenty feet square, being at the north side of his chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty feet southward, because he can walk or not walk it; but is not at the same time at liberty to do the contrary, *i. e.* to walk twenty feet northward.

In this, then, consists freedom; viz. in our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall choose or will.

We must remember, that volition, or willing, is an act of the mind, directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word *action*, to comprehend the forbearance too of any action

action proposed; sitting still, or holding one's peace, when walking or speaking are proposed, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the will, and being as often weighty in their consequences, as the contrary actions, may, on that consideration, well enough pass for actions too.

The will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on such direction; to the question, What is it that determines the will? the true and proper answer is, The mind: for that which determines the general power of directing to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power it has that particular way. If this answer satisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the question, What determines the will? is this, What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular motion or rest? And to this I answer, The motive for continuing in the same state or action is only the present satisfaction in it: the motive to change is always some uneasiness; nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action; which, for shortness sake, we will call determining of the will.

That which determines the will in regard to our actions, upon second thoughts, I am apt to imagine, is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view; but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under. This is that which successively determines the will, and sets us upon those actions we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it is, *desire*; which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good. All pain of the body, of what sort soever, and disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness; and with this is always joined desire equal to the pain or uneasiness felt, and is scarce distinguishable from it. For desire being nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain felt, ease is that absent good; and till that ease be attained, we may call it desire; nobody feeling pain that he wishes not to be eased of, with a desire equal to that pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent positive good; and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal. As much as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain for it. But here all absent good does not, according to the greatness it has, or is acknowledged to have, cause pain equal to that greatness, as all pain causes desire equal to itself; because the absence of good is not always a pain, as the presence of pain is. And therefore
absent

absent good may be looked on and considered without desire. But so much as there is any where of desire, so much there is of uneasiness.

That desire is a state of uneasiness, every one who reflects on himself will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in desire what the wise man says of hope, (which is not much different from it), "that it being deferred makes the heart sick;" and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire; which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, Give me children, give me the thing desired; or I die? Life itself, and all its enjoyments, is a burden cannot be borne under the lasting and unremoved pressure of such an uneasiness.

Good and evil, present and absent, it is true, work upon the mind: but that which immediately determines the will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire fixed on some absent good; either negative, as indolence to one in pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it is this uneasiness that determines the will to the successive voluntary actions whereof the greatest part of our lives are made up, and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends, I shall endeavour to show, both from experience and the reason of the thing.

When a man is perfectly content with the

state he is in, which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness, what industry, what action, what will is there left but to continue in it? Of this every man's observation will satisfy him. And thus we see our all-wise Maker, suitable to our constitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, and other natural desires, that return at their seasons, to move and determine their wills, for the preservation of themselves and the continuation of their species. For I think we may conclude, that if the bare contemplation of these good ends, to which we are carried by these several uneasinesses, had been sufficient to determine the will, and set us on work, we should have had none of these natural pains, and perhaps, in this world, little or no pain at all. "It is better to marry than to burn," says St Paul; where we may see what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life. A little burning felt, pushes us more powerfully, than greater pleasures in prospect draw or allure.

We being in this world beset with sundry uneasinesses, distracted with different desires, the next inquiry naturally will be, Which of them has the precedency in determining the will to the next action? And to that the answer is, That, ordinarily, which is the most pressing of those
that

that are judged capable of being then removed: For the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action for some end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable: that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to lose its labour, for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable; and therefore very great uneasinesses move not the will when they are judged not capable of a cure; they in that case put us not upon endeavours. But, these set apart, the most important and urgent uneasiness we at that time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the will successively in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives. The greatest present uneasiness is the spur to action, that is constantly felt, and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action. For this we must carry along with us, that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours, and nothing else; for we producing nothing by our willing it but some action in our power, it is there the will terminates, and reaches no further.

There being in us a great many uneasinesses always soliciting and ready to determine the will, it is natural that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action: and so it does for the most part, but not always; for the mind having in most cases, as is evident in
expe-

experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has: and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults, which we run into in the conduct of our lives and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due examination. To prevent this, we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire, as every one may experience in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think, improperly) called free-will: For during this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due examination, we have judged we have done our duty, all that we can or ought to do in pursuit of our happiness; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination.

This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: it is not an abridgment, it is
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the end and use of our liberty; and the further we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifferency on the mind, not determinable by its last judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection as the want of indifferency to act or not to act till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it rest quiet: he is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him if he wanted that power, if he were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection if he had the same indifferency whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming: it is as much a perfection that desire, or the power of preferring, should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will; and the more certain such a determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free; the very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the good we choose. And therefore every man
is

is put under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment what is best for him to do; else he would be under the determination of some other than himself; which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the time that he wills and acts for it: For if he prefers it in his present thoughts before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have and not have it, will and not will, at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted.

If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy or less free than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are to pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not good; the freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.

LOCKE.

PHI.

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY ESSENTIAL TO
BUSINESS AND SCIENCE.

THE mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies, that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent. The artificer expects, when he carries his goods to market and offers them at a reasonable price, he shall find buyers, and shall be able, by the money he acquires, to engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his subsistence. In proportion as men extend their dealings, and render their intercourse with others more complicated, they always comprehend a greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, from their proper motives, to co-operate with their own. In all these conclusions, they take their measures from past experience, in the same manner as in their reasonings concerning external objects; and firmly believe that men, as well as all the elements, are to continue in their operations the same which they have ever found them.—What would become of history, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian, according to the experience which we have had of mankind? How could

could politics be a science, if laws and forms of government had not an uniform influence upon society? Where could be the foundation of morals, if particular characters had no certain nor determinate power to produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our *criticism* upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters and in such circumstances? It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or action of any kind, without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this *inference* from motives to voluntary actions, from characters to conduct.

HUME.

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY ESSENTIAL TO MORALITY AND RELIGION.

NECESSITY may be defined two ways. It consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another. It has never been denied, that we can draw inferences concerning human actions; and that those inferences are founded in the experienced union of like actions, with like motives, inclinations, and circumstances.

cumstances.—All laws being founded on rewards and punishments, it is supposed as a fundamental principle, that these motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions. Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour if good, nor infamy if evil. The actions themselves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: but the person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can upon their account become the object of punishment or vengeance. According to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity and, consequently, causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth: nor is his character any way concerned in his actions, since they are not derived from it; and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other.

Men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be the consequences. Why, but because the

principles of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone? Men are blamed less for such actions as they perform hastily and unpremeditatedly, than for such as proceed from deliberation. For what reason, but because a hasty temper, though a constant cause and principle in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character? Again, repentance wipes off every crime, if attended with a reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for, but by asserting, that actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind; and when, by any alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal? But, except upon the doctrine of necessity, they never were just proofs, and consequently never were criminal. HUME.

THE ORIGIN OF THE LOVE OF NOVELTY.

THE continuance of the same sensations render them at length insensible to us: and from hence that inconstancy and love of novelty common to all men; for all would be affected in a strong and lively manner. Habit dulls the vivacity of an impression. I see with indifference what I always see; and even the beautiful ceases to be so to me. I have so often regarded the sun, that
sea,

sea, this landscape, and fine woman, that, to excite my attention or admiration, the sun must paint the heavens with colours more lively than common; the sea must be ravaged by storms; the landscape must appear with uncommon lustre; and the woman present herself to me under a new form. The more forcibly we are affected, the more happy we are; provided, however, the sensations be not painful.

HELVETIUS.

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O.

OATHS.

OATHS are requisite in all courts of judicature; but it is a question whether their authority arises from any popular religion. It is the solemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and the reflecting on the general interests of society, together with the punishments annexed to perjury in all well-regulated governments, that are the chief restraints upon mankind. Custom-house oaths, and political oaths, are but little regarded, even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and religion; and a Quaker's affirmation is with us justly put upon the same footing with the oath of any other person. Polybius ascribes, indeed, the infamy of Greek faith to the prevalence of the Epicurean philosophy: but the Punic faith, it is well known, had as bad a reputation in ancient times, as Irish evidence

evidence has in modern; though we cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to mention, that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean philosophy; and Euripides has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against his nation with regard to this circumstance. HUME.

OBSTINACY.

IT is often from the want of passions that arises the obstinacy of persons of mean parts. Their slender knowledge supposes that they never had any desire of instruction, or, at least, that this desire has been always very faint; very much below their fondness for sloth: now he who is not desirous of instruction, has never sufficient motives for altering his mind. To save himself the fatigue of imagination, he must always turn a deaf ear to the remonstrances of reason; and obstinacy, in this case, is the necessary effect of sloth.

HELVE TIUS.

OCCULT QUALITIES.

THE doctrine of occult qualities is the wisest and truest which antiquity has produced. The formation of the elements, the emission of light, animals, vegetables, minerals, our birth, our death, waking, sleeping, sensation, thought,—

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every thing is occult quality. See, feel, separate, measure, weigh, collect, and be assured that you will never do any more. Newton calculated the force of gravitation, but he has not discovered its cause. Why is that cause occult? It is a first principle. We are acquainted with the laws of motion; but the cause of motion being a first principle, will for ever remain a secret. You are alive, but how? You will never know any thing of the matter. You have sensations, ideas; but can you guess by what they are produced? Is not that the most occult thing in the world? Names have been given to a certain number of faculties which display themselves in us, according as our organs acquire some degree of strength, when they are freed from the teguments in which we were inclosed during nine months, without so much as knowing in what that strength consists. If we call any thing to mind, we say it is memory; if we range a few ideas in order, it is judgment; if we form a connected picture of some other scattered ideas, it is called imagination:—and the result or principle of those qualities is named *soul*, a thing still a thousand times more occult.

It is a certain truth, that there does not exist in us one separate being called sensibility, another memory, a third judgment, a fourth imagination; how then can we easily conceive that we have a fifth composed of the four others which are really

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non-entities?—What was understood by the ancients, when they pronounced the Greek word *Psyche*? Did they mean a property of man, or a particular being concealed in man? Was it not an *occult* expression of a very occult thing? Are not all the systems of ontology and psychology mere dreams? In our mother's womb we are entirely unacquainted with ourselves; yet there our ideas ought to be the purest, because there our attention is the least distracted. We are unacquainted with ourselves at our birth, in our growth, during our life, and at the hour of death. The first reasoner who departed from the ancient doctrine of occult qualities, corrupted the understanding of mankind. He involved us in a labyrinth, from which it is now impossible to extricate ourselves.

How much wiser had the first man been, who, sensible of his ignorance, had said to that Being who is the author of the universe: "Thou hast
"made me without my knowing it; and thou
"preserveest me without my being able to find out
"the mode of my existence. When I suckled my
"nurse's breast, I fulfilled one of the most ab-
"struse laws of natural philosophy; and I fulfil
"one still more unknown, when I eat and digest
"the aliments with which thou feedest me. I
"know still less, how some ideas enter my head
"to quit it the next moment without ever re-
"appearing; and how others remain there dur-
"ring

ring my whole life, notwithstanding my strongest efforts to drive them out. I am an effect of thy occult and supreme power, which the stars obey as well as myself. A particle of dust agitated by the wind, saith not, I command the winds. *In te vivimus, movemur, et sumus.* Those are the sole *Being*, and the rest is only mode.

VOLTAIRE.

OUR OPINIONS DEPEND UPON OUR INTEREST.

ALL men agree in the truth of geometric propositions. Is it because they are demonstrated? No: but because men have no interest in taking the false for the true. If they had such interest, the propositions most evidently demonstrated would appear to them problematic; they would prove on occasion, that the contained is greater than the container: this is a fact of which some religions afford examples. If a Catholic divine propose to prove that there are sticks that have not two ends, nothing is more easy: he will first distinguish sticks into two sorts, the one material; the other spiritual. He will then deliver an obscure dissertation on the nature of spiritual sticks; and conclude that the existence of these sticks is a mystery above, yet not contrary to, reason; and then this self-evident proposition, that there is no stick

stick without two ends, becomes problematic. It is the same with the most obvious truths of morality; the most evident is, "That, with regard to crimes, the punishment should be personal, and that I ought not to be punished for a crime committed by my neighbour." Yet how many theologians are there who still maintain, that God punishes in the present race of mankind the sins of their first parents? **HELVETIUS.**

NO SPECULATIVE OPINIONS INJURIOUS TO SOCIETY.

THE most absurd opinions in morality, and from whence the most detestable consequences may be drawn, can have no influence on the manners of a people, if there be no alteration in their laws. It is not a false maxim in morality that will render us wicked, but the interest we have to be so. In morality, says Machiavel, whatever absurd opinion we advance, we do not thereby injure society, provided we do not maintain that opinion by force. In every sort of science, it is by exhausting the errors that we come at last to the spring of truth. In morality, the thing really useful, is the inquiry after truth; and the non-inquiry that is really detrimental. He that extols ignorance, is a knave that would make dupes. Should we destroy error, compel it to silence?

No:

No: How then? Let it talk on. Error, obscure in itself, is rejected by every sound understanding. If time has not given it credit, and it be not favoured by government, it cannot bear the aspect of examination. Reason will ultimately direct wherever it be freely exercised.

HELVETIUS.

ORACLES.

IT is evident we cannot be acquainted with futurity, because we cannot be acquainted with what does not exist; but it is also clear, that conjectures may be formed of an event.

All predictions are reduced to the calculations of probabilities: there is, therefore, no nation in which some predictions have not been made that have come to pass. The most celebrated and best attested, is that which Flavius Josephus made to Vespasian and Titus his son, the conquerors of the Jews. He saw Vespasian and Titus adored by the Roman armies in the East, and Nero detested by the whole empire. He had the audacity, in order to obtain the good graces of Vespasian, to predict to him, in the name of the God of the Jews (Joseph. Book. iii. ch. 28.), that he and his son would become emperors. They, in effect, were so; but it is evident that Josephus ran no risk. If the day of Vespasian's overthrow

throw had come, he would not have been in a situation to punish Josephus; if he obtained the imperial throne, he must recompence his prophet, and till such time as he reigned, he was in hopes of doing it. Vespasian informed this Josephus, that if he were a prophet, he should have foretold him the loss of Jotapat, which he had ineffectually defended against the Roman army. Josephus replied, that he had in fact foretold it, which was not very surprising. What commander, who sustains a siege in a small place against a numerous army, does not foretell that the place will be taken.

The most brilliant function of the oracles was to insure victory in war. Each army, each nation, had its own peculiar oracles, who promised triumphs. The oraculous intelligence of one of the parties was infallibly true. The vanquished, who had been deceived, attributed their defeat to some fault committed towards the gods after the oracle had been consulted; and they hoped the oracle's prediction would another time be accomplished. Thus is almost the whole earth sed with illusion.

It was not difficult to discover, that respect and money might be drawn from the multitude by playing the prophet; and the credulity of the people must be a revenue for any who knew how to cheat them. There were in all places soothsayers;

layers; but it was not sufficient to foretell in their own name, it was necessary to speak in the name of the divinity: and from the time of the prophets of Egypt, who called themselves seers, till the time of Ulpian, who prophesied to the favourite of the empire, Adrian, who became a god, there was a prodigious number of sacred quacks, who made the gods speak to make a jest of man. It is well known how they might succeed; by an ambiguous reply, which they afterwards explained as they pleased.

These prophets were reckoned to know the past, the present, and the future. This is the eulogium which Homer makes upon Calchas.

Divinations and auguries were a kind of oracles, and, perhaps, of higher antiquity; for many ceremonies were necessary, much time was required, to draw custom to a divine oracle, that could not do without temple and priests; and nothing was easier than to tell fortunes in the cross ways. This art was subdivided into a thousand shapes; predictions were extracted from the flight of birds, sheep livers, the lines of the palm of the hand, circles drawn upon the ground, water, fire, small flints, wands; and, in a word, from every thing that could be devised, and frequently from enthusiasm alone, which supplied the place of all rules. But who invented this art? The first rogue that met with a fool.

VOLTAIRE.

O R.

ORTHODOXY.

ORTHODOXY is a Greek word, which signifies a right opinion; and hath been used by churchmen as a term to denote a soundness of doctrine or belief, with regard to all points and articles of faith. But as there have been amongst these churchmen several systems of doctrine or belief, they all assert for themselves, that they *only* are orthodox, and in the right; and that all others are heterodox, or in the wrong. So that what at one time, and in one place, hath been declared orthodoxy, or sound belief, hath at another time, and in another, or even the same place, been declared to be heterodoxy, or wrong belief. Of this there are numberless instances in ecclesiastical history; and we need only just take a transient view of the present Christian world, to perceive many more instances of it subsisting at this day. What is orthodoxy at Constantinople, is heterodoxy or heresy at Rome. What is orthodoxy at Rome, is heterodoxy at Geneva, London, and many other places. What was orthodoxy here in the reign of Edward VI. became heresy in the reign of his sister Mary; and in Queen Elisabeth's time, things changed their names again. Various was the fate of these poor words in the reigns of our succeeding kings; as the currents of Calvinism, Armini-

anism, and Popery, ebbcd and flowed. So uncertain and fluctuating a thing is orthodoxy. To-day it consists in one set of principles, to-morrow in another. Were the words orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and heresy, employed, as they ought, in distinguishing virtue from vice, and good from evil, they would admit of no variation, and be for ever taken in the same sense. But as they are used to denote opinions concerning the most incomprehensible subjects, no wonder that their meaning should be so often mistaken, and occasion so many endless and bitter disputes.

ROBERTSON.

P.

MANKIND GOVERNED BY PAIN AND PLEASURE.

NATURE has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire; but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility

recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is, to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.

The happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is composed, that is, their pleasures and their security, is the end and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view: the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be *made to* fashion his behaviour. But whether it be this or any thing else that is to be *done*, there is nothing by which a man can ultimately be *made to do it*, but either pain or pleasure.

J. BENTHAM.

SANCTIONS, OR SOURCES OF PAIN AND PLEASURE, AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN LEGISLATION.

THERE are four distinguishable sources from which pleasure and pain are in use to flow: Considered separately, they may be termed the *physical*, the *political*, the *moral*, and the *religious*; and inasmuch as the pleasures and pains belonging

ing to each of them are capable of giving a binding force to any law or rule of conduct, they may all of them be termed *sanctions*. If it be in the present life, and from the ordinary course of nature, not purposely modified by the interposition of the will of any human being, nor by any extraordinary interposition of any superior invisible being, that the pleasure or the pain takes place or is expected, it may be said to issue from or belong to the *physical sanction*. If at the hands of a particular person or set of persons in the community, who, under names correspondent to that of *judge*, are chosen for the particular purpose of dispensing it, according to the will of the sovereign or supreme ruling power in the state, it may be said to issue from the *political sanction*. If at the hands of such *chance* persons in the community, as the party in question may happen in the course of his life to have concerns with, according to each man's spontaneous disposition, and not according to any settled or concerted rule, it may be said to issue from the *moral sanction*. If from the immediate hand of a superior invisible Being, either in the present life, or in a future, it may be said to issue from a *religious sanction*. Pleasures or pains which may be expected to issue from the *physical, political, or moral* sanctions, must all of them be expected to be experienced, if ever, in the *present life*: those which may be

expected to issue from the *religious* sanction, may be expected to be experienced either in the *present* life or in a *future*.

Those which can be experienced in the present life, can of course be no other than such as human nature in the course of the present life is susceptible of; and from each of these sources may flow all the pleasures or pains of which, in the course of the present life, human nature is susceptible. With regard to these then (with which alone we have in this place any concern), those of them which belong to any one of those sanctions, differ not ultimately in kind from those which belong to any one of the other three: the only difference there is among them lies in the circumstances that accompany their production. A suffering which befalls a man in the natural and spontaneous course of things, shall be styled, for instance, a *calamity*; in which case, if it be supposed to befall him through any imprudence of his, it may be styled a punishment issuing from the *physical* sanction. Now this same suffering, if inflicted by the law, will be what is commonly called a *punishment*; if incurred for want of any friendly assistance, which the misconduct, or supposed misconduct, of the sufferer has occasioned to be withholden, a punishment issuing from the *moral* sanction; if through the immediate interposition of a particular providence, a punishment
issuing

issuing from a *religious* sanction. A man's goods, or his person, are consumed by fire. If this happened to him by what is called an accident, it was a calamity; if by reason of his own imprudence (for instance, from his neglecting to put his candle out), it may be styled a punishment of the physical sanction: if it happened to him by the sentence of the political magistrate, a punishment belonging to the political sanction; that is, what is commonly called a punishment: if for want of any assistance which his *neighbour* withheld from him out of some dislike to his *moral* character, a punishment of the *moral* sanction: if by an immediate act of *God's* displeasure, manifested on account of some *sin* committed by him, or through any distraction of mind, occasioned by the dread of such displeasure, a punishment of the *religious* sanction.

As to such of the pleasures and pains belonging to the religious sanction as regard a future life, of what kind these may be we cannot know. These lie not open to our observation. During the present life they are matter only of expectation: and, whether that expectation be derived from natural or revealed religion, the particular kind of pleasure or pain, if it be different from all those which lie open to our observation, is what we can have no idea of. Of these four sanctions, the physical is altogether, we may observe,

serve, the groundwork of the political and the moral; so is it also of the religious, in as far as the latter bears relation to the present life. It is included in each of those other three. This may operate in any case (that is, any of the pains or pleasures belonging to it may operate) independently of *them*: none of *them* can operate but by means of this. In a word, the powers of nature may operate of themselves; but neither the magistrate, nor men at large, *can* operate, nor is God in the case in question *supposed* to operate, but through the powers of nature.

For these four objects, which in their nature have so much in common, it seemed of use to find a common name. It seemed of use, in the first place, for the convenience of giving a name to certain pleasures and pains, for which a name equally characteristic could hardly otherwise have been found: in the second place, for the sake of holding up the efficacy of certain moral forces, the influence of which is apt not to be sufficiently attended to. Does the political sanction exert an influence over the conduct of mankind? The moral, the religious sanctions do so too. In every inch of his career are the operations of the political magistrate liable to be aided or impeded by these two foreign powers: who, one or other of them, or both, are sure to be either his rivals or his allies. Does it happen to him to leave them
out

out in his calculations; he will be sure almost to find himself mistaken in the result. It behoves him, therefore, to have them continually before his eyes; and that under such a name as exhibits the relation they bear to his own purposes and designs.

J. BENTHAM.

THE NATURE OF PAIN AND TERROR.

A MAN who suffers under *violent* bodily pain has his teeth set, his eye-brows violently contracted, his forehead wrinkled, his eyes dragged inwards, and rolled with great vehemence, his hair stands an end, the voice is forced out in short shrieks and groans, and the whole fabric totters. Fear or terror, which is an apprehension of pain or death, exhibits exactly the same effects, approaching in violence to those just mentioned, in proportion to the nearness of the cause, and the weakness of the subject.

This is not only so in the human species, but it is observable even in dogs; they, under the apprehension of punishment, writhe their bodies, and yelp, and howl, as if they actually felt blows. From whence we may conclude, that pain and fear act upon the same parts of the body, and in the same manner, though somewhat different in degree: that pain and fear consist in an unnatural

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ral tension of the nerves; that this is sometimes accompanied with an unnatural strength, which sometimes suddenly changes into an extraordinary weakness; that the effects often come on alternately, and are sometimes mixed with each other. This is the nature of all convulsive agitations, especially in weaker subjects, which are the most liable to the severest impressions of pain and fear. The only difference between pain and terror is, that things which cause pain operate on the mind by the intervention of the body; whereas things that cause terror, generally affect the bodily organs by the operation of the mind suggesting the danger; but both agreeing, either primarily or secondarily, in producing a tension, contraction, or violent emotion of the nerves, they agree likewise in every thing else. For it appears clearly from this example, as well as from many others, that when the body is disposed, by any means whatsoever, to such emotions as it would acquire by the means of a certain passion, it will of itself excite something very like that passion in the mind.

To this purpose Mr Spon, in his *Recherches d'Antiquité*, gives us a curious story of the celebrated Campanella, a physiognomist. This man, it seems, had not only made very accurate observations on human faces, but was very expert in mimicking such as were any way remarkable.

markable. When he had a mind to penetrate into the inclinations of those he had to deal with, he composed his face, his gesture, and his whole body, as nearly as he could, into the exact similitude of the person he intended to examine; and then carefully examined what turn of mind he seemed to acquire by this change. So that, says our author, he was able to enter into the dispositions and thoughts of people as effectually as if he had been changed into the very men. We may observe, that on mimicking the looks and gestures of angry, or placid, or frightened, or daring men, our minds are involuntarily turned to that passion whose appearance we endeavour to imitate; nay, it seems hard to avoid it, though one strove to separate the passion from its correspondent gestures. Our minds and bodies are so closely and intimately connected, that one is incapable of pain and pleasure without the other. Campanella, of whom we have been speaking, could so abstract his attention from any sufferings of his body, that he was able to endure the rack itself without much pain; and in lesser pains, every body must have observed, that when we can employ our attention on any thing else, the pain has been for some time suspended: on the other hand, if by any means the body is indisposed to perform such gestures, or to be stimulated into such emotions as any passion usually produces in it, that
passion

passion itself never can arise, though its cause should be ever so strongly in action; though it should be merely mental, and immediately affecting none of the senses: As an opiate, or spirituous liquors, shall suspend the operation of grief, or fear, or anger, in spite of all our efforts to the contrary; and this, by inducing in the body a disposition contrary to that which it receives from these passions.

BURKE.

A PARABLE AGAINST PERSECUTION.

AND it came to pass after these things, that Abraham sat in the door of his tent, about the going down of the sun. And behold a man bent with age, coming from the way of the wilderness leaning on a staff. And Abraham arose, and met him, and said unto him, Turn in, I pray thee, and wash thy feet, and tarry all night; and thou shalt arise early in the morning, and go on thy way. And the man said, Nay; for I will abide under this tree. But Abraham pressed him greatly: so he turned, and they went into the tent: and Abraham baked unleavened bread, and they did eat. And when Abraham saw that the man blessed not God, he said unto him, Wherefore dost thou not worship the most high God, Creator of heaven and earth? And the man answered and said, I do

not worship thy God, neither do I call upon his name; for I have made to myself a god, which abideth always in my house, and provideth me with all things. And Abraham's zeal was kindled against the man; and he arose, and fell upon him, and drove him forth with blows into the wilderness. And God called unto Abraham, saying, Abraham, where is the stranger? And Abraham answered and said, Lord, he would not worship thee, neither would he call upon thy name; therefore have I driven him out from before my face into the wilderness. And God said, Have I borne with him these hundred and ninety and eight years, and nourished him, and clothed him, notwithstanding his rebellion against me; and couldst not thou, who art thyself a sinner, bear with him one night?

FRANKLIN.

PARDON OF CRIMINALS.

CLEMENCY is a virtue which belongs to the legislator, and not to the executor of the laws; a virtue which ought to shine in the code, and not in the private judgment. To show mankind, that crimes are sometimes pardoned, and that punishment is not the necessary consequence, is to nourish the flattering hope of impunity, and is the cause of their considering every punishment in-

dicted as an act of injustice and oppression. The prince in pardoning, gives up the public security in favour of an individual, and, by his ill-judged benevolence, proclaims a public act of impunity. Let then the executors of the laws be inexorable; but let the legislator be tender, indulgent, and humane. He is a wise architect, who erects his edifice on the foundation of self-love, and contrives that the interest of the public shall be the interest of each individual; who is not obliged, by particular laws and irregular proceedings, to separate the public good from that of individuals, and erect the image of public felicity on the basis of fear and distrust; but, like a wise philosopher, he will permit his brethren to enjoy, in quiet, that small portion of happiness which the immense system, established by the first cause, permits them to taste on this earth. A small crime is sometimes pardoned, if the person offended choose to forgive the offender. This may be an act of goodness and humanity, but it is contrary to the good of the public. For, although a private citizen may dispense with satisfaction for the injury he has received, he cannot remove the necessity of example.

BECCARIA.

PA.

PARENTAL AFFECTION.

IT is the constant hourly attention that a mother gives to her child, an attention that commences on her part before it is born, and not any thing properly instinctive, that is the cause of the idea of it becoming associated with almost every idea and affection of her soul, which is the source of maternal tenderness; a kind of tenderness that the father seldom feels any thing of till some months afterwards, when it is acquired by the same attention: Hence it is that a sickly child generally gets the largest share of its parents love. For the same reason also, nurses that are not mothers feel more of this tenderness than the mothers who send their children out to nurse. The same familiar intercourse, that endears a child to a parent, does likewise endear the parent to the child; and to expect these affections without such intercourse and attention, is the same thing as expecting the harvest without a previous seed-time. This intercourse, and those endearments, which gradually supply the associations that constitute parental affection, are mechanical things, and cannot be acquired without the association of the proper ideas and sensations which only time and intercourse can supply.

PRIESTLEY,

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ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

A MOTHER idolizes her son; I love him, says she, for his own sake. However, one might reply, you take no care of his education, though you are in no doubt that a good one would contribute infinitely to his happiness: why, therefore, do not you consult some men of sense about him, and read some of the books written on that subject? Why, because, says she, I think I know as much of that matter as those authors and their works. But how did you get this confidence in your own understanding? Is it not the effect of your indifference? An ardent desire always inspires us with a salutary distrust of ourselves. If we have a suit at law of considerable consequence, we visit counsellors and attorneys, we consult a great number and examine their advice. Are we attacked by any of those lingering diseases, which incessantly place around us the shades and horrors of death, we go to physicians, compare their opinions, read medical books, and in some degree become physicians ourselves. Such is the conduct of a man very much interested. With respect to the education of children, if you are not influenced in the same manner, it is because you do not love your son so well as yourself. But, adds the mother, What then should be the motive

tive of my tenderness? Among fathers and mothers, I reply, some are influenced by the desire of perpetuating their name in their children; they properly love only their names: others are fond of command, and see in their children their slaves. The animal leaves its young when their weakness no longer keeps them in dependence; and paternal love becomes extinguished in almost all hearts, when children have by their age and station attained to independence. Then, said the poet Saadi, The father sees nothing in them but greedy heirs; and this is the cause, adds some poet, of the extraordinary love of the grandfather for his grandchildren; he considers them as the enemies of his enemies. There are fathers and mothers who make their children their play-things and their pastime. The loss of this play-thing would be insupportable to them; but would their affliction prove that they loved the child for itself? Every body knows the story of M. de Lauzun; when he was in the Bastile, without books, without employment, a prey to lassitude and the horrors of a prison, he took it into his head to tame a spider. This was the only consolation he had left in his misfortune. The governor of the Bastile, from an inhumanity common to men accustomed to see the unhappy, crushed the spider. The prisoner felt the most cutting grief; and no mother could be affected by the death of an only

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son with a more violent sorrow. Now, whence is derived this conformity of sentiments for such different objects? It is because, in the loss of a child, or in the loss of the spider, people frequently weep for nothing but for the lassitude and want of employment into which they fall. If mothers appear, in general, more afflicted at the death of a child, than fathers employed in business, or given up to the pursuit of ambition, it is not because the mother loves her child more tenderly, but because she suffers a loss more difficult to be supplied. Errors, in this respect, are very frequent; people rarely cherish a child for its own sake. That parental affection, of which so many people make a parade, and by which they believe themselves so warmly affected, is most frequently nothing more than an effect, either of a desire of perpetuating their names, of the pride of command, or the fear of the wearisomeness of inaction.

HELVE TIUS.

THE INDEPENDENCY OF THE PARLIAMENT OF BRITAIN.

MEN are generally more honest in their private than in their public capacity; and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than when their own private interest is alone concerned. Honour is a great check upon mankind: But where a con-

siderable

fitlerable body of men act together, this check is in a great measure removed; since a man is sure to be approved by his own party for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of adversaries. When there offers, therefore, to our censure and examination, any plan of government, real or imaginary, where the power is distributed among several courts, and several orders of men, we should always consider the private interest of each court and each order; and if we find that, by the skilful division of power, private interest must necessarily in its operation concur with public, we may pronounce that government to be wise and happy. If, on the contrary, the private interest of each order is not checked, and be not directed to public interest, we ought to look for nothing but faction, disorder, and tyranny, from such a government. The share of power allotted by the British constitution to the House of Commons is so great, that it absolutely commands all the other parts of the government. The King's legislative power is plainly no proper check to it. For though the King has a negative in framing laws; yet this, in fact, is esteemed of so little moment, that whatever is voted by the two Houses, is always sure to be passed into a law, and the Royal assent is little better than a form. The principal weight of the Crown lies in the executive power. But besides that

that the executive power in every government is altogether subordinate to the legislature; besides this, I say, the exercise of this power requires an immense expence; and the Commons have assumed to themselves the sole power of granting money. How easy, therefore, would it be for that House to wrest from the Crown all these powers, one after another, by making every grant conditional; and choosing their time so well, that their refusal of subsidies should only distress the government; without giving foreign powers any advantage over us?—By what means is this member of the British constitution confined within the proper limits, since, from the very constitution, it must necessarily have as much power as it demands, and can only be confined by itself? How is this consistent with our experience of human nature? I answer, that the interest of the body is here restrained by the interest of individuals; and that the House of Commons stretches not its power, because such an usurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its members. The Crown has so many offices at its disposal, that, when assisted by the honest and disinterested part of the House, it will always command the resolution of the whole; so far, at least, as to preserve the ancient constitution from danger. We may therefore give to this influence what name we please; we may call it by the invidious

vidious appellations of *corruption* and *dependence*; but some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixed government. All questions concerning the proper medium between extremes are difficult to be decided; both because it is not easy to find words to fix this medium, and because the good and ill, in such cases, run so gradually into each other, as even to render our sentiments doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar difficulty in the present case, which would embarrass the most knowing and impartial examiner. The power of the Crown is always lodged in a single person, either king or minister; and as this person may have either a greater or less degree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity, or fortune, the power which is too great in one hand, may become too little in another. By that influence of the Crown, which I would justify, I mean only that arising from the offices and honours which are at the disposal of the Crown. As to private bribery, it may be considered in the same light as employing spies; which is scarcely justifiable in a good minister, and is infamous in a bad one; But to be a spy, or to be corrupted, is always infamous under all ministers, and is to be regarded as a shameless prostitution. Polybius justly esteems the pecuniary influence of the senate and
censors,

censors, to be one of the regular and constitutional weights which preserved the balance of the Roman government.

HUME.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IT may be questioned whether the progress to absolute slavery and insecurity would be more rapid, if the King were *nominally* arbitrary, or only virtually so, by uniformly influencing the House of Commons. In some respects, so large a body of men would venture upon things which no single person would choose to do of his own authority; and so long as they had little intercourse but with one another, they would not be much affected with the sense of fear or shame. One may safely say, that no single member of the House would have had the assurance to decide as the majority have often done in cases of controverted elections. Whenever the House of Commons shall be so abandonedly corrupt, as to join with the Court in abolishing any of the essential forms of the constitution, or effectually defeating the great purposes of it, let every Englishman, before it is too late, peruse the history of his country, and do what Englishmen are renowned for having done formerly in the same circumstances.—Where civil liberty is entirely divested of its natural

tural guard, political liberty, I should not hesitate to prefer the government of one to that of a number; because a sense of shame would have less influence upon them, and they would keep one another in countenance, in cases in which any single person would yield to the sense of the majority.

PRIESTLEY.

THE ORIGIN OF THE PASSIONS.

WE must distinguish the passions into two kinds; those immediately given us by nature, and these we owe to the establishment of society. And to know which of these passions has produced the other, let us transport ourselves in idea to the first ages of the world; and we shall there see that nature, by hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, informed man of his wants, and added a variety of pleasing and painful sensations; the former to the gratifications of these wants, the latter to the incapacity of gratifying them. There we shall behold man capable of receiving the impressions of pleasure and pain, and born as it were with a love for the one and hatred for the other. Such was man when he came from the hand of nature. In this state he had neither envy, pride, avarice, or ambition; sensible only of the pleasure and pain derived from nature, he was ignorant of all those artificial pains and pleasures we procure from

from the above passions. Such passions then are not immediately given by nature; but their existence, which supposes that of society, also supposes that we have in us the latent seeds of those passions. If, therefore, we receive at our birth only wants, in those wants, and in our first desires, we must seek the origin of these artificial passions.

HELVE TIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THEY certainly do not attach clear ideas to the word *passions*, who regard them as detrimental. Our desires are our motives; and it is the force of our desires which determines that of our virtues and vices. A man without desire and without want, is without invention and without reason. No motive can engage him to combine or compare his ideas with each other. The more a man approaches to that state of apathy, the more stupid he becomes. To attempt to destroy the passions of *men*, is to attempt to destroy their action. Does the theologian rail at the passions? He is the pendulum that mocks its spring, and the effect that mistakes its cause. By annihilating the desires, you annihilate the mind; every man without passions, has within him no principle of action, nor motive to act.

HELVE TIUS.

DIFFERENT PASSIONS RECIPROCALLY INSULT EACH OTHER.

LET a woman, young, beautiful, and full of gallantry, such as history has painted the celebrated Cleopatra, who by the multiplicity of her charms, the attractions of her wit, the variety of her caresses, makes her lover daily taste all the delights that could be found in inconstancy, and in short, whose first enjoyment was, as Echard says, only the first favour; let such a woman appear in an assembly of prudes, whose age and deformity secure their chastity; they will there despise her charms and her talents: sheltered from seduction by the Medusean shield of deformity, these prudes form no conception of the pleasure arising from the infatuation of a lover; and do not perceive the difficulty a beautiful woman finds in resisting the desire of making him the confident of all her secret charms: they therefore fall with fury upon this lovely woman, and place her weakness among crimes of the blackest dye: but let one of these prudes in her turn appear in a circle of coquets, she will there be treated with as little respect as youth and beauty show to old age and deformity. To be revenged on her prudery, they will tell her, that the fair who yields to love, and the disagreeable who resist that passion,

sion, are both prompted by vanity; that in case of a lover, one seeks an admirer of her charms, and the other flies from him who proclaims her disgrace; and that both being animated by the same motive, there is no other difference but that of beauty between the prude and the woman of gallantry.

HELVETIUS.

THE PASSIONS SOURCES OF ERROR.

THE passions lead us into error, because they fix our attention to that particular part of the object they present to us, not allowing us to view it on every side. A king passionately affects the title of conqueror; and, inebriated with the hopes of victory, he forgets that fortune is inconstant, and that the victor shares the load of misery almost equally with the vanquished. He does not perceive, that the welfare of his subjects is only a pretence for his martial frenzy, and that pride alone forges his arms, and displays his ensigns; his whole attention is fixed on the pomp of the triumph.—Fear, equally powerful with pride, will produce the same effect: it will raise ghosts and phantoms, and disperse them among the tombs; and in the darkness of the woods, present them to the eyes of the affrighted traveller; seize on all the faculties of the soul, without leaving any one at liberty to reflect on the absurdity of the

the motives for such a ridiculous terror.—The passions not only fix the attention on particular sides of the objects they present to us; but they also deceive us, by exhibiting the same objects when they do not really exist. It is common for us to see in things what we are desirous of finding there. Illusion is the necessary effect of the passions; the strength or force of which is generally measured by the degree of obscurity into which they lead us. There is no century which has not by some ridiculous affirmation or negation afforded matter of laughter to the following age. A past folly is seldom sufficient to show mankind their present folly. The same passions, however, which are the germ of an infinity of errors, are also the sources of our knowledge. If they mislead us, they at the same time impart to us the strength necessary for walking. It is they alone that can rouse us from that sluggishness, and torpor always ready to seize on the faculties of the soul.

HELVETIUS..

PATRIOTISM.

EVERY particular society, when it is confined and its members united, alienates itself from the general one of mankind.—A true patriot is inhospitable to foreigners: they are mere men, and appear to have no relation to him. This in-

convenience is inevitable, but it is not great. The most essential point is a man's being beneficent and useful to those among whom he lives. The inhabitants of Sparta, when abroad, were ambitious, covetous, and unjust; but disinterestedness, equity, and concord reigned within their walls. Be ever mistrustful of those cosmopolites, who deduce from books the far-fetched and extensive obligations of universal benevolence, while they neglect to discharge their actual duties towards those who are about them. A philosopher of this stamp affects to have a regard for the Tartars, by way of excuse for his having none for his neighbours. Natural man is every thing with him: he is a numerical unit, an absolute integer, that bears no relation but to himself or his species. Civilized man is only a relative unit, the numerator of a fraction, that depends on its denominator, and whose value consists in its relation to the integral body of society. The best political institutions are those which are best calculated to divest mankind of their natural inclinations; to deprive them of an absolute, by giving them a relative, existence, and incorporating distinct individuals in one common whole. A citizen of Rome was neither Caius nor Lucius; he was a Roman; nay, he even loved his country, exclusive of its relation to himself. Regulus pretended himself a Carthaginian, as being become
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the property of his masters. In that character he refused to take his seat in the Roman senate, till a Carthaginian commanded him. He was filled with indignation at the remonstrances made to save his life; and returned triumphant to perish in the midst of tortures. This appears to me, indeed, to have little relation to men with whom we are at present acquainted.—The Lacedemonian, Pedaretes, who presented himself for admission into the council of three hundred, was rejected, returned home rejoicing that there were to be found in Sparta three hundred men better than himself. Supposing the demonstrations of his joy sincere, as there is room to believe they were, this man was a true citizen.—A woman of Sparta, having five sons in the army, and being hourly in expectation of hearing of a battle, a messenger at length arrived; of whom she, trembling, asked the news: Your five sons, says he, are killed.—*Vile slave*, who asked you of my sons?—But we have gained the victory, continued he. This was enough; the heroic mother ran to the temple, and gave thanks to the gods. This woman was a true citizen.—Those who would have man, in the bosom of a society, retain the primitive sentiments of nature, know not what they want. Ever contradicting himself, and wavering between his duty and inclination, he would

neither be the man nor the citizen; he would be good for nothing either to himself or to others.

ROUSSEAU.

PEASANTS AND SAVAGES.

THERE are two kinds of men, who live in a continual exercise of body, and never think of the cultivation of the mind: These are Peasants and Savages. The former nevertheless are clownish, brutal, and dull; while the latter are as remarkable for their strong sense as for their subtlety. Generally speaking, nothing is so stupid as a clown, nor so cunning as a savage. Whence comes this difference? Doubtless it arises hence: the former being accustomed to do what he is bid, or what his father used to do before him, plods on in the same beaten track; and being little better than a mere machine, constantly employed in the same manner, habit and obedience stand with him in the place of reason.—As to the savage, the case is widely different; being attached to no one place, having no settled task, obedient to none, and restrained by no other law than his own will, he is obliged to reason on every action of his life: he makes not a motion nor takes a step without having previously considered the consequences. Thus, the more his body is exercised, the more is his mind enlightened; his mental
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and corporeal faculties advance together, and reciprocally improve each other.

ROUSSEAU.

ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

THE ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three great branches; Physics, or natural philosophy; Ethics, or moral philosophy; and Logic. This general division seems perfectly agreeable to the nature of things.

The great phenomena of nature, the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, eclipses, comets, thunder, lightning, and other extraordinary meteors; the generation, the life, growth, and dissolution of plants and animals; are objects which, as they necessarily excite the wonder, so they naturally call forth the curiosity of mankind to inquire into their causes. Superstition first attempted to satisfy this curiosity, by referring all those wonderful appearances to the immediate agency of the gods. Philosophy afterwards endeavoured to account for them from more familiar causes, or from such as mankind were better acquainted with, than the agency of the gods. As those great phenomena are the first objects of human curiosity; so the science which pretends to explain them must naturally have been the first branch of philosophy that was cultivated.

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The first philosophers, accordingly, of whom history has preserved any account, appear to have been natural philosophers.

In every age and country of the world men must have attended to the characters, designs, and actions of one another; and many reputable rules and maxims for the conduct of human life, must have been laid down and approved of by common consent. As soon as writing came into fashion, wise men, or those who fancied themselves such, would naturally endeavour to increase the number of those established and respected maxims, and to express their own sense of what was either proper or improper conduct; sometimes in the more artificial form of apologies, like what are called the fables of *Æsop*; and sometimes in the more simple one of apophthegms, or wise sayings, like the Proverbs of *Solomon*, the verses of *Theognis* and *Phocylides*, and some part of the works of *Hesiod*. They might continue in this manner for a long time, merely to multiply the number of those maxims of prudence and morality, without even attempting to arrange them in any very distinct or methodical order, much less to connect them together by one or more general principles, from which they were all deducible, like effects from their natural causes. The beauty of a systematical arrangement of different observations connected

ned by a few common principles, was first seen in the rude essays of those ancient times towards a system of natural philosophy. Something of the same kind was afterwards attempted in morals. The maxims of common life were arranged in some methodical order, and connected together by a few common principles, in the same manner as they had attempted to arrange and connect the phenomena of nature. The science which pretends to investigate and explain those connecting principles, is what is properly called Moral Philosophy.

Different authors gave different systems both of natural and moral philosophy. But the arguments by which they supported those different systems, far from being always demonstrations, were frequently at best but very slender probabilities, and sometimes mere sophisms, which had no other foundation but the inaccuracy and ambiguity of common language. Speculative systems have in all ages of the world been adopted, for reasons too frivolous to have determined the judgment of any man of common sense in a matter of the smallest pecuniary interest. Gross sophistry has scarce ever had any influence upon the opinions of mankind, except in matters of philosophy and speculation; and in these it has frequently had the greatest. The patrons of each system of natural and moral philosophy naturally

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endeavoured to expose the weakness of the arguments adduced to support the systems which were opposite to their own. In examining those arguments, they were necessarily led to consider the difference between a probable and a demonstrative argument, between a fallacious and a conclusive one; and logic, or the science of the general principles of good and bad reasoning, necessarily arose out of the observations which a scrutiny of this kind gave occasion to. Though in its origin posterior both to physics and to ethics, it was commonly taught, not indeed in all, but in the greater part of the ancient schools of philosophy, previously to either of those sciences. The student, it seems to have been thought, ought to understand well the difference between good and bad reasoning, before he was led to reason upon subjects of so great importance.

A. SMITH.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

IN the ancient philosophy, whatever was taught concerning the nature either of the human mind, or of the Deity, made a part of the system of physics. Those beings, in whatever their essence might be supposed to consist, were parts of the great system of the universe, and parts, too, productive of the most important effects. What-
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ever human reason could either conclude or conjecture concerning them, made, as it were, two chapters, though no doubt two very important ones, of the science which pretended to give an account of the origin and revolutions of the great system of the universe. But in the universities of Europe, where philosophy was taught only as subservient to theology, it was natural to dwell longer upon these two chapters than upon any other of the science. They were gradually more and more extended, and were divided into many inferior chapters; till at last the doctrine of spirits, of which so little can be known, came to take up as much room in the system of philosophy, as the doctrine of bodies, of which so much can be known. The doctrines concerning those two subjects were considered as making two distinct sciences. What are called metaphysics or pneumatics were set in opposition to physics, and were cultivated, not only as the more sublime, but, for the purposes of a particular profession, as the more useful science of the two. The proper subject of experiment and observation, a subject in which a careful attention is capable of making so many useful discoveries, was almost entirely neglected. The subject in which, after a few very simple and almost obvious truths, the most careful attention can discover nothing but obscurity and uncertainty, and can consequently produce

produce nothing but subtleties and sophisms, was greatly cultivated.

When those two sciences had thus been set in opposition to one another, the comparison between them naturally gave birth to a third, to what was called *Ontology*, or the science which treated of the qualities and attributes which were common to both the subjects of the other two sciences. But if subtleties and sophisms composed the greater part of the metaphysics or pneumatics of the schools, they composed the whole of this cob-web science of ontology; which was likewise sometimes called *Metaphysics*.

Wherein consisted the happiness and perfection of a man, considered not only as an individual, but as the member of a family, of a state, and of the great society of mankind, was the object which the ancient moral philosophy proposed to investigate. In that philosophy the duties of human life were treated of as subservient to the happiness and perfection of human life. But when moral, as well as natural philosophy, came to be taught only as subservient to theology, the duties of human life were treated of as chiefly subservient to the happiness of a life to come. In the ancient philosophy, the perfection of virtue was represented as necessarily productive, to the person who possessed it, of the most perfect happiness in this life. In the modern philosophy, it

was frequently represented as generally, or rather as almost always, inconsistent with any degree of happiness in this life; and heaven was to be earned only by penance and mortification, by the austerities and abasement of a monk; not by the liberal, generous, and spirited conduct of a man. Casuistry and an ascetic morality made up, in most cases, the greater part of the moral philosophy of the schools. By far the most important of all the different branches of philosophy, became in this manner by far the most corrupted.

Such, therefore, was the common course of philosophical education in the greater part of the universities in Europe. Logic was taught first: Ontology came in the second place: Pneumatology, comprehending the doctrine concerning the nature of the human soul and of the Deity, in the third: In the fourth followed a debased system of moral philosophy, which was considered as immediately connected with the doctrines of pneumatology, with the immortality of the human soul, and with the rewards and punishments which, from the justice of the Deity, were to be expected in a life to come: A short and superficial system of physics usually concluded the course.

The alterations which the universities of Europe thus introduced into the ancient course of philosophy, were all meant for the education of ecclesiastics, and to render it a more proper in-

introduction to the study of theology. But the additional quantity of subtlety and sophistry, the casuistry and the ascetic morality which those alterations introduced into it, certainly did not render it more proper for the education of gentlemen or men of the world, or more likely either to improve the understanding, or to mend the heart.

This course of philosophy is what still continues to be taught in the greater part of the universities of Europe; with more or less diligence, according as the constitution of each particular university happens to render diligence more or less necessary to the teachers. In some of the richest and best endowed universities, the tutors content themselves with teaching a few unconnected shreds and parcels of this corrupted course; and even these they commonly teach very negligently and superficially.

The improvements which, in modern times, have been made in several different branches of philosophy, have not, the greater part of them, been made in universities; though some no doubt have. The greater part of universities have not even been very forward to adopt those improvements after they were made; and several of those learned societies have chosen to remain for a long time the sanctuaries in which exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection,

tion, after they had been hunted out of every other corner in the world. In general, the richest and best endowed universities have been the slowest in adopting those improvements, and the most averse to permit any considerable change in the established plan of education. Those improvements were more easily introduced into some of the poorer universities, in which the teachers, depending upon their reputation for the greater part of their subsistence, were obliged to pay more attention to the current opinions of the world.

But though the public schools and universities of Europe were originally intended only for the education of a particular profession, that of churchmen, and though they were not always very diligent in instructing their pupils even in the sciences which were supposed necessary for that profession; yet they gradually drew to themselves the education of almost all other people, particularly of almost all gentlemen and men of fortune. No better method, it seems, could be fallen upon of spending, with any advantage, the long interval between infancy and that period of life at which men begin to apply in good earnest to the real business of the world, the business which is to employ them during the remainder of their days. The greater part of what is taught in schools and universities, however, does not seem to be the most proper preparation for that business.

In England, it becomes every day more and more the custom to send young people to travel in foreign countries immediately upon their leaving school, and without sending them to any university. Our young people, it is said, generally return home much improved by their travels. A young man who goes abroad at seventeen or eighteen, and returns home at one and twenty, returns three or four years older than he was when he went abroad; and at that age it is very difficult not to improve a good deal in three or four years. In the course of his travels, he generally acquires some knowledge of one or two foreign languages; a knowledge, however, which is seldom sufficient to enable him either to speak or write them with propriety. In other respects he commonly returns home more conceited, more unprincipled, more dissipated, and more incapable of any serious application either to study or to business, than he could well have become in so short a time had he lived at home. By travelling so very young, by spending in the most frivolous dissipation the most precious years of his life, at a distance from the inspection and control of his parents and relations, every useful habit, which the earlier parts of his education might have had some tendency to form in him, instead of being rivetted and confirmed, is almost necessarily either weakened or defaced. Nothing but the discredit

discredit into which the universities are allowing themselves to fall, could ever have brought into repute so very absurd a practice as that of traveling at this early period of life. By sending his son abroad, a father delivers himself, at least for some time, from so disagreeable an object as that of a son unemployed, neglected, and going to ruin before his eyes.

Such have been the effects of some of the modern institutions for education.

A. SMITH.

PHYSIOGNOMY.

THE physiognomy, or countenance, is formed by a simple display of the traces already sketched out by nature: but besides this natural display of the features, they are insensibly fashioned into physiognomy by the frequent impression of certain affections of the mind. That these affections are impressed on the visage, is beyond doubt; and that such impressions, by frequent repetition, must necessarily become durable. Hence it is that a man's character may frequently be discovered in his face, without having recourse to mysterious explications, which suppose a knowledge we are not endowed with.—In the countenance of a child there are only two affections which are strongly impressed, *i. e.* joy and grief: he laughs

or he cries: the intermediate affections are nothing. He passes incessantly from one emotion to another; and this continual change prevents any permanent impression which might form a physiognomy: but at an age when, becoming more sensible, he is more powerfully and frequently affected, the impressions are too deep to be easily effaced; and from the habitual state of the mind results a certain arrangement of features, which in time becomes unalterable. Nevertheless, the physiognomy does sometimes change at different ages: but whenever this happens, it may be remarked, that there is a change also of the habitual passions.

ROUSSEAU.

THE LOVE OF PLEASURE AND THE LOVE OF ACTION, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN NATURE.

THERE are two natural propensities, which we may distinguish in the most virtuous and liberal dispositions, the love of pleasure and the love of action. If the former is refined by art and learning, improved by the charms of social intercourse, and corrected by a just regard to oeconomy, to health, and to reputation, it is productive of the greatest part of the happiness of private life. The love of action is a principle of a much stronger and more doubtful nature. It often leads to
anger,

anger, to ambition, and to revenge: but when it is guided by the sense of propriety and benevolence, it becomes the parent of every virtue; and if those virtues are accompanied with equal abilities, a family, a state, or an empire, may be indebted for their safety and prosperity to the undaunted courage of a single man. To the love of pleasure we may therefore ascribe most of the agreeable, to the love of action we may attribute most of the useful and respectable qualifications. The character in which both the one and the other should be united and harmonized, would seem to constitute the most perfect idea of human nature. The insensible and inactive disposition, which should be supposed alike destitute of both, would be rejected by the common consent of mankind, as utterly incapable of procuring any happiness to the individual, or any public benefit to the world. GIBBON.

PLEASURES AND PAINS, VALUE OF THEIR KINDS.

PLEASURES and pains are interesting perceptions; and as such either *simple* or *complex*.

The several simple pleasures of which human nature is susceptible, seem to be as follows:

1. The pleasures of sense.
2. The pleasures of wealth.
3. The pleasures of skill.
4. The pleasures

fures of amity. 5. The pleasures of a good name. 6. The pleasures of power. 7. The pleasures of piety. 8. The pleasures of benevolence. 9. The pleasures of malevolence. 10. The pleasures of memory. 11. The pleasures of the imagination. 12. The pleasures of expectation. 13. The pleasures dependent on association. 14. The pleasures of relief.

The several simple pains seem to be as follows:

1. The pains of privation. 2. The pains of the senses. 3. The pains of awkwardness. 4. The pains of enmity. 5. The pains of an ill name. 6. The pains of piety. 7. The pains of benevolence. 8. The pains of malevolence. 9. The pains of the memory. 10. The pains of the imagination. 11. The pains of expectation.

1. The pleasures of sense seem to be as follows: 1. The pleasures of the taste or palate; including whatever pleasures are experienced in satisfying the appetites of hunger and thirst. 2. The pleasures of the organ of smelling. 3. The pleasures of the touch. 4. The simple pleasures of the ear, independent of association. 5. The simple pleasures of the eye, independent of association. 6. The pleasure of the venereal sense. 7. The pleasure of health; or the internal pleasurable feeling or flow of spirits (as it is called) which accompanies a state of full health and vigour; especially at times of moderate bodily exertion.

ertion. 8. The pleasures of novelty; or the pleasures derived from the gratification of the appetite of curiosity, by the application of new objects to any of the senses.

2. By the pleasures of wealth may be meant those pleasures which a man is apt to derive from the consciousness of possessing any article or articles which stand in the list of instruments of enjoyment or security, and more particularly at the time of his first acquiring them; at which time the pleasure may be styled a pleasure of gain or a pleasure of acquisition; at other times a pleasure of possession.

3. The pleasures of skill, as exercised upon particular objects, are those which accompany the application of such particular instruments of enjoyment to their uses, as cannot be so applied without a greater or less share of difficulty or exertion.

4. The pleasures of amity, or self-recommendation, are the pleasures that may accompany the persuasion of a man's being in the acquisition or the possession of the good-will of such or such assignable person or persons in particular; or, as the phrase is, of being upon good terms with him or them; and, as a fruit of it, of his being in a way to have the benefit of their spontaneous and gratuitous services.

5. The pleasures of a good name are the pleasures

asures that accompany the persuasion of a man's being in the acquisition or the possession of the good-will of the world about him; that is, of such members of society as he is likely to have concerns with; and as a means of it, either their love or their esteem, or both; and as a fruit of it, of his being in the way to have the benefit of their spontaneous and gratuitous services. These may likewise be called the pleasures of good repute, the pleasures of honour, or the pleasures of the moral sanction.

6. The pleasures of power are the pleasures that accompany the persuasion of a man's being in a condition to dispose people, by means of their hopes and fears, to give him the benefit of their services; that is, by the hope of some service, or by the fear of some disservice, that he may be in the way to render them.

7. The pleasures of piety are the pleasures that accompany the belief of a man's being in the acquisition or in possession of the good-will or favour of the Supreme Being; and, as a fruit of it, of his being in a way of enjoying pleasures to be received by God's especial appointment, either in this life or in a life to come. These may also be called the pleasures of religion, the pleasures of a religious disposition, or the pleasures of the religious sanction.

8. The pleasures of benevolence are the pleasures

tures resulting from the view of any pleasures supposed to be possessed by the beings who may be the objects of benevolence; to wit, the sensitive beings we are acquainted with; under which are commonly included, 1. The Supreme Being. 2. Human beings. 3. Other animals. These may also be called the pleasures of good-will, the pleasures of sympathy, or the pleasures of the benevolent or social affections.

9. The pleasures of malevolence are the pleasures resulting from the view of any pain supposed to be suffered by the beings who may become the objects of malevolence; to wit, 1. Human beings. 2. Other animals. These may also be styled the pleasures of ill-will, the pleasures of the irascible appetite, the pleasures of antipathy, or the pleasures of the malevolent or dissocial affections.

10. The pleasures of the memory are the pleasures which, after having enjoyed such and such pleasures, or even in some case after having suffered such and such pains, a man will now and then experience, at recollecting them exactly in the order and in the circumstances in which they were actually enjoyed or suffered. These derivative pleasures may of course be distinguished into as many species as there are of original perceptions, from whence they may be copied. They may also be styled pleasures of simple recollection.

11. The

11. The pleasures of the imagination are the pleasures which may be derived from the contemplation of any such pleasures as may happen to be suggested by the memory, but in a different order, and accompanied by different groups of circumstances. These may accordingly be referred to any one of the three cardinal points of time, present, past, or future. It is evident they may admit of as many distinctions as those of the former class.

12. The pleasures of expectation are the pleasures that result from the contemplation of any sort of pleasure, referred to time future, and accompanied with the sentiment of belief. These also may admit of the same distinctions.

13. The pleasures of association are the pleasures which certain objects or incidents may happen to afford, not of themselves, but merely in virtue of some association they have contracted in the mind with certain objects or incidents which are in themselves pleasurable. Such is the case, for instance, with the pleasure of skill, when afforded by such a set of incidents as compose a game of chess. This derives its pleasurable quality from its association partly with the pleasures of skill, as exercised in the production of incidents pleasurable of themselves; partly from its association with the pleasures of power. Such is the case also with the pleasure of good luck, when

afforded by such incidents as compose the game of hazard, or any other game of chance, when played at for nothing. This derives its pleasurable quality from its association with one of the pleasures of wealth; to wit, with the pleasure of acquiring it.

14. Farther on, we shall see pains grounded upon pleasures; in like manner may we now see pleasures grounded upon pains. To the catalogue of pleasures may accordingly be added the pleasures of relief; or the pleasures which a man experiences when, after he has been enduring a pain of any kind for a certain time, it comes to cease or to abate. These may of course be distinguished into as many species as there are of pains; and may give rise to so many pleasures of memory, of imagination, and of expectation.

1. PAINS of privation are the pains that may result from the thought of not possessing in the time present any of the several kinds of pleasures. Pains of privation may accordingly be resolved into as many kinds as there are of pleasures to which they may correspond, and from the absence whereof they may be derived.

There are three sorts of pains which are only so many modifications of the several pains of privation. When the enjoyment of any particular pleasure happens to be particularly desired, but without any expectation approaching to assurance,

the pain of privation which thereupon results takes a particular name, and is called the pain of *desire*, or of unsatisfied desire. Where the enjoyment happens to have been looked for with a degree of expectation approaching to assurance, and that expectation is made suddenly to cease, it is called a pain of *disappointment*.

A pain of privation takes the name of a pain of regret in two cases: 1. Where it is grounded on the memory of a pleasure, which having been once enjoyed, appears not likely to be enjoyed again. 2. Where it is grounded on the idea of a pleasure which was never actually enjoyed, nor perhaps so much as expected, but which might have been enjoyed (it is supposed) had such or such a contingency happened, which in fact did not happen.

2. The several pains of the senses seem to be as follows: 1. The pains of hunger and thirst; or the disagreeable sensations produced by the want of suitable substances which need at times to be applied to the alimentary canal. 2. The pains of the taste; or the disagreeable sensations produced by the application of various substances to the palate and other superior parts of the same canal. 3. The pains of the organ of smell; or the disagreeable sensations produced by the effluvia of various substances when applied to that organ. 4. The pains of the touch; or the disagreeable

agreeable sensations produced by the application of various substances to the skin. 5. The simple pains of the hearing; or the disagreeable sensations excited in the organ of that sense by various kinds of sounds, independently (as before) of association. 6. The simple pains of the sight; or the disagreeable sensations, if any such there be, that may be excited in the organ of that sense by visible images, independent of the principle of association. 7. The pains resulting from excessive heat or cold, unless these be referable to the touch. 8. The pains of disease; or the acute and uneasy sensations resulting from the several diseases and indispositions to which human nature is liable. 9. The pain of exertion, whether bodily or mental; or the uneasy sensation which is apt to accompany any intense effort, whether of mind or body.

3. The pains of awkwardness are the pains which sometimes result from the unsuccessful endeavour to apply any particular instruments of enjoyment or security to their uses, or from the difficulty a man experiences in applying them.

4. The pains of enmity are the pains that may accompany the persuasion of a man's being obnoxious to the ill-will of such or such an assignable person or persons in particular; or, as the phrase is, of being upon ill terms with him or them; and, in consequence, of being obnoxious

to certain pains of some sort or other, of which he may be the cause.

5. The pains of an ill-name are the pains that accompany the persuasion of a man's being obnoxious, or in a way to be obnoxious to the ill-will of the world about him. These may likewise be called the pains of ill-repute, the pains of dishonour, or the pains of the moral sanction.

6. The pains of piety are the pains that accompany the belief of a man's being obnoxious to the displeasure of the Supreme Being; and in consequence to certain pains to be inflicted by his especial appointment, either in this life or in a life to come. These may also be called the pains of religion, the pains of a religious disposition, or the pains of the religious sanction. When the belief is looked upon as well-grounded, these pains are commonly called religious terrors; when looked upon as ill-grounded, superstitious terrors.

7. The pains of benevolence are the pains resulting from the view of any pains supposed to be endured by other beings. These may also be called the pains of good-will, of sympathy, or the pains of the benevolent or social affections.

8. The pains of malevolence are the pains resulting from the view of any pleasures supposed to be enjoyed by any beings who happen to be the objects of a man's displeasure. These may also be styled the pains of ill-will, of antipathy,

or

or the pains of the malevolent or dissocial affections.

9. The pains of the memory may be grounded on every one of the above kinds, as well of pains of privation as of positive pains. These correspond exactly to the pleasures of the memory.

10. The pains of the imagination may also be grounded on any one of the above kinds, as well of pains of privation as of positive pains: in other respects they correspond exactly to the pleasures of the imagination.

11. The pains of expectation may be grounded on each one of the above kinds, as well of pains of privation as of positive pains. These may be also termed pains of apprehension.

12. The pains of association correspond exactly to the pleasures of association.

Of the above list there are certain pleasures and pains which suppose the existence of some pleasure or pain of some other person, to which the pleasure or pain of the person in question has regard: such pleasures and pains may be termed *extra-regarding*. Others do not suppose any such thing: these may be termed *self-regarding*. The only pleasures and pains of the extra-regarding class are those of benevolence, and those of malevolence: all the rest are self-regarding.

Of all these several sorts of pleasures and pains there is scarce any one which is not liable, on

more accounts than one, to come under the consideration of the law. Is an offence committed? it is the tendency which it has to destroy, in such or such persons, some of these pleasures, or to produce some of these pains, that constitutes the mischief of it, and the ground for punishing it. It is the prospect of some of those pleasures, or of security from some of these pains, that constitutes the motive or temptation; it is the attainment of them that constitutes the profit of the offence. Is the offender to be punished? it can be only by the production of one or more of these pains that the punishment can be inflicted.

It would be a matter not only of curiosity, but of some use, to exhibit a catalogue of the several complex pleasures and pains, analysing them at the same time into the several simple ones of which they are respectively composed. But such a disquisition would take up too much room to be admitted here. A short specimen, however, for the purpose of illustration, can hardly be dispensed with.

The pleasures taken in at the eye and ear are generally very complex. The pleasures of a country scene, for instance, consist commonly, amongst others, of the following pleasures:

I. Pleasures of the senses.

1. The simple pleasures of sight, excited by the perception of agreeable colours and figures, green fields,

fields, waving foliage, glistening water, and the like.

2. The simple pleasures of the ear, excited by the perceptions of the chirping of birds, the murmuring of waters, the rustling of the wind among the trees.

3. The pleasures of the smell, excited by the perceptions of the fragrance of flowers, of new-mown hay, or other vegetable substances in the first stages of fermentation.

4. The agreeable inward sensation, produced by a brisk circulation of the blood, and the ventilation of it in the lungs by a pure air, such as that in the country frequently is in comparison of that which is breathed in town.

II. Pleasures of the imagination produced by association.

1. The idea of the plenty, resulting from the possession of the objects that are in view, and of the happiness arising from it.

2. The idea of the innocence and happiness of the birds, sheep, cattle, dogs, and other gentle or domestic animals.

3. The idea of the constant flow of health, supposed to be enjoyed by all these creatures: a notion which is apt to result from the occasional flow of health enjoyed by the supposed spectator.

4. The idea of gratitude, excited by the contemplation of the all-powerful and beneficent Being,

ing, who is looked up to as the author of these blessings.

These four last are all of them, in some measure at least, pleasures of sympathy.

The depriving a man of this groupe of pleasures is one of the evils apt to result from imprisonment; whether produced by illegal violence, or in the way of punishment by appointment of the laws.

J. BENTHAM.

VALUE OF A LOT OF PLEASURE AND PAIN,

HOW TO BE MEASURED.

PLEASURES, and the avoidance of pains, are the *ends* which the legislator ought to have in view; it behoves him therefore to understand their *value*. Pleasures and pains are the *instruments* he has to work with: it behoves him therefore to understand their force; which is again, in other words, their value.

To a person considered *by himself*, the value of a pleasure or pain considered *by itself*, will be greater or less, according to the four following circumstances:

1. Its *intensity*.
2. Its *duration*.
3. Its *certainly or uncertainty*.
4. Its *proximity or remoteness*.

These

These are the circumstances which are to be considered in estimating a pleasure or a pain considered each of them by itself. But when the value of any pleasure or pain is considered for the purpose of estimating the tendency of any act by which it is produced, there are two other circumstances to be taken into the account: These are,

5. Its *secundity*, or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the *same* kind: that is, pleasures, if it be a pleasure; pains, if it be a pain.

6. Its *purity*, or the chance it has of *not* being followed by sensations of the *opposite* kind: that is, pains, if it be a pleasure; pleasures, if it be a pain.

These two last, however, are in strictness scarcely to be deemed properties of the pleasure or the pain itself; they are not, therefore, in strictness to be taken into the account of the value of that pleasure or that pain. They are in strictness to be deemed properties only of the act, or other event, by which such pleasure or pain has been produced; and accordingly are only to be taken into the account of the tendency of such act or such event.

To a number of persons, with reference to each of whom the value of a pleasure or a pain is considered, it will be greater or less, according to seven circumstances: to wit, the six preceding ones, viz.

1. Its

1. Its *intensity*.
2. Its *duration*.
3. Its *certainty* or *uncertainty*.
4. Its *proximity* or *remoteness*.
5. Its *fecundity*.
6. Its *purity*.

And one other: to wit,

7. Its *extent*; that is, the number of persons to whom it *extends*, or (in other words) who are *affected* by it.

To take an exact account then of the general tendency of any act by which the interests of a community are affected, proceed as follows. Begin with any one person of those whose interests seem most immediately to be affected by it; and take an account,

1. Of the value of each distinguishable *pleasure* which appears to be produced by it in the *first* instance.
2. Of the value of each *pain* which appears to be produced by it in the *first* instance.
3. Of the value of each pleasure which appears to be produced by it *after* the first. This constitutes the *fecundity* of the first *pleasure*, and the *impurity* of the first *pain*.
4. Of the value of each *pain* which appears to be produced by it after the first. This constitutes the *fecundity* of the first *pain*, and the *impurity* of the first *pleasure*.

5. Sum

5. Sum up all the values of all the *pleasures* on one side, and those of all the *pains* on the other. The *balance*, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the *good* tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that *individual* person; if on the side of pain, the *bad* tendency of it upon the whole.

6. Take an account of the *number* of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above process with respect to each. Sum up the numbers expressive of the degrees of *good* tendency which the act has with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is *good* upon the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is *bad* upon the whole. Take the *balance*; which, if on the side of *pleasure*, will give the general *good tendency* of the act, with respect to the total number or *community* of individuals concerned: if on the side of pain, the general *evil tendency* with respect to the same community.

It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial operation. It may, however, be always kept in view; and as near as the process actually pursued on those occasions approaches to it, so near will such process approach to the character of an exact one.

The

The same process is alike applicable to pleasure and pain, in whatever shape they appear, and by whatever denomination they are distinguished: to pleasure, whether it be called *good* (which is properly the cause or instrument of pleasure), or *profit* (which is distant pleasure, or the cause or instrument of distant pleasure), or *convenience*, *advantage*, *benefit*, *emolument*, *happiness*, and so forth; to pain, whether it be called *evil* (which corresponds to *good*), or *mischiefe*, or *inconvenience*, or *disadvantage*, or *loss*, or *unhappiness*, and so forth.

Nor is this a novel and unwarranted, any more than it is a useless, theory. In all this there is nothing but what the practice of mankind, wheresoever they have a clear view of their own interest, is perfectly conformable to. An article of property, an estate in land, for instance, is valuable, on what account? On account of the pleasures of all kinds which it enables a man to produce, and, what comes to the same thing, the pains of all kinds which it enables him to avert. But the value of such an article of property is universally understood to rise or fall according to the length or shortness of the time which a man has in it; the certainty or uncertainty of its coming into possession; and the nearness or remoteness of the time at which, if at all, it is to come into possession. As to the *intensity* of the pleasures which

a man may derive from it, this is never thought of, because it depends upon the use which each particular person may come to make of it; which cannot be estimated till the particular pleasures he may come to derive from it, or the particular pains he may come to exclude by means of it, are brought to view. For the same reason, neither does he think of the *secundity* or *purity* of those pleasures.

J. BENTHAM.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REMOVAL OF PAIN AND POSITIVE PLEASURE.

PAIN and pleasure are simple ideas, incapable of definition. People are not liable to be mistaken in their feelings; but they are frequently wrong in the names they give them, and in their reasonings about them. Many are of opinion, that pain arises necessarily from the removal of some pleasure; as they think pleasure does from the ceasing or diminution of some pain. Pain and pleasure, in their most simple and natural manner of affecting, are each of a positive nature, and by no means necessarily dependent on each other for their existence. The human mind is often, nay for the most part, in a state neither of pain nor pleasure; which may be called a state of indifference. When we are carried from this state

into a state of actual pleasure, it does not appear that we should pass through the medium of any sort of pain. If in such a state of indifference, or ease, or tranquillity, or call it what you please, you were to be suddenly entertained with a concert of music; or suppose some object of a fine shape and bright lively colours to be presented before you; or imagine your smell is gratified with the fragrance of a rose; or if without any previous thirst you were to drink of some pleasant kind of wine; or to taste of some sweet-meat without being hungry; in all the several senses, of hearing, smelling, and tasting, you undoubtedly find a pleasure; yet if inquiry be made into the state of your mind previous to these gratifications, you will hardly say, that they found you in any sort of pain; or having satisfied these several senses with their several pleasures, will you say that any pain has succeeded, though the pleasure is absolutely over? Suppose, on the other hand, a man in the same state of indifference, to receive a violent blow, or to drink of some bitter potion, or to have his ears wounded with some harsh and grating sound: here is no removal of pleasure; and yet here is felt, in every sense which is affected, a pain very distinguishable. It may be said perhaps that the pain in these cases had its rise from the removal of the pleasure which the man enjoyed before, though that pleasure was of so

low a degree as to be perceived only by the removal. But this seems to be a subtilty that is not discoverable in nature. For if, previous to the pain, I do not feel any actual pleasure, I have no reason to judge that any such thing exists; since pleasure is only pleasure as it is felt. The same may be said of pain, and with equal reason. Pleasure and pain are not mere relations, which can exist only as they are contrasted. They are positive pains and pleasures; and depend not on each other. There is nothing to be distinguished in the mind with more clearness than the three states, of indifference, of pleasure, and of pain. Every one of these is to be perceived without any sort of idea of its relation to any thing else. Caius is afflicted with a fit of the colic; this man is actually in pain; stretch Caius upon the rack, he will feel a much greater pain; but does this pain of the rack arise from the removal of any pleasure? or is the fit of the colic a pleasure or a pain just as we are pleased to consider it?

We shall carry this proposition yet a step further, that pain and pleasure are not necessarily dependent for their existence on their mutual diminution or removal, but that, in reality, the diminution or ceasing of pleasure does not operate like positive pain; and that the removal or diminution of pain, in its effect, has very little resemblance to positive pleasure. The former of these

propositions may probably be allowed more readily than the latter; because it is very evident that pleasure, when it has run its career, sets us down very nearly where it found us. Pleasure of every kind quickly satisfies; and when it is over, we relapse into indifference, or rather we fall into a soft tranquillity, which is tinged with the agreeable colour of the former sensation. At the first view indeed it is not so apparent, that the removal of a great pain does not resemble positive pleasure; but let us recollect in what state we have found our minds upon escaping some imminent danger, or on being released from the severity of some cruel pain. We have on such occasions found the temper of our minds in a tenor very remote from that which the presence of positive pleasure induces; we have found them in a state of great sobriety, impressed with a sense of awe; in short, of tranquillity shadowed with horror. The fashion of the countenance and the gesture of the body on such occasions is so correspondent to this state of mind, that any person, a stranger to the cause of the appearance, would rather judge us under the same consternation, than in the enjoyment of any thing like positive pleasure.

As when a wretch, who conscious of his crime,
Pursued for murder from his native clime,
Just gains some frontier, breathless, pale, amaz'd;
All gaze, all wonder!

This

This striking appearance of the man whom Homer supposes to have just escaped an imminent danger, the sort of mixed passion, of terror, and surprise, with which he affects the spectators, paints very strongly the manner in which we find ourselves affected upon occasions any way similar. For when we have suffered from any violent emotion, the mind naturally continues in something like the same condition, after the cause which first produced it has ceased to operate. The tossing of the sea remains after the storm; and when this remain of horror has entirely subsided, all the passion which the accident raised subsides along with it; and the mind returns to its usual state of indifference. In short, pleasure that is any thing either in the inward sensation or outward appearance, like pleasure from a positive cause, has never its origin from the removal of pain or danger.

But shall we therefore say, that the removal of pain or its diminution is always simply painful? or affirm, that the cessation or the lessening of pleasure is always attended itself with a pleasure? By no means. There are pleasures and pains of a positive and independent nature; and, secondly, the feeling which results from the ceasing or diminution of pain does not bear a sufficient resemblance to positive pleasure, to have it considered as of the same nature, or intitle it to be known

by the same name; and, thirdly, upon the same principle, the removal or qualification of pleasure has no resemblance to positive pain. It is certain that the former feeling (the removal or moderation of pain) has something in it far from distressing or disagreeable in its nature. This feeling, in many cases so agreeable, but in all so different from positive pleasure, has no name which I know; but that hinders not its being a very real one, and very different from all others. It is most certain, that every species of satisfaction or pleasure, how different soever in its manner of affecting, is of a positive nature in the mind of him who feels it. The affection is undoubtedly positive; but the cause may be, and in this case it certainly is, a sort of *privation*.

BURKE.

PLEASURE AND PAIN.

Good and evil are common to every thing, and affect us only in different proportions. The most happy are those who feel the least of pain; the most miserable those who experience the least of pleasure. Every one suffers more from the former than he enjoys of the latter, and this disproportion is common to all mankind. The happiness of man, in his present state, is merely negative, and must be estimated by the least quantity

tity of his sufferings.—Every sense of pain is inseparable from the desire of being freed from it; every idea of pleasure is alike inseparable from the desire of enjoying it: now every desire supposes the privation or absence of the object desired; and this circumstance is always in some degree painful: In the disproportion, therefore, between our desires and our abilities consists our misery. A susceptible being, whose abilities should be equal to its desires, would be positively happy—In what then consists human wisdom, or the means of acquiring happiness? To diminish our desires is certainly not the method; for if these were less than our abilities, part of our faculties would remain useless and inactive, and we should enjoy but half our being. Nor is it, on the other hand, to extend our natural capacity for enjoyment; for if our desires, at the same time, be extended in a greater proportion, we should only become thereby the more miserable. It must consist, therefore, in lessening the disproportion between our abilities and our desires, and in reducing our inclinations and our powers to a perfect equilibrium. It is in such a situation, and in that only, that all our faculties may be employed, and yet the mind preserve its tranquillity, and the body its due regularity and ease.

ROUSSEAU.

P O.

POLITENESS.

AMONG the arts of conversation, no one pleases more than mutual deference or civility; which leads us to resign our own inclinations to those of our companion, and to curb and conceal that presumption and arrogance so natural to the human mind. To correct such gross vices as lead us to commit real injuries on others, is the part of morals, and the object of the most ordinary education. Where that is not attended to in some degree, no human society can subsist. But in order to render conversation and the intercourse of minds more easy and agreeable, good manners have been invented, and have carried the matter somewhat further. Wherever nature has given the mind a propensity to any vice, or to any passion disagreeable to others, refined breeding has taught men to throw the bias on the opposite side, and to preserve in all their behaviour the appearance of sentiments different from those to which they naturally incline. Thus, as we are commonly proud and selfish, and apt to assume the preference above others, a polite man learns to behave with deference towards his companions, and to yield the superiority to them in all the common incidents of society. In like manner, wherever a person's situation may naturally beget any
dis-

disagreeable suspicion in him, it is the part of good-manners to prevent it, by a studied display of sentiments directly contrary to those of which he is apt to be jealous. Thus old men know their infirmities, and naturally dread contempt from youth: hence well-educated youth redouble the instances of respect and deference to their elders. Strangers and foreigners are without protection: hence, in all polite countries, they receive the highest civilities, and are intitled to the first place in every company. A man is lord in his own family; and his guests are, in a manner, subject to his authority: hence he is always the lowest person in the company; attentive to the wants of every one; and giving himself all the trouble, in order to please, which may not betray too visible an affectation, or impose too much restraint on his guests.

HUME.

POLYGAMY.

WITH regard to polygamy in general, independently of the circumstances which may render it tolerable, it is not of the least service to mankind, nor to either of the two sexes, whether it be that which abuses, or that which is abused. Neither is it of service to the children; for one of its greatest inconveniences is, that the father and
mother

mother cannot have the same affection for their offspring; a father cannot love twenty children with the same tenderness as a mother can love two. It is much worse when a wife has many husbands; for then paternal love is only held by this opinion, that a father may believe that certain children belong to him.

They say, that the emperor of Morocco has women of all colours, white, black, and tawny, in his seraglio. But the wretch has scarce need of a single colour. Besides, the possession of many wives does not always prevent their entertaining desires for those of others; which is the reason why women in the east are so carefully concealed. It is with lust as with avarice, whose thirst increases by the acquisition of treasure.

In the reign of Justinian, many of the philosophers, displeased with the constraint of Christianity, retired into Persia. What struck them the most, says Agathias, was, that polygamy was permitted amongst men, who did not even abstain from adultery.

Does not a plurality of wives lead to that passion which nature disallows? for one depravation always draws on another. It is said, that in the revolution which happened at Constantinople, when Sultan Achmet was deposed, that the people having plundered the kiaya's house, they found

not

not a single woman. They tell us, that at Algiers, in the greatest part of their seraglios, they have none at all.

MONTESQUIEU.

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in the second part of their journey they
found a hill.

Montesquieu.



END OF THE SECOND VOLUME

